

British Documents on the Spanish Moroccan War in Melilla (1892-1894) Part I

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In a recent interview, the Spanish historian Francisco Manuel Pastor Garrigues qualified the 1893 Melilla War, also known by the “War of Margallo”, (or War Chica) as “more decisive than that of Cuba and the Philippines”.⁽¹⁾ Yet, this episode, which is part of a sensitive and a longstanding issue in the relationship between Morocco and Spain, concerning the presidios borders in Ceuta and Melilla, has not been sufficiently investigated by the first Spanish historians during the colonial period. Indeed, they only devoted to it few pages of their published works on the general history of Morocco.⁽²⁾ Furthermore, these few pages were mostly based on secondary sources.

After the Moroccan independence and during the 70s and 80s of the last century, the works of both Moroccan and foreign scholars, have focused much more on studying the Rif war led by Mohammed Ben Abdelkerim El Khattabi, while the issue of Presidios has received a very limited attention.⁽³⁾

However, from the 90s up to the present time, Moroccan and European scholars from different disciplines have produced many studies on Ceuta and Melilla borders.⁽⁴⁾ This concern is, partially, due to the constant influx of sub-

(1) <http://www.diariodecadiz.es/articulo/entrevistas/1239760/la/guerra/melilla/fue/mas/decisiva/cuba/y/filipinas.html>

(2) Jeronimo Becker. *España y Marruecos. Sus relaciones diplomáticas durante el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Tip de Raoul Péant, 1903); *Historia de Marruecos* (Madrid: Edit. Rubiñoz, 1815): 381-403; Manuel P. Castellanos, *Historia de Marruecos* (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1946): 681-688; Tomás García Figueras, *Marruecos (la acción de España en el Norte de África)*, (Tetuan: cuarta edición, 1955): 100-101.

(3) Mustapha Allouh has listed 1397 items relating to the Rif issues, including books and articles in different disciplines. *Le Rif face aux visées coloniales: 1921-1927*, bibliographies - 3 Bibliographie réunie et préparée par Mustapha Allouh, Fondation du Roi Abdulaziz, Casablanca. http://www.fondation.org.ma/Pdf/Rif_lat.pdf; Manuel Torres Campos, “La question de Melilla et la politique internationale d’Espagne”, *Revue de Droit International et de législation comparée*, t.XXVI (1894):229-253; Robert Rezette. *Les enclaves espagnoles au Maroc* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1976); Mohamed Lamouri. *Le contentieux relatif aux frontières du Maroc*, (s.n., 1979); Rachid Lazrak, *Le contentieux territorial entre le Maroc et l’Espagne* (Casablanca: Dār-al-Kitāb, 1974).

(4) Ángel Manuel Ballesteros. *Estudio diplomático sobre Ceuta y Melilla*, (Córdoba (Argentina), M. Lerner Editora, 1989); José Ramón Remacha Tejada, “Las fronteras de Ceuta y Melilla”, *Anuario español de derecho internacional*, 10 (1994): 195-238; Henk Driesen. *On the Spanish Moroccan Frontier. A Study in Ritual, Power and Ethnicity*, (Oxford: Berg, 1992); Maria Rosa de Madariaga, *España y el Rif. Crónica de una historia casi olvidada*. (Melilla: Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla / UNED- Centro Asociado de Melilla, 1999).

Saharan migrants through boundaries of Ceuta and Melilla, which territories are considered as being part of Schengen Area.⁽⁵⁾

Most of these aforementioned studies dealing with Melilla alluded briefly to the Margallo War. But, even scholars, especially Spanish, who produced whole studies on this conflict, limited themselves to the use of Spanish and French archives as primary sources.⁽⁶⁾

Therefore, this paper aims at publishing the first part of a sample of documents from the British archives related to the conflict occurred in Melilla between neighboring Riffian tribes and Spanish forces in 1893, a documents which were rarely used till now. These 132 documents consist of diplomatic correspondences including dispatches, telegrams, consular reports, inter alia which were exchanged during the event between members of the European diplomatic corps in office in major European capitals and in Tangier. These samples of documents also reflect different aspects of the military policy followed by the Spanish government during the era of Restoration, and of the general situation in Morocco during the end of XIX century.

After the frontier crisis about Melilla in 1859, which was solved thanks to the British mediation by the signature of a bilateral agreement between Morocco and Spain in the 24th of August 1859,⁽⁷⁾ and after more than thirty

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- (5) The most recent study about Melilla relating to this subject was published by Miguel Ángel Acosta-Sánchez, Associate Professor (credited PTU) in Public International Law and Relations International University of Cadiz, under the following title: “Las Fronteras Land of Spain in Melilla: Delimitación, Vallas Fronterizas Y “Tierra De Nadie” or “Spanish’s Land Borders in Melilla: Definition, Border Fences And “No Man’s Land”, in [28] *Revista Electrónica De Estudios Internacionales* (2014), 34p. The author explores with precision the stages which the evolution of boundaries had experienced throughout the second half of nineteenth century, based on maps and plans of Melilla, which have undergone constant changes for the years 1859, 1860, 1861, 1863 and 1894 and thus recognizes the complexity of the situation, even for the present time.
- (6) Augustin Ramon Rodríguez González, “El conflicto de Melilla en 1893” *Hispania* 171 (1989): 235-266; Adolfo llanos Alcaraz, *La campaña de Melilla de 1893-1894* (Málaga: Algazara, 1994), 356; M. del C. y González Velilla y Pacios González-Loureiro, M^a B, “La crisis de Melilla de 1893-1894”, Fusi, J.P. y Niño, A (eds.): *Antes del ‘desastre’: Orígenes y antecedentes de la crisis del 98* (Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1996): 323-336; “Cristóbal Robles Muñoz, Guerra de Melilla y reajustes en Europa (1893-1894)”, *Hispania*, Vol. 59, 203 (1999): 1033-1061; Josep Pich I Mitjana *Francesc pi y margall y la crisis de Melilla 1893-1894* (Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2008): 505; Augustin Ramon Rodriguez Gonzalez, *La Guerra de Melilla en 1893* (Madrid: Almena, 2008): 191.
- (7) Khalid Ben-Srhir, “Prelude to the Tetouan War (1859): Part I: Correspondence respecting the Spanish Moroccan conflict about Melilla Frontier”, *Hespéris-Tamuda* XLVI (2011): 89-171; see 163-170, for the full text in Arabic, Spanish and French of this Convention between Morocco and Spain extending the Limits of Melilla etc., signed at Tetuan, August 24, 1859. The first article of this Convention was as follow: “Art. 1- S.M. el Rey de Marruecos, deseando dar a S.M. Católica una señalada muestra de los buenos deseos que le animan, y queriendo contribuir en lo que de él dependa al resguardo y seguridad de las plazas españolas de la costa de Africa, conviene en ceder a S.M. Católica en pleno dominio y soberanía el territorio próximo a la plaza española de Melilla hasta los puntos más adecuados para la defensa y tranquilidad de aquel presidio”.

years following the Tetuan war (1859-1860),⁽⁸⁾ Melilla and its surroundings will be the theater of military confrontations between Moroccan tribes dwelling in the Rif region close to the Spanish colony in 1893.

After the Tetuan War, Spain obtained from the Makhzen written guarantees for an urgent demarcation of new boundaries for Melilla, in accordance with the second article from the August 1859 agreement signed at Tetuan stipulating the cession for Spain a neutral ground in the form of half circle whose circumference and extensions will be fixed on the basis of the reach of a cannon shot derived from a piece of 24 old model.⁽⁹⁾

Apparently, the implementation of this clause had actually taken place during the following years,⁽¹⁰⁾ but some difficulties had always existed, since the neighboring tribes of the Rif were able to acquire some pieces of artillery purchased from smugglers in Gibraltar, (see below document 19, 25 and 31), and continued to endanger from time to time the safety of the inhabitants of Melilla. Here is a very revealing picture of the situation in the early years from the reign of Sultan Moulay El Hassan (1873-1894):

“(...) Melilla est continuellement en guerre avec les Riffains qui entourent sans -cesse la ville, au centre de laquelle un clocher est élevé où un soldat veille sans cesse. Chaque fois que l’ennemi se donne le loisir d’envoyer quelques boulets dans la place l’observateur, qui a pu voir l’artillerie se préparer à mettre le feu à sa pièce, sonne une cloche et les habitants qui se trouvent à découvert ont le temps de se soustraire au danger(...)”.⁽¹¹⁾

Furthermore, the content of a dispatch sent from Bonham, the British Ambassador in Madrid, to the Earl of Roserbery, Head of the Foreign Office, gives us some brief but very important details about the progressive introduction of the Spanish sovereignty in this neutral zone between 1861 and 90s of the XIX century before the outbreak of the conflict in 1893:

“(...) By the Treaty of 1861, at the termination of the war with Morocco, it was agreed that a certain district round Melilla should remain under Spanish jurisdiction for the greater security of the fortress and garrison. This district was to be a semi-circle with Melilla, situated on the coast, for its centre; the radius to be determined by a cannon-shot from the artillery then in use. In

(8) Khalid Ben-Srhir, “Prelude to the Tetuan War (1859): Part II Correspondence respecting the Spanish Moroccan conflict about Ceuta Frontier”, *Hespèris-Tamuda* XLVIII, (2013): 145-313.

(9) Miguel Ángel Acosta-Sánchez, reproduced two important maps relating to the neutral zone and to the limits of Melilla, (see figuras 2 & 3, p. 11, 15) in “Las Fronteras Land of Spain in Melilla: Delimitación, Vallas Fronterizas Y “Tierra De Nadie”. “ There is also a reproduction of the cannon used for the boundary demarcation.

(10) see footnote 5 above.

(11) Pierre Larousse, *Grand dictionnaire universelle du XIX^e siècle*, (Paris: 1873) vol. 10, 1470.

1862 a Commission, consisting of two Moorish Delegates and two Spaniards fixed the limit, the projectile falling in the bed of a stream at a distance of 2,900 metres from the fort, close to a village named Farjana; the arc of the semi-circle was then continued at a distance of about 3,000 metres, following the inequalities of the ground, till it touched the Mediterranean to the north at Rostogordo, to the south at a place subsequently named Casa Blanca.

From 1862 till 1870 the Spaniards did not assert their sovereignty in this territory, containing an area of about 1,500 hectares, so that their jurisdiction was only nominal. In 1870 the decision was made to divert the course of the stream, in order to drain an unhealthy marsh close to the fort. This, however, was not done without a series of skirmishes and small engagements, which necessitated the sending of a considerable force, acting in concert with troops sent by the Sultan of Morocco.

On the outbreak of the Carlist war in 1870, it was found necessary to withdraw nearly all the troops, and from that time till 1884 the reduced garrison of Melilla seems to have led a precarious existence, being constantly harassed by the Moorish tribes.

In 1884 the Government determined to carry out the plan of defence which had been sketched out as long ago as 1864, constructing the first of a series of detached Forts -San Lorenzo. About the same time they granted a Concession of the land to the North African Society. Since that time the Spaniards claim that a real and effective sovereignty has always been exercised over that territory (...)⁽¹²⁾

Though the Melilla war was a military conflict limited in time and space, it seems that it was the most serious incident which Spain and Morocco faced in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It is also true, that this event is much known in its broad outlines by historians. However, the exploitation of the following first part of British documents emanating from various chancelleries of Europe - at an era where colonial rivalry between European Superpowers was still very rampant about Morocco⁽¹³⁾ - together with the content of other Moroccan archives, especially the correspondence of Mohammed Torres, the Sultan's representative in Tangier, preserved at the General Library in Tetuan, could shed new lights from different angles on the ways of taking major decisions, from the outside of Makhzen circles, which

(12) See Document 15, Confidential 6448, n° 82, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 4, 1893.

(13) Khalid Ben-Srhir, "Rivalités européennes au Maroc précolonial (1844-1890): intrigues, compromis, résistances, enjeux politiques et économiques", *The Maghreb Review*, 39, n° 3, (2014): 266-291.

made the course of events related to this episode so critical in the Relationships between Morocco and Spain during the pre-colonial period.

Document 1:⁽¹⁴⁾*Telegram in "Imparcial". Petition of the Rif tribes against the construction of a Spanish Fort at Sidi Ouriach, as they think it interferes with their mosque and cemetery.*

The "Imparcial" contains a telegram from Melilla, dated yesterday, at 5'30 P.M., stating that the Pashas of Frapana [Farkhana], Benizicar, and Mazuga, with a large suite, have had a conference with General Margallo.

The object of the meeting was to attempt to dissuade the Spanish authorities from pursuing the construction of the Spanish fort of Sidi Zueriach [Sidi Ouriach], which would, the Moors think, interfere with the Kabyle Cemetery.

The tone of the Moors was that of a friendly appeal to the goodwill of the Spaniards.

General Margallo replied that he would submit to the Spanish Government the Petition of the Kabyles, but warned them against taking any course but that of request, under the penalty of severe punishment.

The writer goes on to say that the site chosen for the fort is declared by technical opinion the only one possessing the necessary strategical conditions, and that it cannot be altered, but he thinks that, if persisted in, a rupture will take place between the garrison and the neighbourhood.

Document 2:⁽¹⁵⁾*works are proceeding at Fort Sidi Ouriach. General Margallo has told the tribes he cannot entertain petition. Disturbances are feared.*

With reference to my despatch n^o.180 of the 3rd July, the "Imparcial" announces that the works at the fort of Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach], are proceeding. General Margallo has informed the Pashas of the Kabyles that he cannot entertain Petitions on the subject, which can only be discussed between the Governments of Morocco and Spain.

Meanwhile, he threatens signal punishment ("terrible castigo") to any Moors who attempt to interrupt the work.

(14) Confidential 6448, n^o 1, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (n^o. 180), Madrid, July 3, 1893.

(15) Confidential 6448, n^o 5, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (n^o. 182), Madrid, July 4, 1893.

The Kabyles are reported as much agitated, and disturbances are feared.

Document 3:⁽¹⁶⁾ *Rumoured collision between Moroccan Riffians and Spaniards at Melilla. The Spanish Minister says that shots have been fired, but he attaches little importance to the incident.*

I received on 6th instant a telegram from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid, inquiring as to the truth of a report which had appeared in a Madrid newspaper regarding a collision which had occurred between the Moors and Spaniards at Melilla on account of a fort which the later were building there.

I took an early opportunity of speaking to the Spanish Minister on the subject. He informed me that there had been a collision, and shots had been fired; but he had no further information except that the fort was not the cause. The Marquis Potestad -who is inclined to regard all Moorish questions in a somewhat light and airy way- did not attach much importance to the incident. He said that these collisions were constantly occurring, and referred to some similar trouble at Ceuta.

I also inquired from the Moorish Commissioner for Foreign Affairs; but he knew absolutely nothing regarding the matter.

Document 4:⁽¹⁷⁾ *The Spanish Minister left in a Spanish ship to visit the occupied "presidios" on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast.*

As prognosticated in your Lordship's despatch n^o. 87 of the 26th ultimo, the Marquis de Potestad-Fornari, Spanish Minister in Morocco, left Tangier this afternoon on his visit to the Spanish "presidios" on the Mediterranean coast in a Spanish despatch-vessel.

Document 5:⁽¹⁸⁾ *The return of the Spanish Minister from visiting Ceuta and Melilla. Description of relations between Spanish and Moroccan officials as satisfactory.*

With reference to my telegram n^o.44 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that the Spanish Minister returned on the 18th instant in the gun-boat "Isla do Luzon" from his trip to the Spanish "Presidios."

In his Circular to the foreign Representatives announcing his departure the Marquis de Potestad had stated that he was about to visit "the Spanish possessions on the northern coast of Morocco;" his trip was, however,

(16) Confidential 6448, n^o 17, Sir West Ridgeway to the Earl of Rosebery, (n^o. 111), Tangier, July 10, 1893.

(17) Confidential 6448, n^o 43, (Telegraphic) P, Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery, Tangier, August 15, 1893.

(18) Confidential 6448, n^o 133, Mr. White to the Earl of Rosebery, Tangier, August 20, 1893.

confined to visits to Ceuta and Melilla, and was of shorter duration than had been anticipated.

The Marquis de Potestad has informed me that the object of this tour was merely to see the places in question, and to make the personal acquaintance of the officers in command there, and he expressed himself as being well pleased with his trip. He found the relations between Spanish and Moorish officials at both places very satisfactory, and was informed by the Commandant at Melilla that the various incidents which had lately occupied the Spanish press had been much exaggerated.

The Spanish Minister also mentioned that there had been some talk of the Sultan's establishing a custom-house on the Moorish lines at Ceuta, but that up to the present time no proposition to that effect had been made by either Government.

Document 6:⁽¹⁹⁾ *Moroccan tribes from the Rif attacked the Spanish garrison at Melilla. Some Spaniards were killed. Reinforcement ordered.*

On the 2nd instant the Kabyles attacked the Spanish garrison at Melilla, and several Spaniards were killed. The Government have ordered reinforcements to the scene of action. I am sending a report by post.

Document 7:⁽²⁰⁾ *Señor Moret asks Lord Rosebery for his opinion about the way the Spanish Government should pursue. He will take no definite step without full agreement with the British Government.*

At an interview which I have just had with Señor Moret, his Excellency asked me to inquire of your Lordship by telegraph what course in your opinion would be pursued by the Spanish Government at the present juncture; whether war should be declared against the Sultan, which might lead to European complications, or whether they should confine themselves to punishing the Moors at Melilla, as at present.

His Excellency further asked me to say that, without full agreement with your Lordship, he would not commit himself to any definite policy.

Document 8:⁽²¹⁾ *Tribes from the Rif attacked the Spanish garrison at Melilla. Some Spaniards were killed. Reinforcement ordered.*

(19) Confidential 6448, n° 64, (Telegraphic) P, Sir Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 4, 1893.

(20) Confidential 6448, n° 65, (Telegraphic) P, Sir Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 4, 1893.

(21) Confidential 6448, 71, (Telegraphic) P, Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery, Malaga, October 4, 1893, 10'55 A.M.

Fighting Melilla. Troops sent from here.

Document 9:⁽²²⁾ *Tribes from the Rif attacked Spanish garrison at Melilla. Some Spaniards were killed. Reinforcement ordered.*

On the 22nd ultimo a considerable body of Riffians attacked Melilla, but were driven back by the Spanish troops. Sixteen men were killed on the Spanish side, and thirty three men wounded, whilst three men were reported as missing.

I am addressing your Lordship a despatch on this subject.

Document 10:⁽²³⁾ *the Spanish action should be restricted to securing local punishment of Moroccan Riffians concerned.*

YOUR telegram n° 65 of yesterday.

I feel grateful to Señor Moret for affording me this proof of his personal confidence, and have no hesitation in urging on the Spanish Government the advisability of restricting their action to securing the local punishment of the Moors concerned in the attack at Melilla.

Document 11:⁽²⁴⁾ *Accounting for the encounter at Melilla between the Riffian and the Spanish militaries. Reinforcements to be sent from Malaga to the scene of conflict.*

With reference to Sir Henry Drummond Wolff's despatches n^{os}. 180 and 182 of the 3rd and 4th July respectively, in which his Excellency called attention to the opposition, raised by tribes occupying the districts of Morocco contiguous to the Spanish fortress of Melilla, to the construction of an outpost fort named Sidi Gueriach [Sidi Ouriach], I have the honour to report that, according to telegrams published in this morning's papers, a conflict took place yesterday between the tribes in question, who are designated as Kabyles of the Riff, and the Spanish garrison of Melilla, resulting in the abandonment of the fort in question, with a loss of eighteen killed and thirty three wounded.

The Moors, who, it appears, were in great force, commenced the attack on Sidi Gueriach [Sidi Ouriach] at daybreak. It immediately became evident to General Margallo, who is in command of the Spanish troops, that the small force of forty men, comprising engineers and workmen, would not be able to withstand it. He accordingly occupied a detached fort of Camellas in the immediate neighbourhood, and devoted all his energies to covering the retreat

(22) Confidential 6448, n° 75, (Telegraphic) P, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, Tangier, October 5, 1893.

(23) Confidential 6448, n° 76, The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham, Foreign Office, October 5, 1893.

(24) Confidential 6448, n° 77, Sir G. Bonham to The Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 3, 1893.

of the exposed men. The action appears to have become general and lasted till the evening, when the Spanish force are stated to have successfully beaten off the assailants, who had, however, destroyed the obnoxious fort.

It is further stated that orders have been sent to the Governor-General of Andalusia to send reinforcements of artillery from Malaga.

In commenting on this event, the "Imparcial" calls attention to a similar act of aggression on the part of the Moorish tribes at Philipeville, when the French authorities took prompt repressive action without provoking any protest, and stating that this being an analogous case, sufficient force should be sent to protect the construction of the fort at Gueriach, and expressing the opinion that if it were found necessary to occupy temporarily a part of Moorish territory, no objection would be made on the grounds of its being an infraction of international law.

Document 12:⁽²⁵⁾ *Agreement with Señor Moret' point of view. He fears patriotic feelings may necessitate more vigorous action. His objective is to strengthen the Sultan's position. He allows Mr. Satow to urge steps to prevent any further aggressions.*

Señor Moret desires me to thank your Lordship for the views expressed in your telegram of yesterday's date, which I did not fail immediately to communicate to his Excellency. He says that they are in entire accordance with his own, his wish being to restrict operations to the neighbourhood of Melilla; at the same time, he fears that the patriotic feeling which has been aroused may, in the event of further Spanish losses, make more vigorous action necessary.

The object of the Spanish Government will be to strengthen the position of the Sultan.

He asks that instructions may be sent to the British Representative at Tangier to support the Spanish Minister in urging the Sultan's Government to take measures to prevent further aggressions on the part of the Kabyles.

Document 13:⁽²⁶⁾ *Urging the Makhzen to interfere in order to prevent further hostilities against the Spaniards.*

Melilla incident may develop into a general conflagration of a most serious character. You should therefore support Spanish Minister in urging

(25) Confidential 6448, n° 78, (Telegraphic) P, Sir G. Bonham to The Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 6, 1893.

(26) Confidential 6448, n° 79, (Telegraphic) P, The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow, Foreign Office, October 6, 1893.

Moorish Government to take every possible step in order to induce Moors to refrain from further hostile action against Spaniards.

Document 14:⁽²⁷⁾ *Reporting the above. Pointing out that the hostile actions against the Sultan might give other Powers an excuse for interference, and lead to serious results.*

I have instructed Mr. Satow in accordance with request of Spanish, Government conveyed in your n° 66. You should point out to Señor Moret that any action hostile to the Sultan of Morocco would be likely to afford other Powers an excuse for interference, and might lead to most serious results. Urge that no, such steps be taken, and remind him that the Sultan has little, if any, control over the tribes near Melilla.

Document 15:⁽²⁸⁾ *Circumstances connected with the introduction of the Spanish sovereignty in that region concerned by the recent conflict. The rough sketch map gives positions of the various forts. Strong measures have been urgently taken by the Spanish Government.*

With reference to my despatch n° 254 of yesterday's date, reporting that a conflict had taken place between the Kabyles and the Spanish garrison of Melilla, on the coast of Morocco, it may not be out of place to recapitulate the circumstances connected with the introduction of Spanish sovereignty in that region.

By the Treaty of 1861, at the termination of the war with Morocco, it was agreed that a certain district round Melilla should remain under Spanish jurisdiction for the greater security of the fortress and garrison. This district was to be a semi-circle with Melilla, situated on the coast, for its centre; the radius to be determined by a cannon-shot from the artillery then in use. In 1862 a Commission, consisting of two Moorish Delegates and two Spaniards fixed the limit, the projectile falling in the bed of a stream at a distance of 2,900 metres from the fort, close to a village named Farjana; the arc of the semi-circle was then continued at a distance of about 3,000 metres, following the inequalities of the ground, till it touched the Mediterranean to the north at Rostrogordo, to the south at a place subsequently named Casa Blanca.

From 1862 till 1870 the Spaniards did not assert their sovereignty in this territory, containing an area of about 1,500 hectares, so that their jurisdiction was only nominal. In 1870 the decision was made to divert the course of the stream, in order to drain an unhealthy marsh close to the fort. This, however,

(27) Confidential 6448, n° 80, (Telegraphic) P, The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham, Foreign Office, October 6, 1893.

(28) Confidential 6448, n° 82, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 4, 1893.

was not done without a series of skirmishes and small engagements, which necessitated the sending of a considerable force, acting in concert with troops sent by the Sultan of Morocco.

On the outbreak of the Carlist war in 1870, it was found necessary to withdraw nearly all the troops, and from that time till 1884 the reduced garrison of Melilla seems to have led a precarious existence, being constantly harassed by the Moorish tribes.

In 1884 the Government determined to carry out the plan of defence which had been sketched out as long ago as 1864, constructing the first of a series of detached Forts -San Lorenzo. About the same time they granted a Concession of the land to the North African Society. Since that time the Spaniards claim that a real and effective sovereignty has always been exercised over that territory.

The accompanying rough sketch map will serve to show the position of the various forts which have since been erected, and in order to complete the system of forts for the defence of the valley of Rio Oro, it only remained to construct the fort at Sidi Anariacc [Sidi Ouriach] which has been the cause of the recent conflict. The strategical importance of this fort consists in its effectually securing Melilla from attacks on the part of the Moors, and also from its proximity to the Moorish cemetery, the Village of Farjana, and the spot where the more important fairs are held; it is thus a most convenient point for observing the enemy's movements.

The Kabyles themselves were not slow in perceiving the importance of the situation, having shown their opposition to its construction from the very first.

It is stated that alarming symptoms have for some time manifested themselves among the native tribes in acts of piracy and outrage, which have been unpunished, and it is pointed out that, though, in consequence of representations made at Tangier, an indemnity is sooner or later forthcoming, the real offenders invariably escape.

In these circumstances the Government is being urged on all sides to take strong and decisive measures.

Document 16:⁽²⁹⁾ *Reproting the lordship's instructions to Señor Moret. He will take no action without reference to Lord Rosebery if events prove too strong for him.*

On the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I have spoken earnestly to Señor Moret in the sense of your instructions.

(29) Confidential 6448, n° 83, Sir G. Bonham to The Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 7, 1893.

His Excellency told me that it was his desire “to place himself on the side of the Sultan,” but that he would take no action without reference to your Lordship “if events should prove stronger than” him. He appears to be fully alive to the gravity of the situation.

The Sultan’s absence in the south is, he considers, an advantage, as any action he could take might be less efficacious than the threats which the Moorish Government at Tangier will be enabled to hold out.

Document 17:⁽³⁰⁾*An account for fighting and casualties at Melilla. Reinforcements being sent from Malaga.*

This morning I had the honour of reporting that fighting was going on between the Spanish garrison at Melilla and the Moors.

It appears that on large numbers of the latter having collected round the place in a hostile attitude the Military Governor attacked them, and, as it would appear, not very successfully, for he has asked for reinforcements.

About eighty artillerymen were sent off at once from here, and it is reported that a war vessel is expected in Malaga to convey a battalion of the regiment which is in garrison here and troops which have just arrived from Almeria to Melilla.

The Spanish losses are said to be eight killed and thirty-three wounded; those of the Moors are not known.

Document 18:⁽³¹⁾*The Attitude of the Spanish press are moderate hitherto though they all recommend strong measures.*

The attitude of the press with regard to the state of affairs at Melilla has been, up to the present time, moderate. All the organs of public opinion, it is true, are unanimous in approving the dispatch of troops, and in recommending the adoption of strong measures towards the Moors who have attacked the Spanish forces in Spanish territory; but I have not met with any article advocating such an extreme measure as war with Morocco. Indeed, in one or two the idea is only mentioned as one to be disapproved of.

The “Liberal” has an article in which the following passages occur, which, although mainly historical, are not without interest at the present time:-

“Since the most sad and memorable day in which our troops, victorious at Tetuan and at Wad Ras, were stopped by a note in which Sir A. Buchanan, the English Minister called on our Minister of State to put a stop to our action

(30) Confidential 6448, n° 84, Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery, Malaga, October 4, 1893.

(31) Confidential 6448, n° 85, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 5, 1893.

in Morocco, and threatened us if he did not do so, with War, Spain has not witnessed in that territory a situation as difficult and critical as the present one.”

After describing the attack of the Moors and the gallant defence of the Spanish force in much the same terms as I have already reported them to your Lordship, except that it is stated that the Spaniards Were pursued to the walls of Melilla, the article continues:-

“To remain quiet, to do nothing, to suspend on whatever pretext the works at Guariach, is to fall so deep into the abyss of weakness that we should be looked upon by the Moors as dead, and the whole of Europe, which has seen our soldiers enter Melilla, chased by the frontier hordes, and lighted by the fires of the burning fort, would regard us with pity. That which Sir A. Buchanan did to us in 1858 would be a small matter compared with the pretensions which those who have their eyes on Morocco would now be able to advance to our prejudice.”

Document 19:⁽³²⁾*Troops sent from Malaga to Melilla. Cause of the outbreak. Belief that the English policy prompted it. Seizure of a boat smuggling arms under flying British flag.*

I have the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch n^o.30 of the 4th October, that the first battalion of the Borbon Regiment, consisting of 543 officers and men and 60 volunteers from other regiments, left here yesterday for Melilla amidst great enthusiasm.

The usual garrison at that place being about 1,400; and further reinforcements are to be sent from here and other parts, while the Moors are said to be 14,000 men and other tribes coming in.

Owing to some confusion in the arrangements this battalion was kept ready to start for three days by the steamer “Rabat,” which was in quarantine at Seville.

In the morning a boat arrived from Melilla with thirty-two sick and wounded, bringing also a great number of telegrams which could not be sent direct as the cable had broken down.

The medical arrangements at Melilla also are said to be so defective that Colonel Viana Cardenas paid for a supply of medicines and medicaments out of his private purse and took them with him for the use of his regiment.

The immediate cause of the outbreak is said to be that the Spanish authorities considered it of strategical necessity to erect an advance post

(32) Confidential 6448, n^o 91, Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery, Malaga, October 7, 1893.

overlooking a shrine much frequented by Moorish women; and here it is firmly believed that English policy is at the bottom of the rising, an idea which is confirmed by the reported seizure the other night of a falucho flying the British flag which was trying to smuggle arms on to the Riff coast, whereas little notice is taken of the fact that Moors have been exporting arms from this place and elsewhere for a long time.

Document 20:⁽³³⁾ *Information concerning troops sent to Melilla. No more to be sent at present.*

The Spanish press continues to devote almost its entire space to the dispatch of troops and the smallest incidents connected with Melilla.

It appears that this affair has been sufficient to reveal certain deficiencies in the means of transport, as well as in the Commissariat and Sanitary Departments of the Spanish army. In the prevailing atmosphere of exaggeration it is difficult to arrive at the exact truth, but the following information with respect to troops sent, which has been communicated to the German Military Attaché by the authorities at the War Department, may doubtless be relied on.

Volunteers from various regiment of the Second Corps.....	300
One battalion Rifles of Cuba.....	500
Two battalions Regiment of Borbon.....	700
One Artillery Company.....	100
From Regiment of Savoy.....	50
From Regiment of Porto Rico.....	25

These two latter are armed with Mauser rifles.

No cavalry have been sent.

It is not intended for the present to send any more reinforcements, as there is no accommodation for them and provisions would run short.

The reinforcements now sent should, it is thought, be sufficient to enable the Spaniards to inflict chastisement on the Moors in the immediate neighbourhood of Melilla and to construct the fort of Al Guariach [Sidi Ouriach], but not to undertake a campaign against the Kabyles in the hilly regions, near the coast.

(33) Confidential 6448, n° 92, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 9, 1893.

Document 21:⁽³⁴⁾*Statement of the cause of the outbreak being the closeness of the fort to the Moroccan shrine as confirmed by Señor Moret.*

With reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which I have .this day received, under flying seal, from Her Majesty's Consul at Malaga. giving information with regard to the embarkation of troops to Melilla.

Mr. Finn's statement with regard to the origin of the outbreak, namely, that the fort of Al Guariach [Sidi Ouriach], is too near a shrine frequented by Moorish women, is confirmed by a communication made to me by Señor Moret, which I have had the honour to report to your Lordship in my Confidential despatch n^o.256 of the 4th instant, but which I have not yet had an opportunity of sending.

Document 22:⁽³⁵⁾*Details of Conversation with Señor Moret on the subject of Melilla conflict and some views about the future of Morocco.*

With reference to my despatch n^o.254 of the 3rd October, relating to recent events in Morocco, I have the honour to report that in a conversation which I had with Señor Moret this afternoon his Excellency confirmed what I have already reported with regard to the conflict at Melilla, adding minor details which are not, however, without interest. For instance, he explained that the rooted objection entertained by the Kabyles to the construction of the fort is that it is within sight of a mosque or shrine, and that the Spanish soldiers would be able to see the Moorish women going thither. I ought, perhaps, to have reminded his Excellency that it was a want of consideration to Mahommedan religious rites which had led to the Indian mutiny.

He further stated that the Moors were well armed with Remington rifles, but that they fortunately had no artillery.

Since the action on the 2nd they had been endeavouring to obtain concessions from General Margallo, who, however, declined to make any with regard to territory which was undoubtedly Spanish. The Moors of the Riff were, he said, a turbulent race, being practically independent of the Sultan, who had no control over them.

I thanked his Excellency, and was about to allude to other subjects, when he said there was a point of great importance on which he wished to speak to me, saying that if I had not myself asked for an audience this afternoon he

(34) Confidential 6448, n^o 93, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 9, 1893.

(35) Confidential 6448, n^o 94, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential), Madrid, October 4, 1893.

was about to send for me. He proceeded to enunciate his views respecting the future of Morocco asking me to inquire by telegraph what were your Lordship's views respecting the policy Spain should pursue at the present juncture, as stated in my telegram n° 65 of to-day's date, laying stress on the fact that he will not commit himself to any definite policy without previous consultation with your Lordship.

On his speaking of extreme measures towards Morocco, and hinting that England might possibly derive some advantage from the dismemberment of that country, I told him, speaking quite unofficially, that hitherto the independence of Morocco had been a cardinal point of English policy, and that what he had said about the independent attitude of the Kabyles of the Riff made it seem hard that the Sultan should be made responsible for their misdeeds. His Excellency interrupted me, saying he had taken these arguments into consideration; that as regards the independence of Morocco, it could not last long, and that in her action against barbarous tribes England had frequently taken very strong measures. His Excellency continued at some length in this strain, but I did not think it incumbent on me to say more without instructions, and passed on to other subjects.

Document 23:⁽³⁶⁾ *Approval of the language reported in Document 22. Remarks on Señor Moret's views. Her Majesty's Government do not wish the Moroccan question to be suddenly and forcibly raised.*

The language that you used to Señor Moret, as recorded in your despatch n°.256, has my entire approval.

Señor Moret appears to have argued that as Great Britain has at times been compelled to adopt strong measures in barbarous countries, Spain would be justified in active hostilities against the Moors of the Riff.

It is of course impossible to object to this proposition so far as it involves the security of a Spanish post bearing the Spanish flag and secured to Spain by Treaty.

But should Señor Moret be disposed to carry it further and deduce from it that his Government would be justified in commencing a war against the Sultan, with the result, and possibly the object, of dismembering the Shereefian Empire, he should carefully weigh the consequences.

You stated to him with perfect justice that the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Morocco is based on the preservation of the *status*

(36) Confidential 6448, n° 96, The Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham, Foreign Office, October 13, 1893.

quo in Morocco, not because they considered the condition of that Empire to be by any means satisfactory, nor because they believe that it could not easily be changed for the better, but because they fear that any sudden convulsion that should dislocate the framework of that State would probably produce evils much more serious than those which at present exist. The alarms and jealousies that would be excited among several European Powers, which would in all probability hasten to secure by force of arms what they believed to be their several interests, would bring about a war as terrible as it would be unlimited, while the reaction of savage fanaticism in Morocco itself would devastate and ruin that country. From every point of view, therefore, and more especially for the preservation of European peace, no statesman could wish to rudely disturb the existing Government of Morocco.

It may be said that this is only a postponement, but postponement in the case of war is always a good in-itself. Time assuages many passions, and settles many questions which would otherwise be insoluble.

For these reasons, then, Her Majesty's Government do not wish to see the question of Morocco suddenly and forcibly raised. Should this be done, they would know how to secure what British interests might be affected. But none the less do they deprecate any movement in a direction which can only raise, under present circumstances, a vast and endless contest.

Document 24:⁽³⁷⁾ *The Substance of the official report of the occurrences at Melilla and the Spanish losses.*

The following contains the substance of the official despatch relating to the events which took place at Melilla on the 2nd instant. General Margallo's despatch is dated the 4th instant, and reached the Ministry of War yesterday. It will be seen that it does not differ in any important point from the unofficial versions which I have had the honour to transmit to your Lordship.

The night of the 1st passed without anything remarkable, the Moors having fired a few shots against a shed which was being constructed near the site fixed upon for the fort of Sidi Aguariach [Sidi Ouriach], and as this could not be looked upon as a sufficient reason for suspending the work and taking extraordinary measures of precaution, the workmen set out at the usual time, arriving at the fort about 7'30, with the engineers and soldiers forming the escort.

A fair was being held that day at Trajana [Farkhana?], so that no surprise was roused by the large number of Moors who assembled.

(37) Confidential 6448, n° 97, Sir G. Bonham to The Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 11, 1893.

On the arrival of the labourers, the detachments of soldiers, numbering forty men, told off to guard the shed occupied by the labourers during the night, set out for Melilla; but on the Moors opening a sustained fire, the labourers and their guard, together with the forty men returning to Melilla, were forced to take refuge within the shed, where they were practically besieged by a large number of Moors. The party consisted of an officer and 40 men of the Regiment of Africa, 2 officers and 41 men of the disciplinary battalion, 1 officer and 27 sappers and miners, and 73 unarmed workmen.

As the shed is dominated by positions occupied by the Moors at a distance of 1,500 metres from the fort of Camellos, and 2,000 from that of Cabrerizas, it was not thought possible to render assistance from those forts from the uncertainty of artillery fire upon scattered bodies of men at that distance, it became necessary to send reinforcements from Melilla. The General in command accordingly proceeded to Camellos, giving orders that all the troops available should follow, and that fire should be opened from the forts on the groups of Moors, and on the villages in which there was good reason to suppose that the enemy was being harboured. Part of the garrison was also employed in attacking certain bodies of Moors threatening to cut off communication with Aguariach [Sidi Ouriach]. The first reinforcements to arrive consisted of 100 men from the Regiment of Africa.

The Moors, evidently emboldened by the smallness of the Spanish force, maintained their position against Sidi Aguariach [Sidi Ouriach], advanced towards Camellos, and threatened the fort of San Lorenzo on the flank.

As the necessity for stopping the Moors' advance became urgent a detachment of cavalry was dispatched to attack them on the flank, which was done with such effect that no further attack occurred in that direction during the day.

Other troops were then employed in opening out a way for the passage of two pieces of mountain artillery, which, having been placed in a convenient position, kept up a fire of the enemy till 1'30 in the afternoon.

At that time an advance was made with 145 men of the Regiment of Africa, 86 of the disciplinary battalion, and 16 sappers and miners. A detachment consisting of 50 men, supported by a second detachment of 50, and a reserve of another 50, was to clear the country near the shed and take up a position on a height beyond it. Another detachment of 50 was sent to reinforce the skirmishers on the right, the disciplinary force to remain as a reserve, and the force of cavalry employed in repelling the enemy were to return and place themselves in front of Camellos, three cavalry soldiers being

retained in order to take an opportunity of reaching the shed and informing the defenders that it was time to retire.

Although the movement was carried out in, the manner indicated, the men did not retire from the shed. One of the soldiers returned saying that there was very heavy firing going on and that they could not leave their shelter.

The main part of the enemy's fire around the shed had from the commencement of the action been protected by thickets of Indian fig trees, from which it would have been rash to try to dislodge them, so that the only course was to take measures for covering the retreat of the besieged men, who did not appear to have comprehended the General's plan.

As the numbers of the enemy continued to increase, orders were given to make the advance more complete, and to make known to the men that they must retire from the shed. This was done under the cover of skirmishers, and they reached the fort of Camellos, abandoning in the shed their workmen's tools and the body of one man who had been killed.

Having attained this object the retreat was effected in the most orderly manner. At 4'30 the troops had been formed behind the fort of Camellos. All the wounded had been placed in hospital, and a skirmishing force of the disciplinary body, was maintained to, keep the Moors at a distance.

It is impossible to calculate exactly the number of the enemy but it cannot have been less than 4.000.

The Spanish losses were 15 killed, 4 missing, 3 officers and 34 regulars and convicts wounded, and 13 bruised. There is good reason for believing that the enemy's loss was considerable as the villages were bombarded.

Some bodies-were left on the field, which were given up on the following day by the Pasha, having been disgracefully mutilated, which caused great indignation in the fort.

Document 25:⁽³⁸⁾*The exportation of arms for Morocco from Gibraltar under the British flag.*

My Spanish colleague understands that exportation of arms and ammunition for the use of the Riffian Moors is being carried on under the British flag from the hulks in Gibraltar Bay. Can any steps be taken to prevent this?

(38) Confidential 6448, n° 98 , (Telegraphic) P, Mr. Satow to The Earl of Rosebery, Tangier, October 14, 1893.

Document 26:⁽³⁹⁾*An account of the encounter at Melilla from the Spanish Minister and his recommendations. The powerlessness of the Sultan representative Mohammed Torres. The imprudence of any Spanish extension of territory.*

My Spanish colleague, the Marquis de Potestad-Fornari, informs me that on the 2nd instant a serious engagement took place at Melilla between the garrison and a large body of Riff Moors, in which the former lost 16 killed, 33 wounded, and 3 missing, while the loss of the latter is unknown, though supposed to be very considerable.

When the boundary was laid down, in pursuance of the Agreement signed in March last between Spain and Morocco, instead of drawing a straight line from point to point, a slight deviation was made, in order to preserve to the Riff Moors a mosque which lay in the way. Subsequently, the Spaniards commenced to build a fort to the south-east of Melilla, which the Riff Moors objected to, on the ground that it would overlook the mosque, and thus become a source of annoyance to their women going backwards and forwards. From time to time shots had been fired at the workmen, and the Commandant was compelled to post a detachment of troops for their protection. On the night of the 1st instant, it seems, the Riff Moors had endeavoured to destroy the works, and on the following day they made an attack in great force on the labourers and the troops, and large bodies attempted to cut them off by landing from boats on the shore between them and the fortress. Fire was thereupon opened from the ramparts, and the disembarkation was prevented. The garrison, after successfully repelling the attack, withdrew within the walls of the fortress. On the following day small bodies of Riff Moors were seen hovering on the hills in the vicinity, but no attempt was made to renew hostilities.

The Marquis de Potestad thinks that the garrison ought to be reinforced with troops sufficient to enable the Commandant to take the offensive in case of a fresh attack, and to make a razzia in French fashion on the villages of the offenders. He will also recommend his Government to send a couple of gun-boats to Melilla to guard the shore until the fort can be completed. Cid Torres had bewailed his powerlessness to take any effective measures. He offered to send a dozen men (recruited from the prisoners in the Tangier gaol), but when they were taken alongside a Spanish steamer that happened to be lying in port, bound for Melilla by way of Cadiz and Malaga, the master declined to receive them, on the ground of their unhealthy appearance.

(39) Confidential 6448, n° 99, Mr. Satow to The Earl of Rosebery, (Very Confidential), Tangier, October 5, 1893.

I understand from a native source that the governor of the Moorish territory close to Melilla telegraphed on the 1st to Cid Torres, informing him that the tribesmen had wrecked the fort, and asking for instructions. Cid Torres had intended to ask the Spanish Minister to stop the work until the Sultan's authority could be invoked to restrain his turbulent subjects, but the events of the 2nd instant rendered this idea impracticable

I am not sure that my Spanish colleague may not also have in view the further extension of the zone which surrounds Melilla, as far as may be thought necessary for defensive purposes. But the more usual way of settling the affair, according to Moorish notions would be the payment of an indemnity by the Sultan. If it be true that the Spanish Government, as the Marquis de Potestad has stated to me, once informed the French Government that they would put an army in the field to prevent the Algerian frontier being pushed forward to the Mouluya, it would seem to be extremely imprudent to provoke a move on the side of France by even the slightest addition to the territory already possessed by Spain in Morocco.

Document 27:⁽⁴⁰⁾ *Representations of the Spanish Minister in Tangier to Mohammed Torres, the Sultan's Representative.*

On the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of this morning instructing me to support the Spanish Minister in urging the Moorish Government to do its utmost to induce the Riff tribesmen to cease their attacks on Melilla, I lost no time in communicating its contents to the Marquis de Potestad-Fornari, His Excellency said he should have great pleasure in informing his Government of your Lordship's offer, which he accepted readily.

He read to me two notes, with their replies, which he had addressed to Cid Mohammed Torres, which were conceived in very moderate terms. In the first he presented, by order of his Government, a protest against the destruction of the works which were being carried on within Spanish territory, and against the attack of the 2nd instant. He demanded the punishment of the aggressors, and stated that indemnities for the dead and wounded, as well as for the destruction of property, would be required. In the second he stated that unless the Moorish Government intervened effectually Spain would be compelled to take the law into her own hands and chastise the hostile tribes. The replies of Cid Mohammed Torres were studiously vague, but I understand that he verbally accepted the principle of an indemnity. The Marquis de Potestad further informed me that he was endeavouring to obtain from Cid Mohammed Torres copies of the instructions he has sent to the Basha near

(40) Confidential 6448, n° 100, Mr. Satow to The Earl of Rosebery, Tangier, October 7, 1893.

Melilla, in order to enable the Spanish Government to show the public that the accredited Agent of the Sultan at Tangier is acting in good faith and with all the energy at his command.

It seems that the French Chargé d' Affaires has had more than one interview with Cid Torres, who sought advice from him as to the terms in which he should reply to the Spanish Minister's notes.

I have sent Mr. de Vismes to Cid Torres with a *note verbale*, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, based on your Lordship's telegram, and should the Spanish Minister address the Court direct on the affair, I purpose sending a note in similar terms to Cid Gharneet.

Inclosure in Document 27:⁽⁴¹⁾ *Copying the 'note verbale' on Melilla conflict from Satow to Mohammed Torres.*

Her Majesty's Government have heard with the gravest concern of the unprovoked attack made on the Spanish garrison of Melilla by subjects of His Shereefian Majesty, and have instructed Her Majesty's Minister to represent to the Moorish Government the urgent necessity of their immediately taking steps to control and restrain these turbulent mountaineers from acts of violence, which, if repated, will certainly bring grave troubles upon His Shereefian Majesty. It is like the small cloud on the horizon, no bigger than a man's hand, which threatens to cover the whole sky. Her Majesty's Minister hopes that Cid Torres will dispatch his swiftest messengers to, the Sultan to inform him of what has occurred, and at the same time exert himself by taking immediate and extraordinary measures to keep in order the Riff tribesmen who are round Melilla.

His Excellency must know that the news of the attack by thousands of Moors on a mere handful of Spaniards, the unequal contest, the barbarous treatment of the corpses of those who fell in the fight, will produce great excitement throughout Spain, and it is impossible to foretell what grave consequences may ensue to the Empire of Morocco, unless its rulers at once take proper measures and offer satisfactory reparation to the Spanish Government.

Document 28:⁽⁴²⁾ *The Italian representative at Tangier instructed to support the Spanish demands. Italy will give moral and, if need be, material support in maintenance of the 'Status quo'.*

(41) Confidential 6448, inclosure in n° 100, Mr. Satow to The Earl of Rosebery, Tangier, October 7, 1893.

(42) Confidential 6448, n° 101, Lord Vivian to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential), Rome, October 12, 1893.

Signor Brin spoke to me yesterday about the Spanish difficulty at Melilla. His Excellency said that Count Rascon, the Spanish Ambassador, had brought him two days ago a telegram from Señor Moret, instructing him to urge the Italian Government to support the demands of the Spanish Government on the Sultan of Morocco, which, as I understand him, were that His Majesty should put a stop to the attacks on the Spanish garrison, punish the aggressors, and pay an adequate indemnity for the loss of life they had occasioned, Signor Brin had at once consented to do this, and had telegraphed instructions in this sense to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier; but on learning, in reply, that as the Sultan was absent from Fez it would take a month to get an answer from him, he had repeated his instructions, and insisted on the necessity of prompt satisfaction being given to Spain.

Señor Moret had added in his telegram that the Spanish Government were very uneasy at the suspicious attitude of the French Minister at Tangier, who was in constant communication with Cid Gharneet, and appeared to hold aloof from giving any countenance to the demands of Spain; yesterday, however, Count Rascon brought a second telegram from Señor Moret stating that the Spanish Government had been reassured by its spontaneous offer from the French Ambassador of the good offices of the French Minister at Tangier in promoting a settlement of the grievances of Spain.

I gave Signor Brin the substance of the instructions which your Lordship had sent to Mr. Satow on the subject, as conveyed to him in your telegram of the 6th instant, adding that you had urged at Madrid that nothing should be done in a sense hostile to the Sultan, who had little, if any, control over the tribes at Melilla. His Excellency repeated on this occasion what he has often previously said to me, namely, that being thoroughly convinced of our self-denying policy in Morocco, and of our sincere desire for the maintenance of the *status quo*, Italy would always be prepared to give it her moral and, in case of need, her material support.

Document 29:⁽⁴³⁾ *Objects to be undertaken by the Spanish Government at Melilla as alluded to in a newspaper article.*

One of the more enterprising newspapers as regards the practice of interviewing, which has been brought in Spain to a high state of perfection, publishes at great length the substance of an interview with a Member of the Government, which corresponds to such a remarkable extent with the language held to me and to some others of the foreign Representatives by Señor Moret, that I venture to send a summary.

(43) Confidential 6448, n° 102, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 13, 1893.

With regard to the fort at Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach], two plans have been submitted to the Government, one by General Margallo, who commands the forces at Melilla, and one drawn up in the Ministry of War. The latter, which appears to have been approved by the Government, consists of the construction of a fort on a larger scale than had been originally intended, capable of containing 250 men, with the necessary artillery and munitions of war. Some time must necessarily elapse before such a fort can be constructed; as the preparatory works will of themselves require some weeks.

The objects which have to be undertaken by Spain and the Government are stated to be:

1. The construction of the fort at Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach].
2. The punishment of the Chiefs of the Riff country and the principal Moors, who have infringed the rights of Spain and killed Spanish soldiers.
3. The exaction of a pecuniary indemnity for the families of the men thus killed. These three conditions are those to which the Sultan of Morocco is absolutely bound by the Treaty of Wad Ras, concluded in 1839, and it would be ridiculous if Spain did not now insist on their being carried out. By the prompt settlement of those claims, the object of the Treaty of Wad Ras would be attained with the minimum loss of life and money to Spain.

With regard to the course to be pursued in the event of the Sultan being unable or unwilling to carry out the provisions of this Treaty, the Minister is reported to have said that at present there is no reason to think that the Sultan will refuse the satisfaction demanded by Spain, supported, as her claims are, on the grounds of general interest, by the foreign policy of Europe.

Up to the present time Sidi Mohammed Torres, the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has shown himself to be entirely in favour of making reparation, and by means of messages and threats, has done everything in his power to make the Chiefs of the Kabyles at Melilla understand that the Sultan will cause them to be seriously punished for their unjustifiable act of aggression. The opinion, moreover, of all the higher class at Tangier is that Spain is entitled to just reparation. At the same time, if these signs were to prove delusive, Spain would not hesitate to declare war against Morocco, in which case Melilla would not be chosen as a base of operations.

Although the Minister was not sufficiently sanguine to suppose that the works of fortification which are about to be undertaken at Melilla will be accomplished without some hostile demonstrations on the part of the Kabyles, as there are always fanatics ready to disobey their Chiefs when it is

a question of slaying Christians, the Government still had reason to believe that their warlike spirit had been much broken. They know that the Sultan will show no mercy towards the authors of the attack on the 2nd instant, and will take severe measures against those who resist his authority. They are, moreover, aware that Spain has resolved to send sufficient troops to inflict severe chastisement for the losses which she has sustained. The Minister added that the Government had strong reason for hoping, although they could not of course be certain, that the fear entertained by the Moors of the Sultan, whose moral authority was much greater than is generally supposed, coupled with threats of reprisals on the part of Spain, would result in the submission of the Moors, without the necessity for severe fighting, before the completion of the fort which is about to be constructed.

Military experts, the Minister added, are unanimously of opinion that there is no object to be attained by sending a large army to Melilla; a force of 8,000 men could with difficulty manœuvre in the plain, and the result of an advance into the enemy's country could only be the destruction of a few miserable villages. If necessary, a much larger army would be sent to Africa, but only a sufficient garrison would be left at Melilla to insure the necessary submission on the part of the Moors.

The Minister of War has now been empowered by the Government to take the requisite measures that the expeditionary force destined for Melilla should consist of from 7,000 to 8,000 men. comprising 6,000 infantry, a regiment of cavalry, twelve pieces of artillery, and two companies of engineers. The force is to be under the command of General Chinchilla, although later, should it be deemed necessary, the Minister of War might go to direct the campaign in person.

Although I have not yet had an opportunity of testing the accuracy of the statements attributed in the article of which I have given a summary to a Member of the Government, I have thought myself justified in reporting them to your Lordship.

Document 30:⁽⁴⁴⁾*The above document may be looked upon as an official 'communiqué'.*

Since writing my immediately preceding despatch, I have been informed that the newspaper from which I had taken the account of an alleged interview with a member of the Government of Señor Moret's special organ.

(44) Confidential 6448, n° 103, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 13, 1893.

The views therein expressed relating to the present policy of the Government with regard to the Melilla incident may therefore be looked upon in the light of a “Communiqué.”

Document 31:⁽⁴⁵⁾ *Measures taken officially to prevent exportation of arms as contraband of war to Morocco via Gibraltar.*

(Translation.)

In a note which I had the honour to address to your Excellency yesterday I expressed the thanks of the Spanish Government for the orders given by Her Britannic Majesty’s Government, through the Minister for the Colonies, to the Governor of Gibraltar to prevent the exportation and importation of arms within his jurisdiction.

By a telegram received at an early hour to-day the Minister of State informs me that recent reports show that there are on board the pontoons anchored in Gibraltar Bay actual workshops for getting arms ready before dispatching them as contraband of war.

In these circumstances the Government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent instructs me to request your Excellency, as I now do, to cause fresh instructions to be sent in order that the English authorities may place under supervision the pontoons where the improper proceedings which I have mentioned are taking place.

Document 32:⁽⁴⁶⁾ *The sent copies of plans and sketches of Melilla and surrounding country.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith two copies of a plan of Melilla which has been published to-day. Although not official I understand that it has been drawn up by an engineer officer, and may be considered reliable.

I also inclose a plan published in an illustrated paper, which, although not so accurate as regards the fortress, shows a mountain of, I understand, considerable altitude, marked Gurugo, situated just outside the Spanish territory.

As the fort which the Spaniards are about to construct at Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach] is dominated by this mountain, I understand that it is contemplated by them to take it.

(45) Confidential 6448, n° 104, Señor del Mazo to the Earl of Rosebery, Spanish Embassy, London, October 14, 1893.

(46) Confidential 6448, n° 114, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret), Tangier, October 11.

The German Military Attaché from whom I have derived this information appears to consider that, although not strictly within their rights, the Spanish would, under the circumstances, be justified in doing so.

The Moors, it appears, have unearthed some old cannons (four, I think, in number) which had been buried since the last war, which, if placed in a commanding position, might possibly do some execution.

I understand, further, that although the number of men ordered to Melilla is nominally 6,000, the actual number is probably considerably less, as it includes men on furlough and absent for other causes. The number sent, however, is amply sufficient according to the military authorities for any action that may have to be taken in Melilla itself.

Document 33:⁽⁴⁷⁾ *Remarks on the alleged Spanish ultimatum demanding indemnities by Souhart, The French Chargé d’Affaires. Alluded that he has no knowledge of this from other sources.*

The French Chargé d’Affaires called on me today to tell me that the Spanish Minister, by the order of his Government, yesterday addressed to the Sultan an ultimatum, framed in somewhat uncompromising language, demanding indemnities for the costs to which Spain will be put in consequence of the attack made on Melilla, and guarantees against any future repetition of attempts to interfere with the construction of Fort Sidi Guriach [Sidi Ouriach].

M. Souhart went on to express the opinion that the indemnities thus claimed, when the dispatch of troops and the provisioning of Melilla, which is now cut off from its ordinary sources of supply, are taken into account, would probably amount to some of 10,000,000 fr. He thought that Spanish authorities were much to blame for their imprudence in commencing the fort, to the construction of which they knew the Riffians were so earnestly opposed, all the more that the limits between Spanish and Moorish territory had never been finally laid down, or at least not agreed to by the Sultan, and he strongly suspected that the Government of M. Sagasta, in order to prove to the Spanish nation that they were acting with the energy demanded by the circumstances, would undertake an expedition of some magnitude into the Riff country. In short, he looked upon the situation as one of great gravity.

I have not heard whether M. Potestad has dispatched the supposed ultimatum, and as to the intention to make reprisals I have understood from him that General Margallo would for the present stand on the defensive. I contend myself, therefore, with throwing cold water upon M. Souhart

(47) Confidential 6448, n° 114, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret), Tangier, October 11, 1893.

alarmist suggestions, and only offering the opinion that whether the Spanish Government harboured such intentions or not, it might be well if counsels in the direction of prudence and coolness were offered to them by England and France.

The impression left on by M. Souhart's language was that he wished, for French purposes, to make out that the situation is very critical, and that the intentions of Spain are not to be trusted.

Document 34:⁽⁴⁸⁾*The Portuguese Minister instructed to support his Spanish colleague. The Spanish note to Mohammed Torres includes not only indemnities but also the cost of sending additional troops. The garrison is increased to 3200.*

The Portuguese Minister visited me on the 13th instant, and after informing me that he had been instructed by his Government to support the diplomatic action of the Spanish Minister with regard to the Melilla question, asked me to tell him confidentially what I had done. I read to him the *note verbale* inclosed in my despatch n^o 147 of the 7th instant, and he stated that he should adopt precisely the same course.

My Spanish colleague informs me that, acting on the instructions of his Government, he has within the last few days presented a note to Cid Mohammed Torres notifying him, that Spain will demand from the Sultan, in addition to the indemnities already claimed for loss of life and damage to property at Melilla, the cost incurred for the dispatch of additional troops.

The garrison of Melilla has now been increased from 700 to 3,200.

At the request of the Spanish Minister I telegraphed to your Lordship on the 14th instant that arms and ammunition are believed to have been exported from Gibraltar to supply the Moors of the Riff, and asking whether any steps could be taken to stop this. Later in the day I learnt from the Colonial Secretary at Gibraltar who arrived on a visit to me, that an Ordinance had been published by the Governor on the 11th prohibiting this trade absolutely.

Document 35:⁽⁴⁹⁾*Delaying the building of the forts. The need of water and supply in Melilla.*

(48) Confidential 6448, n^o 116, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential), Tangier, October 16, 1893.

(49) Confidential 6448, n^o 117, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential) Madrid, October 17, 1893.

With reference to my despatch n° 268 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that in a conversation with the German Military Attaché the Minister of War stated with regard to Melilla that unless unforeseen circumstances occurred the operations connected with the building of the forts must necessarily be delayed by the want of implements. The plan, moreover, originally drawn up by General Margallo, after having been altered in some important particulars in the Ministry of War, has been sent back to Melilla, where it will be examined by competent officials on the spot and sent back to Madrid. This will doubtless give time for the necessary preparations to be made.

It appears that the principal difficulty with which the Spanish forces have to contend is want of provisions and water. The former, which, under ordinary circumstances, were procured from the Moors, have now to be brought from Spain and from the Algerian Province of Nemours, and as to water they have, it appears, been under the necessity of bringing it from Malaga, the amount available is quite inadequate for the increased force, and has, moreover, made it impossible for them to send over the number of mules requisite for their artillery.

It appears, moreover, from what the War Minister said, that the mountain marked Gurugu, to which I alluded in my last despatch as being one which the Spanish forces may wish to occupy, is considered to be too distant to be of use to them. I therefore hasten to make this correction.

The action of the Spanish military authorities is being considerably impeded by the impatience shown by the organs of public opinion, which clamour incessantly for immediate hostilities such as might in their present unprepared state lead to disastrous results to the Spanish troops. In order to satisfy this unreasoning enthusiasm the Government is obliged to send a larger force than the object in view appears to demand.

Document 36:⁽⁵⁰⁾ *Articles hostile to England in Spanish press.*

One of the most serious difficulties with which the Spanish Government have at present to contend is the attitude of the press with regard to Melilla,

The sudden outburst of patriotism which occurred when the events of the 2nd became known was no doubt justifiable, and the uninterrupted flow of telegrams which continued long after there was any event to record, and was only, in fact, stayed when the cable got out of order was what may be expected in a country like Spain, where allowance has to be made for grandiloquence

(50) Confidential 6448, n° 118, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 18, 1893.

and exaggeration; but it has, I think, become apparent that the object is now as much to hamper the action of the Government as to restore the prestige of Spanish arms, and I regret to say that with this object articles are sometimes published in which, very much at the expense of truth and probability, it is sought to establish the complicity of England in recent events.

The most objectionable of these articles appeared in the "Liberal" of yesterday, is signed "A. Regidor," and dated from London. It appears, from information which I have been able to obtain, that Señor Regidor is a resident in London, being, I believe, a political refugee. He occupies a quasi-official position, living in the same house as the Spanish Consulate-General, styling himself Legal Adviser of the Spanish Consulate-General.

In the article to which I allude the visit of Her Majesty's Ambassador to England is ascribed to political reasons connected with a proposed cession of Gibraltar to Spain in return for Spanish possessions in Morocco, together with the Canary Islands.

The Melilla affair could not have taken place, the article continues, without the assistance of England in providing the Moors with Remington rifles. Allusion is then made to the negotiations which took place in July last relating to smuggling at Gibraltar, which were brought to a successful conclusion, it is stated, by a previous article written by A. Regidor and the exertions of the Spanish Ambassador at London.

The article concludes by saying that the question is an Anglo-Morocco one.

France in Siam has given Spain a rule of action. No vacillation, negotiations, or rectification of frontiers is to be tolerated; Spanish honour is not to be made subservient to the smugglers of Gibraltar.

I have not attempted to reproduce the style of this article, which has caused some slight impression, but I have ventured to give the substance, in order to show an increasing tendency in the press to stir up a feeling of hostility to England.

Document 37:⁽⁵¹⁾ *General Ortega left Malaga to take command. He sends maps of the surrounding of Melilla.*

General Ortega, whose official title is General of the Second Brigade of the Second Division of the Second Army Corps, Military Governor of Malaga, left this yesterday with his Staff to take command of the troops before Melilla.

(51) Confidential 6448, n° 120, Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery, Malaga, October 17, 1893.

Small detachments have left here several times during this week, but, including those reported in my despatches n° 30 of the 4th October and n° 31 of the 7th October, it is said that no more than 800 men have left this place for the African coast.

A Spanish squadron, consisting of the “Pelaye,”; “Reina Mercedes”; “Alfonso XII”; “Reina Regente,” and “Isla de Luzon,” made a demonstration before Melilla, and then went on to Algeciras.

I beg to inclose copy of a map of the surroundings of Melilla which has been published here.

Document 38:⁽⁵²⁾ *Remarks on the steps to be taken by Spanish Government at Melilla by Count Kálnoky in Vienna.*

Kount Kálnoky told me yesterday that he had heard from Madrid that there was the fullest and almost satisfactory understanding between the British and Spanish Governments in regard the steps to be taken by the latter at Melilla, and that he believed that they were equally anxious to give every reassuring explanation to France also.

I said that as far as my information went there was entire harmony between Her Majesty’s Government and that of Spain.

Count Kalnoky observed that the Spaniards had a very disagreeable task before them; and that as it is notorious that there is almost more jealousy between these Powers about their respective dealings with Morocco than about any other subject that Spain should have a free hand in retaliating for the aggression made upon her.

As far as he could make out, however, security for the future could only be obtained by a considerable extension of the defence at Melilla, and that would involve acquisition of fresh territory, which might not be so quietly acquiesced in by the other two Powers.

Document 39:⁽⁵³⁾ *Report of the recommencement of hostilities. The Spanish gun-boat opened fire on Moroccans subjects from the Rif.*

With reference to my despatch n° 271 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that the state of tension which has been increasing ever since the Spanish and Moorish forces have been confronting each other at Melilla appears to have at length given way, and that hostilities have been

(52) Confidential 6448, n° 121, Sir E. Monson to the Earl of Rosebery, Vienna, October 18, 1893.

(53) Confidential 6448, n° 130, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 22, 1893.

commenced by the Spanish gun-boat "Conde de Venadito" opening fire on the *Moors* on shore.

The facts, however, are not as yet known with certainty, for whereas the press contains sensational accounts of the way in which the *Moors*, having refused to retire from a position within Spanish territory, were, after due warning, fired upon by the Spanish war-ship, the official telegrams communicated by the War Department give the following version of the affair.

According to a telegram, dated Melilla, the 20th October, 9'50 P.M., from General Margallo to the Minister of War, the General informed his Excellency that the *Moors* had made entrenchments in their camp close to the boundary, and that at landmark n° 2 they appeared to have gone somewhat beyond' the stone marking the limits. General Margallo added that he had requested the Pasha to destroy these works or entrenchments within two days, threatening that if this was not done he would carry out his Excellency's instructions.

There appears to have been some firing on the morning of the 21st on account of a mule which the Spaniards had captured, and which the *Moors* wished to retake, but, according to a further telegram received on the evening of yesterday, the 21st, the Pasha had been to the landmark n° 2, and had a conference with the *Moors* in order to decide what was to be done. Instructions had been given to the Captain of the "Conde de Venadit" to fire if he saw operations going on within the Spanish boundary. None were carried on, but the *Moors* having fired some shots from the beach, he fired some shells at the houses on the shore.

Considerable surprise and dissatisfaction are expressed at the fact that the cannonade was discontinued, and has not since been renewed.

The following details respecting the "Conde de Venadito" may be of interest, She is described as being an iron vessel 63'85 metres in length, 9'73 metres in breadth, depth of hold, 5'34 metres. Her displacement is 1,189 tons, and her machinery 1,500 horse-power.

Her armament consists of four Hontona guns (12 centim.), 2 Hotchkiss (57 millim.), four machine-guns (37 millim.). She carries also two torpedo tubes.

Her crew numbers 168 men, and she is commanded by a Captain ("Capitan de fragata ") and ex-Deputy D. Emilio Diaz Moren.

Document 40:⁽⁵⁴⁾ *The Sultan not yet approached by Spanish respecting indemnity. It must cover construction of forts and keep troops.*

With reference to your Lordship's telegram n° 23, I am informed by the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that no hint has as yet been given by him to the Sultan of Morocco as regards the sum to be eventually demanded by way of indemnity. The attitude of the Sultan will determine the amount, but I understood from his Excellency that the expense of constructing forts at Melilla, as well as those of maintaining troops, will have to be covered by it.

Document 41:⁽⁵⁵⁾ *General Margallo is killed in a sortie. General Macias started to take command at Melilla.*

General Margallo was killed in a sortie from Melilla yesterday. The extent of the reverse suffered by the Spanish forces is not yet known; but the attack on Fort Cabrerizas was very determined. General Macias has started to take command. The above information is official.

Document 42:⁽⁵⁶⁾ *Baron von Marshal hears Spain will be content to maintain the status quo, and await the Sultan's return before pressing indemnity aim.*

Baron Von Marschall told me yesterday that he had received very reassuring news from Spain with regard to the action which the Spanish Government propose to take in Morocco; that they would be satisfied with maintaining the *status quo* at Melilla, and would await the return of the Sultan to the capital before pressing their aim for an indemnity.

His Excellency said he was the more glad of this, as he felt convinced that the French Government would never agree to an extension of Spanish territory in Africa without demanding an equivalent territorial compensation for France.

Document 43:⁽⁵⁷⁾ *The Attitude of Spain has not been modified by the occurrences of last two days at Melilla. The Spanish Minister asks colleagues to urge speedily the return on Sultan. The need for an authorisation to act.*

The Spanish Minister has received a telegram from his Government, informing him that the attitude of the Spanish Government towards the Sultan

(54) Confidential 6448, n° 130, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, October 26, 1893.

(55) Confidential 6448, n° 139, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, October 29, 1893.

(56) - Confidential 6448, n° 140, Mr. Gosselin to the Earl of Rosebery, Berlin, October 28, 1893.

(57) - Confidential 6448, n° 141, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Tangier, October 30, 1893.

is not modified by the occurrences of the last two days. The Marquis de Potestad communicated this message to his German, French, and Italian colleagues in addition to myself, and, in calling attention on behalf of the Spanish Government to the gravity of the situation, urged on us the desirability of impressing on the Sultan the necessity for his speedy return to his seat of Government in order to take the necessary steps for according satisfaction to Spain's demands, and providing against similar outbreaks in the future.

The French Minister promised to address a letter to the Sultan in this sense, and the German Minister also signified his willingness to do so, after he had obtained the necessary instructions from his Government.

Have I your Lordship's authority to Act? If so, I would propose to my French, German, and Italian colleagues to concert general outlines of a note to the Moorish Government.

Document 44:⁽⁵⁸⁾ *Decree authorizing extraordinary credit to meet requisite expenditure.*

I have the honour to report that a Royal Decree has been published in the Official Gazette authorizing an extraordinary credit to meet the expenditure required for operations at Melilla. The following is a translation of the Decree:

Article 1. – An extraordinary credit is granted to a supplementary Estimate, additional chapter, in the fourth section, "Ministry of war," of the Estimates of the Department of the current economical year, for the amount required for the unforeseen services connected with the military operations rendered necessary by events which have taken place at Melilla.

Article 2. – The amount of this expenditure will be covered by the floating debt of the Treasury if the sum provided in the Estimates is not sufficient.

Article 3. – The Government will account at the proper time to the Cortes for the present Decree.

Document 45:⁽⁵⁹⁾ *Report of the Spanish losses at Melilla fighting.*

Señor Moret has told me that the Spanish losses in the fighting which has recently taken place at Melilla are seven killed (including General Margallo) and thirty wounded. This is less than in unofficial reports.

(58) Confidential 6448, n° 144, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 29, 1893.

(59) Confidential 6448, n° 146, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, October 31, 1893.

Document 46:⁽⁶⁰⁾ *Souhart has written to the Sultan in support of the Spanish demands. Conversation between the Spanish Minister and Souhart concerning Figuig and Touat; this latter is described as absolutely necessary to France.*

The Spanish Minister informed me yesterday that he had received the most satisfactory assurances from the French Chargé d’Affaires of his willingness to support him in the representations he is making to the Moorish Government with regard to the Melilla affair. Acting on the most positive instructions of his Government, M. Souhart has written direct to the Sultan, impressing upon him the justice of the Spanish demands, and has also desired Dr. Linares to speak seriously to His Majesty in the same sense.

The unanimous action of the Powers on this occasion, added the Marquis de Potestad, was quite a new thing in the history of diplomacy in Morocco, and could not fail to produce a marked effect on the Sultan. He thought that possibly the untoward events at Melilla might prove a turning point in the foreign relations of this country, by showing to the Powers that it was possible to act in harmony for a common object. As far as he could see, no Government had any desire to disturb the *status quo* whatever might have been the policy of Great Britain at the time of Sir Charles Euan-Smith’s mission, and he did not believe that serious projects were entertained by France.

I interrupted him here, in order to assure him that the instructions of Her Majesty’s Government to my predecessor, far from tending to any alteration in the present state of things, had prescribed to him the greatest possible circumspection, and that their policy in this country had undergone no alteration.

M. Potestad went on to say that M. Souhart had spoken to him quite freely about Figuig and Tuat. France did not to possess the former, but the acquisition of the latter, with its neighbouring oases to the south of Algeria, were for her an absolute necessity. He had replied that, speaking for himself personally, and entirely without any authority from the Spanish Government, he could see no reason whatever for objecting to its being brought under French domination.

The Spanish Minister on a previous occasion had said to me that he saw very little use in harping on the string of maintaining the *status quo*, as long as the boundaries of Morocco and Algeria remain undefined throughout the

(60) Confidential 6448, n° 151, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential), Tangier, October 23, 1893.

greater part of their extent, and I have no doubt that he had Tuat in his mind when making this remark.

No answer has yet been received from the Sultan to the letters sent from here by Cid Mohammed Torres immediately after the attack on Melilla, and it is calculated that it will not be possible for his reply to arrive for another week. In the meantime, the Spanish Government appear to have adopted an expectant policy, abstaining both from attacks on the Riff and from the construction of the fort, and the general impression here seems to be that there will be no repetition of hostilities.

Document 47:⁽⁶¹⁾ *Account of the latest hostilities. Sending the official plans of Melilla.*

With reference to my despatch n° 273 of the 22nd, in which I reported that hostilities had been commenced at Melilla by the Spanish man-of-war “Conde de Benadito” opening fire on the Moorish intrenchments, I have the honour to report that according to a telegram which has been communicated by the Ministry of War to the press, an action took place yesterday between the two opposing forces under the following circumstances.

At 11 A.M the works connected with fortifying and constructing trenches in front of the fort of Camellos were commenced by a company of engineers protected by parties of skirmishers armed with Mauser rifles, the battalion of Chasseurs from Cuba, and a mountain battery. A second company of engineers with some convicts were working at Redoubt X (this doubtless refers to the official plan, of which I have not been able to obtain a copy) and a third in conjunction with the forces of the Bourbons and Extremadura regiments and convicts was proceeding with the construction of intrenchments at Rostrogordo and Cabrerizas Bajas.

About 4 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy opened fire on the Spanish troops from their intrenchments and all round the Spanish exterior camp.

General Margallo was at Camellos, and General Ortega in Rostrogordo.

The forces at Camellos succeeded in overpowering the enemy's fire, and in retiring in good order.

At Rostrogordo the entire regiment of Extremadura collected, of which a battalion occupied the Poligon.

(61) Confidential 6448, n° 155, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 28, 1893.

The fire at Camellos ceased. General Margallo, on returning to the fortress and seeing that the Spanish soldiers had not retired to Cabrerizas Altas and Rostrogordo, proceeded thither in person in order to direct the retreat.

The fire had ceased, and General Margallo remains at the forts.

To-morrow more details will be sent.

The foregoing telegram was dispatched from Melilla at 11'30 last night the 27th, by the Colonel of the Regiment of Africa, presumably because General Margallo had not returned to Melilla.

It is thought that it does not contain the whole of the information received by the Minister of War.

P.S- Since writing the foregoing despatch, I have procured two copies of the official plan of Melilla, which I have the honour to inclose herewith.

Document 48:⁽⁶²⁾ *Further details of the latest hostilities and the circumstances of Genaral Margallo's death. Reinforcements sent to Melilla.*

In continuation of my despatch n° 281 of yesterday's date announcing the fact that hostilities had recommenced at Melilla, I have the honour to report that in consequence of the serious news received, a Supplement to the official Gazette was issued late last night containing the following telegrams:

The first, from the captain of the "Conde de Venadito" to the Minister of Marine, dated 8 A.M. on the 28th instant, refers to the actions of the previous day before the fort Camellos, stating the part taken by the ship under his command. He opened fire on the enemy in front of Camellos, at 2500 metres with the quick-firing guns, and at 3500 metres at the village of the Mezquita, by which means he was able to keep the enemy in check until 5.30. The forts of Cabreriz das Altas y Bajas continued firing until 6 o'clock.

The second telegram is from General Ortega, who, I may mention, was in command at Rasrogordo and Cabrerizas, from Melilla, but undated, stating that he had just arrived at Melilla, continues as follow:

"Firing commenced yesterday (the 27th) at 3.30 P.M., without interruption during the night. Reinforcements received from the garrison of Melilla, but that they had been obliged to cede to the enemy by trenches which had been constructed, in which they had established themselves during the night. The situation is serious, and the necessity for large reinforcements most urgent."

(62) Confidential 6448, n° 156, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 29, 1893.

A telegram from Colonel Casiellas to the Minister of War, from Melilla, reports the death of General Margallo at the head of his troops in a sortie from the fort of Cabrerizas.

A telegram from Melilla, dated 28th October, 1.50 P.M., from the captain of the "venadito" to the Minister of Marine, states that the body of General Margallo had just reached Melilla, that the fort of Cabrerizas Atlas has been provisioned, and that the convoy had returned in good order; that there were some wounded in the fortress belonging to the force which had attempted to make a sortie under General Margallo before the force protecting the convoy had arrived.

The telegram continues: "Artillery fire continues without interruption, the enemy experring great loss; but they have advanced to within 23 metres of the fort of caberizas".

From the foregoing telegrams read in connection with those which I had the honour to report to your Lordship yesterday, it may be gathered that General Margallo, having repelled the attack of the Kabyles at Camellos on the afternoon of the 27th, found, on his return to the fortress at Melilla, that a severe attack had been made simultaneously on the Spanish forts at Rostrogordo and Cabrerizas (whether Altas or Bajas or both is not clear), that he went in person, to the relief, and that he lost his life in a sortie; that a force arrived subsequently, sufficient to prevent the fort falling into the possession of the Moors.

General Ortega who was originally in command of the detached forts, has, it appears, arrived at the fortress of Melilla. The fact that the Moors had arrived close under the walls of the fortress would appear to require additional explanation, as it is not absolutely clear whether they were allowed to remain there.

The action taken by the Government on receipt of the foregoing information has been to order the embarkation to-day of three battalions of Chasseurs and a complete brigade of infantry in Cadiz and Malaga; to approve the immediate departure of the cruizer "Alfonso XII" from Algeciras for Melilla; to make arrangements for the embarkation, immediately on their arriving at Malaga, of the regiment of cavalry of Santiago quartered near that city, besides which other brigades of infantry are to await orders to embark.

In connection with the foregoing, I have further the honour to report that previously to the serious intelligence received yesterday some important changes had already been made with regard to the Generals commanding the forces at Melilla.

General Macias, who embarked at Malaga last night, and who should in the ordinary course have now reached Melilla, having been appointed to take over the supreme command from General Margallo, who was to have returned to Madrid at once in order to confer with the Minister of War, and if I am correctly informed, to explain his conduct in having ordered the construction of the Sidi Guriach [Sidi Ouriach] without previous instructions from Madrid.

A further appointment is that of General Chinchilla, commanding the forces in Andalusia, who will also proceed to Melilla.

The regiment of Wad Ras, which was already under orders, left Madrid yesterday afternoon for the scene of action. Previously to their departure Her Majesty the Queen-Regent, with the young King, visited the barracks in which they were quartered, after which the regiment, numbering, it is stated, some 800 men, proceeded to the station amidst a scene of great enthusiasm.

Document 49:⁽⁶³⁾ *The latest news from Melilla are considered as satisfactory.*

Latest news from Melilla is satisfactory. A sortie to provision the forts was successfully carried out. The Moors have been driven from their intrenchments within Spanish territory.

Document 50:⁽⁶⁴⁾ *British men-of-war at Gibraltar. Assurances to the Spanish Ambassador that they are there solely for manœuvres, and that Her Majesty's Government has no intention to intervene in Morocco under present circumstances.*

The Spanish Ambassador read to me to-day a telegram from his Government, of which I transmit to you a copy herewith, respecting the presence of a number of British war-ships at Gibraltar, and their connection with the Melilla incident.

I told his Excellency that the arrival of the fleet at Gibraltar was part of the autumn manœuvres, which had long ago been arranged.

I had on various occasions interposed to prevent our ships going to Gibraltar for fear of offending Spanish susceptibilities in regard to Morocco. This could not go on forever, as Gibraltar was one of our most important stations, and we could not debar ourselves altogether from the use of it.

(63) Confidential 6448, n° 158, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, November 1, 1893.

(64) Confidential 6448, n° 159, the Earl of Rosebery to Sir G. Bonham, Foreign Office, November 1, 1893.

He might, however, give Señor Moret the most explicit assurances that the fleet was not there for any purpose other than their manoeuvres, and that we had no intention of intervening in Morocco under present circumstances.

Señor del Mazo thanked me in the most cordial manner for this communication.

Inclosure in document 50:⁽⁶⁵⁾ *Telegraph concerning the above subject.*

La presse fait des commentaires sur la réunion des vaisseaux de guerre Anglais à Gibraltar: veuillez télégraphier la signification pour guider l'opinion publique. La presse Française tâche de l'impressionner en supposant que l'Angleterre s'oppose à l'Espagne au Maroc et profite de cette occasion pour occuper Tanger. A cet effet elle annonce que la France est identifiée avec l'Espagne non seulement dans la question du Maroc, mais dans toutes celles de la Méditerranée, et que la Russie se mettra à coté des deux nations.

Veuillez communiquer ces impressions au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Document 51:⁽⁶⁶⁾ *Excitement caused by the reported Spanish reverses at Melilla. Departure of General Mouroy and Macias with all available troops to the conflict scene.*

Intense excitement is reigning here owing to telegrams received with the news that Generals Ortega and Margallo have been defeated in a sortie against the Moors round Melilla. Very little is known of the details, but it is said that they have lost the artillery they had with them, and that they were unable to make good their retreat into the fortress, though they were able to take shelter in two of the advanced forts. General Mouroy, the newly-appointed Military Governor here, and General Macias, the latter as Commander-in-chief, start at 12 o'clock to-night with all the troops at their disposal in the Isla de Cuba," of the Spanish navy, and a hired transport, the "Luis de Cuadra."

Document 52:⁽⁶⁷⁾ *Further details of recent fighting at Melilla. General Martinez Campos may be sent out in command.*

With reference to my despatch n° 283 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that there is but little to change in the account of the events of the 27th instant which I derived from the telegrams published in the official Gazette. It may make the matter more clear if I state that General Margallo

(65) Confidential 6448, inclosure in n° 159, Señor Moret to Señor del Mazo, (Télégraphique), Le 1^{er} Novembre, 1893.

(66) Confidential 6448, n° 161, Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery, Malaga, October 28, 1893, 9.30 P.M.

(67) Confidential 6448, n° 162, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 30, 1893.

was engaged in constructing trenches on the western or inland side of Fort Camellos, when he was attacked by the Moors, who were in large force on the high ground at Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach]; he then sent large reinforcements from Camellos, leaving the fort almost deserted, on seeing which, the Moors attacked the fort on the south side, but were kept in check by the guns of the "Conde de Venadito." He subsequently had to retire into Camellos, and later on he withdrew, with the forces he had taken in the morning, to Melilla.

It was then that, on hearing firing at Cabrerizas Altas, he proceeded thither with a small force, and on arriving there found himself cut off from Melilla and also from Rostrogordo. The Moorish entrenchments were on the north and west side, and the enemy advanced to within 25 metres of the fort, and remained there during the night.

In the morning of the 28th, the Colonel Casiellas, in command at Melilla, realizing the dangerous position in which the forts were left, and the fact that they were without provisions, as it appears they have to be victualled every day, took a convoy with provisions and water under a strong escort, and after what is described as very severe fighting, in which they lost and recaptured two guns, succeeded only in reaching the fort, but in driving the Moors out of Spanish territory. It was on the approach of the convoy that General Margallo, going out to meet it, met his death.

This information is from Spanish sources; their losses are said to have been slight, but it is difficult to reconcile this statement with the severe fighting which must have gone on for two days.

An additional regiment left Madrid last night, and it is stated that there are already sufficient tents for a large force, and that contracts have been made for provisioning the forces from Malaga and from the Algerian province of Nemours.

I also understand that the command of these troops may be possibly given to General Martinez Campos, and not to the present Minister of War. By this means popular sentiment would be gratified; and the Ministry will not be weakened at a critical moment.

Document 53:⁽⁶⁸⁾ *The Spanish losses at Melilla. Señor Moret says no decision come to respecting Marshal Campos. His rank may preclude his going.*

With reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have now the honour to report, on the authority of Señor Moret, whom I had an opportunity

(68) Confidential 6448, n° 163, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 30, 1893.

of seeing just as he was going to attend a Cabinet Council, that the Spanish killed and wounded during the engagements of the 27th and the 28th amounted to seven killed and thirty wounded, of whom not more than five or six, seriously. He stated that if it had not been for General Margallo's unfortunate death the military operation would have been looked upon as a successful one for the Spanish arms, as the Moorish forces had been driven beyond the Spanish boundary.

In answer to my question, he said that nothing had been decided with regard to General Martinez Campos taking the command at Melilla. He was very anxious to do so, but being a Marshal he was of almost too great importance to send on such an expedition.

Document 54:⁽⁶⁹⁾ *Report of the latest hostilities at Melilla by eye-witnesses. Description of the surrounding country. The need for ammunition at Melilla and the movement of the Spanish troops.*

Since writing my despatch n° 33 of yesterday's date, I have had an opportunity of speaking with eye-witnesses of the events at Melilla, and was told by them that the Spanish troops, all told, at that place do not number 4,000 men, while the Moors swarm all round the place, and cannot be less than 20,000, and are more likely 30,000, while more of the tribesmen come in every day.

The country round Melilla is described as consisting, for several miles inland, of deep ravines running at right angles with the coast, up which the enemy creeps to right under the walls of the forts, and even up to the walls of the fortress of Melilla, and as none of the forts are built so as to command these ravines there is no means of preventing the "Moors from doing so. Artillery, I am told, is useless unless the Moors chose to expose themselves on the hillocks between the ravines, and cavalry would be entirely out of place.

On the evening between the 27th and 28th, the Riffians came close under the fortress walls, and killed a number of pigs that were, within a few yards of them; while for several days no Spanish soldier had dared to show himself by day or night without receiving a volley from utterly invisible foes. In order to put an end to this state of things; Generals Margallo and Ortega made a sortie on the morning of the 28th. Fighting began immediately they left the town, and as the Spaniards were only 3,000 men and four guns, and the Moors at least six times their number, soon became very desperate. Large numbers of the Riff people threw away their muskets, and, using only their long knives, charged up to the cannon mouth; there they overpowered the artillerymen

(69) Confidential 6448, n° 166, Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery, Malaga, October 29, 1893.

and captured three of the guns. On seeing this, General Margallo himself charged with a body of infantry, and, although he was successful in getting the guns back, was soon after killed by three bullet wounds in the head, neck, and side. A bullet also passed through General Ortega's collar. The latter managed to withdraw his men under shelter, but was shut up himself in the Fort of Cabrerizas Altas, where, when my informants left, he was surrounded by the Moors, who kept a musketry fire all night, the Spanish artillery and the guns of the "Conde de Venadito" cruiser firing in return whenever the Moors showed themselves.

My informant left Melilla by the mail-boat last night, and so could give no idea of the number of killed and wounded; but they agreed that the number of Spaniards who fell was comparatively small, while of the Moors, they say, at least 1500 were left on the field. They said that, with the exception of bread, provisions were abundant; but that apart from the supply which was sent from here last night there was not two days' supply of ammunition left at Melilla, and they tell me that early on the morning of the 28th the enemy had succeeded in cutting the telegraph and telephone wires, so that the outlying forts could neither communicate with the town or with each other until a successful attempt was made to introduce signalmen from the "Conde de Venadito." I was also informed that the soldiery got completely out of hand of officers, and amply revenged on the Moors any cruelties which they may have performed on their comrades after the action of the 2nd.

Generals Marcias and Mouroy left here last night with a battalion of 500 men of the "Cazadores de Cataluna," and further reinforcements are expected here to-night and to-morrow. Meanwhile, all Civil Guards and Carabineros that can be spared have been called into Malaga to take the place of the troops sent to the war.

Document 55:⁽⁷⁰⁾ *The Sultan expected shortly at Tafilalet Kaïd Maclean gone to join him. A note on the situation sent to the vizir Gharnit by foreign Representatives.*

Kaïd Harry Maclean, who left Demnat on the 25th October, hoped to arrive at the Sultan's camp on the 31st ultimo. His Shereefian Majesty had not reached Tafilelt at that date but was expected to arrive there-In a short time.

The Portuguese and Italian Ministers and myself are dispatching notes in similar language to Cid Emfadl Gharnit, urging upon him the gravity of the

(70) Confidential 6448, n° 168, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Tangier, November 3. 1893.

situation. The German and French Representatives have written to the Sultan independently.

The Beni Snassen, it is reported, have declared their intention of joining in with the Riffians. If that takes place the Spaniards will have a hard task before them.

I have received reports from Morocco, dated the 29th ultimo, stating that the Sultan had requisitioned that place for money and was raising troops in the Sahara for operations against the Riff.

Document 56:⁽⁷¹⁾ *The Telegram from Oran confirms rumour of Beni Snassen tribe joining the Rif people.*

An unofficial telegram received here from Oran appears to confirm the rumour reported in Mr. Satow's telegram to your Lordship, that the Beni Snassan had joined the Riffs.

The Active Reserves have been called out by Royal Decree, dated yesterday.

Document 57:⁽⁷²⁾ *The Conversation between the British Minister in Vienna with his German colleague Prince Reuss regarding the hostilities between Spain and Rif tribes and the maintenance of the "status quo" in Morocco.*

My German colleague called on me yesterday, and asked me whether I had any information as to the views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the hostilities now being waged between Spain and the Moors at Melilla.

Prince Reuss spoke of the jealousy with which France watches any step taken by England in Morocco, and said that he believed it was reciprocated on the other side of the Channel, and I found that he had been discussing the matter with Count Kalnoky, who had also mentioned it to me when I saw his Excellency the day before yesterday.

I said to Prince Reuss, as I had done to Count Kalnoky the previous day, that I had no reason for believing that there had been any change whatever in the harmony which existed between Her Majesty's Government and that of Spain with reference to this question. As far as my information went, there was a thorough understanding and complete confidence between the two Governments as to the object and scope of Spanish action.

(71) Confidential 6448, n° 173, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, November 5, 1893.

(72) Confidential 6448, n° 175, Sir E. Monson to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential) , Vienna, November 2, 1893.

Prince Reuss having asked me whether it was not the determination of Her Majesty's Government not to permit France to annex any portion of Morocco, I said that my opinion was that we recognized very strongly the inexpediency of raising at this moment the question of any territorial change by which France, Spain, or England might profit, and that in all the region of the Mediterranean, and of contiguous countries, we desired to maintain, as far as possible, the *statu quo*.

I may mention that in his observations regarding events at Melilla, Count Kalnoky said that it appeared that General Margallo had been guilty of great imprudence, and might be said to have deserved his fate.

Document 58:⁽⁷³⁾ *The Conversation with a leading British banker who suggested that Spain would get rid of her colonies on the Moroccan coast as they were a continual source of anxiety.*

In a conversation which I had this morning with a leading banker here, who is, I think, well known to your Lordship, he asked me what I thought would be the result of the present conflict in Morocco. I answered that it was impossible to say, but that, as I tell everybody who asks me, peace and the maintenance of the *status quo* are the main objects of Her Majesty's Government.

He then said this might be so; but people, meaning presumably officials, were very much under the influence of what Sir West Ridgeway had said when he was here, which was to the effect that affairs in Morocco could not go on as they were nor more than a year, and that then the "cataclysm" might be expected.

I answered that it was extremely improbable that Sir West Ridgeway would have used any such language, even if they were his sentiments, which I had no reason to believe. He then alluded to the presence of the combined Channel and Mediterranean squadrons at Gibraltar. I answered that as regard the Channel squadrons it always went to Gibraltar about this season of the year, and that there were many reasons why the Mediterranean squadron should do the same, such as its being popular with the officers.

He said that, speaking for himself, he should be very glad if Spain could get rid of her Colonies on the Morocco coast, as they were a continual source of anxiety, and no profit could be derived from them. As this statement appeared to me to be thrown out with the object of eliciting an opinion as to what England might do in such an event, I answered that we could fully

(73) Confidential 6448, n° 176, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential), Madrid, November 2, 1893.

appreciate his feeling, as England has many Colonies which are a source of weakness rather than anything else.

In this connection, he stated that, in his opinion, France did not want anything on the coast of Morocco, though she might have fixed her eyes on an oasis in the interior, of which I could not catch the name.

I said that the language held by the press was calculated to do a great amount of harm, and expressed my astonishment that statesmen should submit to such a tyranny. He answered that this had always been so, that Señor Canovas and his party were just as much at the beck and call (“à la sonnette”) of journalists as the party at present in power. He further alluded to the goodwill which your Lordship personally feels towards Spain, as shown on the occasion of your visit to this country, and I was glad to be able to confirm his opinion as to the favourable impression then made on your Lordship.

As the connection between “haute finance” and politics is certainly not less intimate in Spain at this moment than in other countries, I have thought it right to report the conversation to your Lordship.

Document 59:⁽⁷⁴⁾ *Urging steps for the cessation of hostilities at Melilla to support the action of the Spanish Minister in the matter.*

Urge the Moorish Government to lose no time in taking all possible steps with view to the cessation of further hostilities on the part of its subjects against Spaniards at Melilla.

You should generally support the action of your Spanish colleague in the matter.

Document 60:⁽⁷⁵⁾ *Views of Count Benomar as a reputed diplomatist on the crisis of Melilla between Spain and Morocco.*

In the present crisis the Spanish Government would perhaps do well to be guided by the opinions of the Conde de Benomar, a Spanish diplomatist of some repute, whose testimony should carry additional weight, inasmuch as he was Spanish Minister in Morocco between 1860 and 1872, during which period the Moors made three distinct attacks against Spanish authority, all of which were satisfactorily arranged without recourse being had to arms.

These opinions have been published in the press, and form an agreeable contrast to the wordy declamation with which they are in juxtaposition.

(74) Confidential 6448, n° 181, The Earl of Rosebery to Mr. Satow, (Telegraphic), Foreign Office, November 6, 1893.

(75) Confidential 6448, n° 185, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 25, 1893.

It is shown that in the old Treaties between Spain and Morocco the Sultan was not responsible for any hostilities on the part of the Moors, simply recognizing the right of the Spaniards to repel them with artillery, but by the Treaty of Wad-al-Ras, which was negotiated by Count Benomar, it was stipulated (Article VII) that any act of aggression against a Spanish fortress or any impediment to raising fortresses in a conquered district would be considered to be an act of disobedience to the Sultan which he would be bound to punish.

The first instance occurred in 1863, when a conflict arose between the Moors of the Riff at Melilla, which was repressed by the Sultan sending a large army, under the command of his brother, to punish them. On this occasion the Spaniards assembled a large force of men and ships between Alicante and Malaga in case the Sultan should not fulfil his duty.

The second occasion occurred in 1871, when the Spaniards desired to alter the course of the Rio de Oro, which the Moors thought would be in some way prejudicial to them. The Conde de Benomar in bad recourse to the Sultan, calling on him to carry out Article VII of the Treaty of 1860. A large Moorish force was again sent, in spite of which an attack was made on the Spanish force, which was repelled. The works were stopped, and the Sultan was again appealed to.

Meanwhile, public opinion in Spain was becoming very excited, and the press was calling on the Government to send a force of from 6,000 to 8,000 men to Melilla.

Count Benomar accordingly sent two telegrams, in the first of which, dated the 20th September, he stated that the action of the Moors of the Riff had been recognized as an insult to the Sultan's authority, and would be severely punished when his troops arrived; that the resistance of the Moors at River Oro had been foreseen, and a special Protocol had been drawn up to provide that the Sultan should find means for repelling it. The Moorish Government therefore requested that the Governor of Melilla be instructed not to make sorties from the fort, but to confine himself to being a spectator of the conflict between the Sultan's troops and the Moors, giving assistance with artillery from the fortress; that the question was one between the Sultan and his subjects, and that he (Count Benomar) would answer for the Sultan fulfilling his engagements.

In his second telegram, dated the 7th October, his Excellency states that as he notices that the Government was being urged on by public opinion and the press to take the matter into their own hands and to send a force to Melilla

to attack the Moors, he gave it as his opinion that if this were done the matter would be most serious, the force actually there being too small, whereas to enter the Riff an army of 12,000 men would be necessary; that a delay would be no disadvantage, whereas it would be decidedly disastrous, in view of the Sultan's assurances, to take action before diplomatic measures had been exhausted.

The Spanish Government, acting on this advice, did not send troops, but waited.

In December the Moorish Commander arrived before Melilla, gave up the ringleaders of the - attack in chains, made excuses in the name of the Sultan before the assembled garrison, and begged that the works at the River Oro might be continued. This was done without any further interruption on the part of the Moors, and the utmost satisfaction was manifested by the press at what was described as a diplomatic triumph and the settlement of the question without loss of Spanish blood. A somewhat similar case occurred in 1873, the details of which are not given.

Since 1860 the policy carried out by the Spanish Government with regard to their African possessions has practically not changed, and has consisted in calling on the Sultan to give satisfaction, while making preparations to take action in case he should not comply with the demand, either from bad faith or inability to do so.

The Count concludes his review by stating as his opinion that, if at the present juncture the Spanish Government alter their policy by paying no attention to the Sultan, and proceeding against the Moors themselves, an army of 12,000 will be necessary, as he said in 1871, when the Moors were not armed with Remington rifles; and preparations will also have to be made for the contingency of war with Morocco, in the event of a "holy war" being proclaimed, and of the Spanish Settlements of Ceuta, Peñon, and Alhucemas being attacked by fanatical hordes.

I have been induced to reproduce Count Benomar's impressions because the events of 1871 appear to offer a very exact parallel with those of to-day; and although the Sultan's answer has not yet been received, the broad fact remains that, until it has been received, and he shows himself unwilling or unable to chastise the Moors of the Riff, the Spaniards are precluded from taking the matter into their own hands, at all events beyond their actual position at Melilla.

Document 61:⁽⁷⁶⁾ *The Conversation with Señor Moret. Comments on Count Benomar's views. Conditions proposed to the Sultan. Amount of the indemnity not mentioned.*

In a conversation which I had to-day with Señor Moret, I asked him whether he had good news from Melilla. His Excellency answered that it was a question of considerable anxiety to him. The Kabyles of the Riff were fortunately divided, and part of them would side with the Sultan. At the same time, he could not disguise from himself the fact that with this large force of armed soldiers, animated with the strongest feelings of patriotic ardour on one side, and a host of barbarous savages on the other, there was every prospect of severe fighting before very long, and it might then be difficult to restrain the Spanish forces within their strict limits. He appeared to be quite sensible of the effect this might have, so I did not think necessary to press it. He expected, he said, that the Sultan's answer would be entirely favourable. At the same time, until he received it in about a week's time, he would feel considerable anxiety. He thought it probable, he said, that the Sultan would send a large force to chastise his rebellious subjects, perhaps 20,000 men; but they could not reach the Riff country till some time in December, and in the meantime, there was this inflammable material, consisting of the large force of soldiers in Melilla, as well as the irrepressible press in this country. I then asked whether the expenditure on such a large force would not be-very considerable, alluding to the purchase of Mauser rifles. He said it would no doubt be large and on my alluding to an indemnity, he said it must be a large one, as it must be sufficient to maintain the large force and construct their batteries. He went on to say that the three conditions which he had-proposed to the Sultan were, the fulfilment of his Treaty obligations, the punishment of the men responsible for the act of aggression at Melilla (which he said he would leave entirely to the Sultan), and an indemnity. I said I hoped it would not be a very large one, as Morocco, being a poor country, in the even of her inability to pay, an excuse might be given for the interference of foreign Powers. His Excellency seemed surprised at this remark but said that an indemnity was the best means of punishing the offending Moors, as it would be from them that the Sultan would extort the money. He added, however, that he had not in his communication to the Sultan made any allusion to the amount of the indemnity, and that it would depend to a great extent on the attitude which he assumes.

On taking leave of his Excellency, I said that at present all the Powers seemed to be anxious to prevent a conflagration, and that I hoped it would be

(76) Confidential 6448, n° 186, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 25, 1893.

found possible to restrain the ardour of the soldiers at Melilla until the Sultan had time to send his forces.

Document 62:⁽⁷⁷⁾ *Interview between Señor Moret and German Military Attaché. Projected construction of a line of forts close to Melilla.*

With reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that, before my interview with Señor Moret, I had seen the German Military Attaché, who had himself had an interview with Señor Moret the previous day.

The conversation appears to have turned principally on the military aspect of the situation. Señor Moret told him emphatically that the object of the present expedition is the construction of a line of forts within the actually defined Spanish territory, that it has been found necessary to send a large force, because 2,000 men will be required to guard the exterior lines, and a large number will be occupied in building the forts and in keeping guard. He further stated that a severe battle is expected to take place early in November, for which the Spaniards wish to be fully prepared.

In answer to the inquiry whether the Moors actually encroached on Spanish territory on the occasion when the trenches were bombarded by the "Conde de Benadita," his Excellency said that the question had been asked by the Minister of War, and that General Margallo had answered, "It appears they did." On my informant expressing surprise that the General in command could not give a more decided answer Señor Moret acquiesced, but said it was to be accounted for by the fact that the boundary-line was not very clearly marked at that place.

The Technical Commission sent to examine the proposed plan of operations on the spot has returned, and submitted their Report to the Minister of War; but the results have not been allowed to transpire.

My German colleague gave it entirely as his own opinion that the danger of the present situation lies in the possibility that the French, whose influence in Morocco is said to have increased since Charles Euan-Smith's mission, may possibly induce the Sultan to resist the Spanish demands. Whether he has anything beyond mere conjecture to support this opinion I have no mean of knowing.

Document 63:⁽⁷⁸⁾ *The Spanish Minister has received a fairly satisfactory reply from the Sultan.*

(77) Confidential 6448, n° 187, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, October 26, 1893.

(78) Confidential 6448, n° 188, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Tangier, November 8, 1893.

A fairly satisfactory reply has been received by the Spanish Minister from the Sultan through the Moorish Agent for Foreign Affairs at Tangier in answer to his representation sent from here at the beginning of last October.

In it the Sultan expressed his regret at what had taken place his wish to be on terms of friendship with Spain in common with all the other European Powers and his intention of sending troops to Melilla to keep the Riffians in order.

Document 64:⁽⁷⁹⁾ *The Riffian tribes' attack on The Spanish convoy of ammunition. Royal Order calling out reserves.*

According to the intelligence officially published yesterday a convoy conducting ammunition to the outlying forts of Rostrogordo and the two Cabrerizas was attacked on the 3rd instant by the Kabyles, with a loss of two killed and thirteen wounded. It is thus shown that although the Spanish forces were able to drive them beyond the boundary, they are unable to prevent them from returning again under cover of darkness, and it would appear that, for the present at all events, the operations of the Spaniards will be confined to keeping the outlying forts provisioned and maintaining connection between them and Melilla itself.

The reported action of General Macias in sending a cruizer some considerable distance down the coast to bombard certain villages inhabited by kabyles, said to be implicated in the recent attack on Melilla, is one which, if confirmed, may be considered to be not entirely justified.

The published accounts of what took place in a Cabinet Council on Friday stated that It had been decided to call out the reserves, and today's "Gazette" contains the following announcement:

"The tenacious resistance of Kabyles of the Riff to the exercise of our lawful dominion in the territory outside the fortress of Melilla renders it indispensable, having regard to events which may occur, to increase the forces of the permanent army, bringing up the strength of the active forces comprising it, this case having been foreseen in Article 150 of the Law of Substitutes of the 11th July, 1885, which provides that with this object the troops of the active reserve may be called out."

The Royal Order calling out the reserves, of which I have the honour to inclose a translation, is annexed.

(79) Confidential 6448, n° 191, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 5, 1893.

It is difficult to obtain reliable information but I am informed that commissariat and sanitary arrangements at Melilla are still in a deplorable state.

I may here mention that General Chinchilla, whose departure for Melilla had been reported, has not yet left, but it is stated that he will, do so when the forces sent to Melilla have reached a sufficient number. According to present arrangements, neither General Martinez Campos nor the minister of War will proceed thither.

Inclosure in Document 64:⁽⁸⁰⁾ *Translation from the "Madrid Gazette" of November 5, 1893.*

Ministry of War.

Royal Decree.

In conformity with the provisions of Article 150 of the existing Law of Recruitment and Substitution for the Army, at the instigation of the Minister of War and in accord with my Council of Ministers; in the name of my august Son, King Alphonso XIII, and as Queen Regent of the Realm,

I hereby decree the following:-

Article 1. All classes and categories of troops of the various arms and corps of the army in the Peninsula and military commands of Ceuta and Melilla, who, having received military instruction, belong to the active reserve, are called to the colours.

Article 2. The Minister of War will issue the necessary instructions for giving effect to this Decree.

Given at the Palace, this 4th day of November, 1893.

(Signed) MARIA CRISTINA.

The Minister of War:

(Signed) JOSE LOPEZ DOMINGUEZ

Document 65:⁽⁸¹⁾ *Copy of Law of Substitutes. Table showing war strength of the Spanish army.*

With reference to my despatch n° 291 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy and translation of the Article of the Law of Substitutes of the 11th July, 1885, which is alluded to in the Royal Decree issued yesterday calling out the reserves.

(80) Confidential 6448, Inclosure in n° 191, Translation from the "Madrid Gazette" of November 5, 1893.

(81) Confidential 6448, n° 192, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 6, 1893.

I also inclose a Table showing the strength on a war footing of the Spanish army as shown in the royal Decree of the 29th August last, of which copies were forwarded in Sir Henry Drummond Wolff's despatch n^o 233 of the 1st September, 1893 amounting it will be seen 132,076 infantry and 16,836 cavalry.

A Circular is also published in the official organ of the Ministry of War providing for the immediate incorporation in the corps which garrison the military posts of Ceuta and Melilla of all troops, including sergeants who have not completed their three years' service in the ranks, who for any reason may be absent from the corps to which they belong, or who may be on leave of absence, temporary or permanent, with the exception of those absent on account of sickness.

It is further stated that a Circular will be issued by the War Department, calling out with the least possible delay the reserves of 1888, 1889 and 1890.

Inclosure in Document 65:⁽⁸²⁾ *Translation from the "Liberal" of November 6, 1893*

The Provision of the Law of Substitutes

In order that the Decree of the 4th instant may be better understood, we reproduce below the Articles of the Law of the 11th July, 1885, to which it refers.

Article 2. The duration of military service in the Peninsula shall be of twelve years from the day on which the recruits are enrolled.

During these twelve years the recruits enlisted at each enrolment shall be included in the following classes and categories:-

1. Recruits on the rolls.
2. On permanent service with the colours.
3. In the first reserve or on leave.
4. Recruits in depôt or conditionally enlisted.
5. In the second reserve.

Categories 2, 3, and 4 are active, and recruits must serve six years in them, completing the obligatory total in the first and fifth categories.

Article 5. The third or active reserve category shall consist of those soldiers, corporals, and sergeants who, having served their appointed time

(82) Confidential 6448, Inclosure in n^o 192, Translation from the "Liberal" of November 6, 1893. The Provision of the Law of Substitutes.

with the colours, in conformity with the previous Article (three years), may receive permanent leave to go to their homes, without by this acquiring a right to do so (“*sin goce de haber algun*”).

In this category they shall serve the remaining time necessary to complete their first six years of service from the day on which they were appointed to their respective corps, to which they will continue to belong liable to be reincorporated on the first notice.

Article 150. In time of war, or when from extraordinary circumstances, an unforeseen increase of the permanent military forces [is necessary] the Government may, by virtue of a Decree issued by the Minister of War, place on a war footing the whole or part of the active forces, as he may deem necessary, by summoning to the colours those soldiers of the active reserve included in them. The Government may likewise mobilize and call to arms the whole or part of the forces of the second reserve before or after forming new fighting units from the recruits remaining in depot after supplying the deficiencies of the permanent active corps. For the completion of the second reserve and the formation of the above-mentioned units from the recruits in depot, a law or a Royal Decree is necessary if the Cortes are not in session.

Document 66:⁽⁸³⁾ *Supply of rifles on their way. Negotiations for Krupp guns.*

With reference to my despatch No. 278 of the 25th ultimo, reporting that the Spanish Government had acquired 10,000 Mauser rifles from Germany, I am now informed that the rifles, with regard to the acquisition of which there had been some difficulty in consequence of their having been made for the Argentine Government, are now on their way to Melilla, having been shipped at Bremen.

I understand, further, that a Commission of Spanish officers left Madrid yesterday for Germany, in order to negotiate with Herr Krupp for a number of guns.

Document 67:⁽⁸⁴⁾ *Señor Moret asks Lord Rosebery's opinion to course in case of no answer, or an unsatisfactory one, from the Sultan. His fear of being hurried into war with Morocco by the popular feeling.*

Señor Moret has earnestly requested me to telegraph to your Lordship expressing his gratitude for the loyal way in which Her Majesty's Government have supported him in Morocco. Before consulting any other Government,

(83) Confidential 6448, n° 193, Sir G. Bonham to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 6, 1893.

(84) Confidential 6448, n° 197, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, November 8, 1893.

his Excellency wishes to learn your Lordship's opinion as to what course should be adopted in case no answer is received from the Sultan, or if the answer is unsatisfactory. If no answer is received by the 12th according to his Excellency's calculation, is an amply sufficient delay, it will be difficult not to declare war. Public opinion has been too much excited; already, on the 28th, when news of the Spanish reverse arrived, the expression of feeling was such as to threaten even the safety of the Monarchy.

To confine the campaign to the neighbourhood of Melilla will be extremely difficult owing to the deficiency of water and supplies, and to the impossibility to find room for troops sufficiently numerous to crush the 50,000 Riffs who at present surround the Spanish lines. In the event of war being declared, operations would be extended to Tangier and other places.

With regard to the attitude of France, his Excellency has had no official communication, but believes that the declaration of war would not be displeasing.

He has not communicated with the Spanish Ambassador in London or anyone except myself, under pledge of secrecy, and relying on the friendliness of the British Government.

The above is merely a reproduction of the language used by his Excellency, who appeared to be a good deal excited and alarmed at the state of opinion in Spain.

Document 68:⁽⁸⁵⁾ *The Sultan's answer received. Satisfactory, but considered as not sufficient from Spanish point of view.*

Señor Moret has just informed me that he received the Sultan's reply last night; that it was satisfactory, "but yet not quite sufficient."

Document 69:⁽⁸⁶⁾ *Movements of the Sultan. Probable course he will adopt with regard his subjects from the Rif.*

With reference to the note from the Vizir of Foreign Affairs inclosed in my despatch n^o 158 of this day's date, speaking of the Sultan's projected expedition to Tafilelt, I have the honour to report that His Majesty had not up to the 7th instant reached that place. The latest information in my possession shows him to have been still at that date at Guers [Gheris?] or Tiatlatin [?], about 25 miles to the south of the crest of the Atlas. It has been stated that the strong opposition of the Sultan's half-brother, Mulai-el-Reshid, who governs

(85) Confidential 6448, n^o 198, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, November 9, 1893.

(86) Confidential 6448, n^o 200, Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, Tangier, October 28, 1893.

the Oasis of Tafilelt, is the reason why His Shereefian Majesty has penetrated no farther. There is no doubt that with his large following of some 40,000 men he has experienced much difficulty in obtaining provisions in sufficient quantity, and that it has been found necessary to dispatch supplies from Morocco and other parts more obedient to his rule. A rumour was extensively about a fortnight since to the effect that he was surrounded by hostile Berbers tribes, who killed any stragglers, and completely prevented his moving forwards or retreating. But the arrival, a few days ago, of a body of sixty men, who came direct from the camp to Tangier to carry off the well known prisoner El Hammam to Morocco, and the delivery of letters from the Court with which their leader was intrusted, have set these alarms at rest. Whether the Sultan will ultimately be able to pay a visit to, the Sanctuary at Tafilelt, even with a reduced escort, seems still uncertain, but all the circumstances point to the probability of his return to Morocco city about the middle of next month.

During His Majesty's absence on the other side of the mountains there have been disturbances in the Province of Shawia, south of Casablanca, but the Sultan's cousin, Mulai-el-Kebir, is already there engaged in restoring the authority of the ruling powers, while it is rumoured that his eldest son Mulai Mohammed, is to be dispatched against the Zemour, Beni Hassan, and people of the Gharb, who have been in almost open revolt for the past two months.

Absolutely nothing is known as yet of the effect produced on His Majesty's mind by the news of the conflict between the garrison of Melilla and the neighbouring Moors of the Riff. I am much inclined to believe that he will carry out his original intention of proceeding to the city of Morocco when the lateness of the season warns him to recross the mountains before the passes are covered with snow. The general opinion seems to be that he will not undertake any repressive operations against the Akalaia tribe, to which the aggressors belong. There are, according to the opinion of a Moorish official of high standing, two courses open for choice: the Sultan might send a large force to crush the tribe, or even proceed to do so in person; or he might let loose the neighbouring tribes to "eat up" the Akalaia. The Beni Snassen, for instance, would be able and ready to perform the operation alone. It was as added that the former alternative would be the best, but the latter simpler and more economical.

It will also, I believe, be more in accord with the traditional policy.

Document 70:⁽⁸⁷⁾*The Spanish Minister in Tangier is asking his colleagues to impress on the Sultan the gravity of the situation.*

The Spanish Minister has just communicated to me a telegram which he received late last night from his Government, of which the following is a translation:-

“The occurrences of the last two days do not modify in any way the attitude of the Spanish Government towards the Sultan. You will be careful to accentuate with more insistence each time. We have been again attacked within our own possessions, whilst making defensive works, independent of and distant from the fort of Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach]. Up to the very eve of the attack the Riffians had given assurances that they would commit no hostilities as long as the fort was not constructed. The Government therefore makes the Sultan responsible for what has happened, and emphasizes its demands requiring exemplary chastisement of the rebels, indemnities for the victims, as well as for any material injuries that may have been sustained. It will also be necessary to require the guarantees against the repetition of such attacks in the future. When communicating with your colleagues of Diplomatic Body, you will point out to them the very grave aspect the question has assumed in view of recent events, as well as the urgent and imperious necessity of impressing on the mind of the Sultan the duty of hastening back with all speed, and making all necessary arrangements for giving Spain satisfaction and insuring peace for the future.”

In reply to the question what he would like me to do, the Marquis de Potestad said that he had already made a similar communication to Count d’Aubigny, who had at once offered to write in urgent language to the Sultan and to Count Tattenbach, who, while expressing his willingness to take the same step, which his personal acquaintance with the Sultan would naturally facilitate, felt it necessary to first obtain the authorization of His Government. After informing me of this, it was the Marquis de Potestad’s intention to visit the Italian Chargé d’Affaires for the same purpose. He would feel greatly obliged if I would also write to the Court to impress on the Sultan the grave position which had been created by this renewed and unexpected attack.

To this I responded that I would at once telegraph to your Lordship for the necessary permission, and suggest the desirability of the action of the foreign Representatives whom he had consulted being taken conjointly. With this idea the Marquis of Potestad heartily agreed, for, as I reported to your Lordship in my despatch n^o 153 of the 23rd instant, he would fain hope

(87) Confidential 6448, n^o 201, Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, Tangier, October 30, 1893.

that joint action with regard to Melilla might inaugurate a more harmonious phase of European diplomacy in Morocco than has hitherto prevailed. At the same time, he thought it might be difficult to induce the German and French Representatives to act openly in concert. I myself am not sanguine of success, but it is worthwhile to make the endeavour.

The Marquis de Potestad appears to be of opinion that the language to be adopted towards the Sultan should be calculated to inspire him with alarm. He should be warned that if he does not give complete satisfaction to Spain, that Power will be forced by the course of events to declare war against Morocco with the object of chastising the aggressors, and of securing a material guarantee for the future in the shape of an addition to the territory of Melilla, and that, should that come to pass, probably other Powers would consider it necessary to secure their interests by active measures. Otherwise the Sultan, who is under the impression that he scored a triumph over Great Britain last year, may be unwise enough to believe that England and France will for their own sakes, combine to prevent Spain from inflicting any serious penalty.

I trust, however, that the desired object may be attained without resorting to anything in the nature of menace.

Unanimity of action among the Representatives of the Great Powers interested would probably suffice to produce the required impression on the Sultan's mind, without its being necessary to foreshadow either a joint coercion or a general scramble for the fragments of his Empire,

I should mention that it is not the Spanish Minister's intention to address the Sultan direct. He will continue as heretofore to present the demands of his Government to the Sultan's Agent at Tangier, to be by him transmitted to the Court. His reason for adhering to this course is that he may avoid any appearance of departing from the policy adopted by him from the first in accordance with the instructions of his Government. That policy is intended to exhibit the patience and moderation of Spain, and her determination not to proceed to extremities so long as there is any reasonable ground of hope that the Sultan will himself undertake the chastisement of these, who hitherto have been recognized as his subjects. At the same time, he suggests that his colleagues who are offering advice to the Sultan in a friendly capacity may perhaps see their way to speaking more vigorously than he can under the circumstances.

Document 71:⁽⁸⁸⁾ *The Sultan's reply. Señor Moret hopes British press will make the most of it as a Spanish success.*

Morocco. At an interview which I had with Señor Moret last night, his Excellency showed me the text of the telegram in which the communication from the Sultan as conveyed. No mention is made of the indemnity, but it is understood to be covered by the following passage in the Sultan's note;-

“With God's help I hope to leave nothing undone that may be necessary to efface the last vestige of displeasure caused by the Riffs to Spain, whose great friend I am.”

His Excellency is anxious that the British press should make the most of the Sultan's letter, as a Spanish success. This will be an assistance to him in his endeavour to pursue a policy of moderation, as urged in your Lordship's telegram n^o, 23 of the 24th ultimo, in opposition to the popular demand for strong measures.

Document 72:⁽⁸⁹⁾ *Señor del Mazo communicates the substance of the Sultan's reply to the Foreign Office.*

The Spanish Ambassador presents his compliments to Sir Philip Currie, and has the honour to in close him the text of a telegram from the Minister of State relative to the Sultan's answer to the note of the Spanish Government upon the affairs of Melilla, which he received yesterday after he had been to the Foreign Office.

Inclosure in Document 72:⁽⁹⁰⁾ *The Minister of State to the Ambassador of His Catholic Majesty in London.*

(Translation.)

The Spanish Minister at Tangier has communicated to me, by telegraph, the text of the note sent to him by Mohammed Torres, by order of the Sultan, in answer to our first communication. The Sultan's letter is dated Tafilet, and has taken nineteen days to arrive at Tangier. Its contents correspond exactly with the demands made by Spain of the Sultan, who, after lamenting deeply what has occurred, and condemning the conduct of the Riff tribes, announces that he is sending cavalry at once to prevent them continuing their attacks on Melilla, and is preparing an army in case that they should not obey him. The Sultan assures us that, with the help of God, he will do all that lies within his

(88) Confidential 6448, n^o 204, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, November 10, 1893.

(89) Confidential 6448, n^o 205, Señor del Mazo to Foreign Office, November 10, 1893.

(90) Confidential 6448, inclosure in n^o 205, the Minister of State to the Ambassador of His Catholic Majesty in London, Madrid, November 10, 1893.

power to remove all traces of the grievance felt by Spain at what has occurred, in order that the great and loyal friendship binding Spain to Morocco may continue. Be pleased to communicate the above to the Government to which you are accredited.

Document 73:⁽⁹¹⁾ *Interview with the Spanish Ambassador, who suggests pressure by England and France to put an end to the disturbances, and describes the situation as unendurable at Melilla.*

M. de Leon y Castillo, the Spanish Ambassador, having received instructions to consult me on the affairs of Morocco, called on me this morning.

His Excellency began by saying that the position of the Spanish troops at Melilla had become unendurable. It was impossible to undertake a campaign against the Kabyles. The Sultan had the proper remedy in his hands, and should reduce the tribes to order, as he was obliged to do by Treaty. If he refused to do so, it only remained for Spain to go to war with Morocco. A war of this kind might have disastrous consequences for Europe. Such pressure ought therefore to be brought to bear by England and France on Morocco as would put a stop to the present disturbances.

I told his Excellency that I had heard that the terms in which the Sultan had replied to the Spanish demands were not altogether unsatisfactory.

M. de Leon y Castillo stated that he himself had no notification to this effect.

Upon my asking his Excellency what view the French Government took of the situation, he stated that M. Develle held the same view of the matter as himself.

Document 74:⁽⁹²⁾ *Spain should call upon the Sultan to restore order and indemnify her and not to take up arms till he has failed to satisfy her, following the hitherto course pursued by her.*

I understand that the course which Spain has hitherto consistently pursued has been, in the event of outrage or attack, to call upon the Sultan to restore order and indemnify her, and that she has not proceeded to take up arms herself until satisfied of his failure to do so.

(91) Confidential 6448, n° 206, The marquis of Dufferin the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Paris, November 10, 1893.

(92) Confidential 6448, n° 207, the Earl of Rosebery to the marquis of Dufferin, (Telegraphic) P, Foreign Office, November 11, 1893.

It seems clear that this is the proper course for Spain now to pursue, and I am glad to notice that the requirements of the case appear to be satisfied by the reply which the Sultan has sent.

Document 75:⁽⁹³⁾ *Drummond Wolff hears Sultan will be called on for a large indemnity and for land concessions round Melilla. The Russian and French fleet left Algeciras to Tangier. Drummond Wolff want to have a Military Attaché at Madrid.*

With reference to your Lordship's telegram n° 27 of the 11th instant, I have heard on good authority, but not from an official source, that the Sultan will be called on to pay a large indemnity, and to make territorial concessions round Melilla which are stated to be necessary for the security of the fortress.

It appears that these conditions are approved by the French Ambassador. The second might form a pretext for advancing the Algerian frontier to the Muluja [Molouia].

Telegrams have been published here, announcing that the Russian and French fleets have left Algeciras for Tangier.

The warlike preparations and movement of troops continue.

The presence of a Military Attaché would be an advantage for direct communication with the Ministry of War, and to furnish technical details.

Document 76:⁽⁹⁴⁾ *A Substance Note sent to Cid Gharnit the Moroccan Ministe. Action taken by his colleagues. The Sultan said to be preparing an expedition against his subjects in the Rif.*

In continuation of my despatch n° 160 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose a copy of the note which, acting on the sanction conveyed in your Lordship's telegram n° 36 of the 31st ultimo, I have this day addressed to the Minister, Cid Emfadl Gharnit.

This note is conceived in somewhat stronger language than that employed in the *note verbale* I caused to be delivered to Cid Mohammed Torres on the 7th ultimo. It draws the attention of the Minister to the fact, that though a month has elapsed since the first unprovoked attack on Melilla, the Moorish Government is not yet known to have done anything to afford satisfaction to Spain. The tribes, encouraged by impunity, have returned to the assault, actually invading Spanish territory. Delay not only emboldens the Riffians,

(93) Confidential 6448, n° 210, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, November 12, 1893.

(94) Confidential 6448, n° 212, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential) P, Tangier, November 3, 1893.

but also tries the patience of the Spanish Government, who could easily have applied the necessary repressive measures, but refrain because they hold the duty of keeping his subjects in order to be incumbent on the Sultan. If the idea were to get abroad that his power was insufficient, the Empire would be in great danger. Her Majesty's Government are much concerned that he should happen to be at such a distance when his attention is urgently needed in the Riff, and trust he will at once proceed to take the necessary steps for putting an end to the outbreak, and afford satisfaction to Spain. It adds that this is the advice which Her Majesty's Government, sincerely anxious for the welfare of the Sultan and the integrity of his dominions, have instructed me to offer.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires and the Portuguese Minister have to-day addressed notes in almost identical language to the Vizier, Cid Emfadl Gharnit, but the French and German Ministers have preferred to act independently. The former informs me that, on the 30th ultimo, he dispatched a note to the Vizier urging the Sultan, in so many words, to return at once from Tafilelt and to proceed to the Riff in person, as His Majesty could not trust his lieutenants to act with the necessary vigour. The German Minister has also stated to me that he wrote to the Sultan the day before yesterday in very forcible terms, offering to His Majesty the same specific advice as the French Representative.

News has reached me to-day from the city of Morocco to the effect that on the 29th October messengers arrived there from the Sultan with instructions to send him money and ammunition, as he was preparing an expedition against the Riff. It was also reported that His Majesty was endeavouring to raise soldiers among the tribes of the Sahara by offering extremely high rates of pay.

Inclosure in document 76:⁽⁹⁵⁾ *The Substance of a note from Mr. Satow to the Minister Emfadl Gharnit pressing him to solve Melilla crisis.*

(Compliments.)

It is now a whole month since the tribes of the Riff made a sudden and unprovoked attack upon the Spanish garrison of Melilla, and we do not yet know that the Moorish Government have done anything to restore order, or afford the satisfaction claimed by the Spanish Government. The news was forwarded to the Sultan's camp without delay, and must long ago have come to His Majesty's knowledge. But the tribes, encouraged by impunity, have again made an attack in large force upon the Spanish lines, actually invading the territory of Spain. I have already, by the commands of my Government,

(95) Confidential 6448, n° 212, Inclosure in n°. 212, Mr. Satow to Cid Emfadl Gharnit, Tangier, November 3, 1893.

addressed Cid Mohammed Torres, pointing out to him the gravity of the situation, and the necessity of adequate measures being taken at once to restore order, and to afford to Spain the reparation to which she is entitled. Every day's delay on the part of the Shereefian Government increases the danger. On the one hand, the hostile tribes are emboldened; on the other, the patience of the Spanish Government approaches exhaustion. It would have been easy for them long before this to have repressed the violence of the aggressor, but they have refrained, because they are unwilling to let it be supposed that the Sultan is unable to keep order among his own subjects. If that idea should become widely diffused the Empire of Morocco would be in great danger. I am instructed, therefore, to express the regret (concern) of my Government that His Majesty should happen to be at such a distant part of his dominions just at the moment when a serious event of this kind demands his immediate attention, and they trust that he will at once make all necessary arrangements for giving complete satisfaction to Spain and insuring peace hereafter. This is the advice which the British Government, sincerely anxious for the welfare of the Sultan and the integrity of his dominions, has instructed me to offer.

Document 77:⁽⁹⁶⁾ *The Anxiety of Senhor Hintze Ribeiro, the Portuguese Minister on effect produced in Portugal by the action of Spain in connection with Melilla crisis.*

In a conversation with Senhor Hintze Ribeiro, his Excellency referred to the political situation in Spain, and made no attempt to conceal his serious anxiety lest the course which the Spaniards seem bent to pursue in Morocco should lead them into insurmountable internal complication, and raise diplomatic questions of considerable Importance.

His Excellency spoke about the contents of the Circular which the Spanish Representatives have been instructed to communicate to foreign Governments, and remarked that the tone of that document appeared to him most incautious, the more so when coupled with the language held by the Spanish Minister at Tangiers.

“The attitude of the Spanish Government in the Morocco incident, if I correctly understand it, “he said,” seems to indicate that Spain has now entered on a venture which is likely not only to open the way to international disagreements, but is fraught with the greatest danger both to herself and to Portugal.

“So far as I am able to judge,” his Excellency added, “Spain has assigned to herself a task of no mean proportions which she is now bound to fulfil, and

(96) Confidential 6448, n° 214, Sir H. MacDonell to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret.), Lisbon, November 3, 1893.

which, if carried out in its entirety, must involve her in difficulties with other Powers. On the other hand, if she fails in accomplishing it, I am of opinion that nothing can save her from a military administration, which would only be a stepping stone to a Republican regime. Such an event should necessarily prove fatal to Portugal by placing the Monarchy in imminent danger.

“We are,” Senhor Hintze Ribeiro further said, “fully prepared to meet a Republican movement which may be set on foot in Portugal; but if it were to come from Spain, under the circumstances I have described, it would be idle to suppose that we could stem the current which will then sweep across our frontier, and that we can then hope to save the Monarchy, the more so, as the Spanish Republicans are well aware that, so long as the Monarchy continues in Portugal, no Spanish Republic can look forward to prolonged existence.

“In any case,” he added, “I cannot account for the extraordinary excitement which the events of Melilla have aroused in Spain, or for the reason that has prompted Señor Sagasta to give way to public opinion; it is a known fact that on a former similar occasion, he obtained satisfaction from the Riff tribes without all the noise and *éclat* given to the present incident.”

His Excellency then informed me that he knew that the Spanish Republicans, probably aided by foreign agents, were actively fomenting the discontent which the Morocco question is creating; and that a number of their French and Portuguese confreres have lately crossed the frontier into Spain. He also called my attention to the fact that whenever the Republicans are preparing to agitate, their journals at once commence to abuse England.

In conclusion, Senhor Hintze Ribeiro requested me to assure your Lordship that, in any question that the present crisis may give rise to in Tangiers, the Portuguese Representative has been instructed to act in concert with Her Majesty’s Minister, and his Excellency, at the same time, gave me to understand that he himself would gladly be guided by your Lordship’s views on the subject, confident that the course which your Lordship proposes to follow with regard to Spain and Morocco will be best calculated to protect the interests of this kingdom.

On taking leave, his Excellency asked me to report to your Lordship what had passed between us in a strictly confidential form.

Document 78:⁽⁹⁷⁾ *Description of the Spanish strength at Melilla.*

According to fairly trustworthy authority, the following was the number of Spanish soldiers in Melilla on the 31st ultimo:-

(97) Confidential 6448, n° 216, Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery, Malaga, November 6, 1893.

GARRISON

Regiment.	Number of Men.
“Africa	875
Disciplinario	493
Melilla (cavalry)	45
Marines	90
TOTAL.....	1,503
Reinforcements lately sent	
Artillery (7 companies)	672
“Segorbe	396
Engineers.....	360
“Barbon”	720
“Estremadura”.....	720
“Pavia”	720
“Cuba” (Rifles).....	396
“Cataluna” (Rifles).....	396
“Tarifa” (Rifles).....	396
2 mountain batteries.....	200
2 field batteries	160
Add garrison	5,136
.....	1,503
Total.....	6,639

But from these must be deducted the total of 22 killed and 88 wounded, leaving an efficient total of 6,529 men, besides the Commissariat and Medical Staff, and 300 men of the “Santiago” Dragoon Regiment, who passed through here on Wednesday last.

The steamer “Sevilla,” which in peace time used once a-week to take 300 tons of water for drinking from here for the use of the garrison now does so three or four times in the week.

Document 79:⁽⁹⁸⁾ *Changing the language tone of the Spanish press toward England. Article in "Liberal".*

A certain change seems to have come over the language of the press, and the hostility reported by Sir George Bonham is diminished.

In to-day's "Liberal," a paper which has been very violent on the subject of England, there appears the following article:-

"All the acts and manifestations of the British Government show, in our opinion, an unquestionable loyalty.

"The Spanish Government knows perfectly what to expect on this point.

"Sir Drummond Wolff, who arrived last night at Madrid, and who will certainly have a conference to-day with the Minister of State, will repeat to Señor Moret, in the opinion of other Ministers, what the Government have known for some days by means of our Ambassador in London, Señor Mazo, namely, that England recognizes as natural and legitimate the claim of Spain with all its consequences, and, on her part, has addressed, and will continue to address, earnestly her counsels to the Sultan to adjust his conduct to the stipulations of our Treaty with Morocco.

"The Government received intelligence yesterday from our Consul at Gibraltar, which serves as a further proof of the sincerity with which the Ministry of Queen Victoria is proceeding with respect to Spain.

"The Secretary of the Governor of that Fortress told the Consular Agent we have mentioned that the authorities had ordered the concentration in one place of all arms and munitions of war which were for sale, and have further forbidden under severe penalties that any sales should take place without special permission.

"The Government of Madrid does not therefore foresee that their action in Melilla, or, should the necessity arise later, in the Empire of Morocco, will give rise to any international difficulty, as this can clearly be deduced from the attitude towards Spain of the other Powers interested in Africa, and especially of England."

Document 80:⁽⁹⁹⁾ *Anxiety displayed by Señor Moret during an interview.*

Yesterday I called by appointment on Señor Moret, and had a long interview with his Excellency.

(98) Confidential 6448, n° 217, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 8, 1893.

(99) Confidential 6448, n° 218, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 8, 1893.

His Excellency informed me that the excitement in Spain with respect to Morocco was increasing daily, and that unless an answer was returned by the Sultan by the 12th it would be impossible to avoid taking the most stringent measures. His Excellency was of opinion that the Sultan was trying to evade giving an answer altogether. At his earnest instance, I telegraphed in my telegram n^o 77 the complete substance of his Excellency's remarks.

His Excellency went on to say, though somewhat in contradiction with opinions he had formerly expressed, that France exercised considerable influence in Spain. This circumstance he attributes to the following causes.

Between 1813 and 1833, when the Bourbonic idea prevailed, great pains were taken by France to associate with her own the public opinion in Spain. In the press and in the pulpit the advantage of despotic theories was contrasted with liberal ideas to which were attributed the sufferings of Spain during the absence of the Bourbons from the Throne of France. These views were encouraged by the Dynasty and Government of Spain, and propagated by every possible means.

On this followed the part taken by Mr. Canning in the emancipation of the Spanish Colonies, whereby Spain has been lowered and impoverished.

Side by side with these considerations is the continuous mortification to Spanish patriotism, caused by the sight of the British flag over the fortifications of Gibraltar. This feeling, his Excellency added, could not be argued away.

More recently the spread of Republican feeling in Spain had been fostered by the success of the Republic in France, and no effort was spared by the French Republicans to enlist the sympathies of that party in Spain. Recently a Madrid telegraphic agency, known as Fabras, had passed into the hands of Havas. His Excellency still retained a certain control over it, but the transfer was a symptom of French activity.

He himself had been gibbeted and caricatured as the creature of England. He had worked with success to modify the anti-English attitude of the Spanish press. His policy was English, and he wished to act under the advice of Her Majesty's Government. But unless satisfaction were promptly given by the Sultan of Morocco, war was inevitable. Melilla was not of sufficient strength to maintain a larger army than the present. There was no neighbourhood from which supplies or water could be obtained, and the Riffs, whose food consisted of barley bread, were constantly relieving each other and harassing the Spanish troops. If this went on, his Excellency apprehended danger both for the Queen-Regent and the future of the Monarchy. On the 28th October,

when a movement was on foot for a friendly demonstration before the French Embassy and a hostile manifestation before this Embassy, the danger, which was very great, had been averted by the strong will of Señor Aguilera, the Governor of Madrid; but further delay was impossible.

I reluctantly consented to address to your Lordship the telegram I forwarded, but the anxiety, not to say alarm, of Señor Moret were so evident, that I found it necessary to give him the promise.

I inclose the translation of the version of the conversation given by his Excellency to the "Liberal," over which he has regained some influence.

Document 81:⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ *Substance of conversation with Señor Moret about the European Governments supporting Spain in Melilla's crisis.*

In the course of my conversation yesterday with Señor Moret, his Excellency informed me that the Powers which had supported Spain in Morocco were Austria, Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. Portugal had also done so apparently, not with his Excellency's cordial approval, as there was an evident misgiving that at a given period that Iberian Power might put forth her claim to a reward.

His Excellency also said that he fancied Russia would have been quite willing to take a similar course, but for this he had given no opening.

In the Minister's opinion, France was labouring under delusions respecting Russia.

The latter country have made herself mistress of the situation by recent manifestations, and would alone reap the benefit. The Emperor was bent on peace, and France was mistaken if she thought to obtain assistance from Russia for a war with the Triple Alliance. Such support would be limited to the Mediterranean, into which Russia wished to establish an access.

Document 82:⁽¹⁰¹⁾ *Substance of the Sultan's reply as published in papers.*

With reference to my telegram n° 79 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inclose herewith, copy and translation of a supplement to the evening newspaper "*El Correo*," which publishes the substance of the Sultan of Morocco's answer to the representations made by the Spanish Government with regard to recent events at Melilla.

(100) Confidential 6448, n° 218, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential), Madrid, November 9, 1893.

(101) Confidential 6448, n° 220, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential), Madrid, November 9, 1893.

Inclosure in document 82:⁽¹⁰²⁾ *Supplement to “El Correo” of November 9, 1893. Substance of the aforementioned Sultan’s reply.*

(Translation.)

The Sultan’s note- According to intelligence which we consider to be from a good source, important telegrams have been received this morning from Tangier, in which precise information is given as to the whereabouts of the Sultan, and furthermore, certain ideas are here advanced as to his reply to the note from our Government. The Sultan was in fact staying at Tafilelt, and his letters had been delayed nineteen days in reaching Tangier; the bearers of these letters being certain soldiers of His Shereefian Majesty.

The Sultan, as we have heard, according to the note delivered yesterday by Sidi Mohammed Torres to our Minister in Tangier, condemns the conduct of the Riffs, protests his firm friendship for Spain, and threatens his subjects with punishment.

He has likewise sent orders to the Riffs to suspend any attitude of hostility towards Spain, the bearer of his instructions being a notable personage of the Court. Meanwhile, the Sultan is preparing an army to chastise the rebels should they disobey his orders, and has ordered a force of cavalry to march for the Riff forthwith.

The note of the Sultan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to our Minister at Tangier ends more or less in the following words :-

“The Sultan has commanded us in the most categorical manner to give you every information, and to assure you that he will act with rigour, so that, by the grace of God, no traces may remain of anything likely to cause discord in the solid friendship uniting the two Governments.”

We believe that this important intelligence has occupied the attention of the Ministers in the Council, presided over to-day by Her Majesty the Queen.

Document 83:⁽¹⁰³⁾ *Advice given by Señor Brin to the Spanish Ambassador. Remarks respecting views of France about the maintenance of the independence of Morocco.*

When some days ago I called on Signor Brin, his Excellency told me that M. Rascon, the Spanish Ambassador, had just left him, and that, naturally, their conversation had principally turned on the state of affairs in Morocco, brought about by the conflicts at Melilla, and on the course of action to be

(102) Confidential 6448, Inclosure in n°. 220. Supplement to “El Correo” of November 9, 1893.

(103) Confidential 6448, n° 222, Mr. Edwardes to the Earl of Rosebery, (Very Confidential), Rome, November 9, 1893.

followed by the Spanish Government for the punishment of the Kabyles, and to avenge the check which Spanish arms had encountered.

Signor Brin told me that he had spoken very openly to Signor Rascon, urging the imperative necessity of moderation on the part of the Spanish Government, so that France should have no pretext for a sudden development of her policy of encroachment in Morocco, and Signor Brin had added, he said, that he was confident that any material disturbance of the *status quo* in that country, which might be brought about by the demands of Spain, would oblige Great Britain to adopt a very energetic policy for the defence of her own interests.

“J’ai dit a M. Rascon,” M. Brin went on to say, “que je pourrais jurer que l’Angleterre désire bien sincèrement le *statu quo* dans le Maroc, mais vous pouvez être bien sûr qu’elle ne vous permettra jamais de mettre la main sur Tanger, ni sur bien d’autres choses.”

Signor Brin repeatedly told M. Rascon that he sincerely hoped that Spain would obtain all the satisfaction which she had a right to demand on account of the attacks of the Kabyles, but he trusted that the demands she would make would be measured by moderation.

From the reports which had reached him, M. Brin said that he was glad to think that the Spanish Government appeared to wish to act with moderation, being fully cognizant of the dangers which might follow on any other course; but it evidently appeared to M. Brin, that Signor Rascon might not be a good adviser on this point to his Government.

M. Brin told me that he had also had a conversation on the state of affairs in Morocco with M. Billot, the French Ambassador, who had also spoken of the importance of the maintenance of the *status quo* in Morocco, but that, when the question of the French advance on Tuat, &c., was incidentally referred to M. Billot had remarked, “mais tout ça nous appartient.”

M. Brin concluded by observing to me that France’s views as to the maintenance of the independence of Morocco were certainly peculiar and convenient to herself.

I made no remark to his Excellency, beyond saying that there could be no shadow of a doubt but that the independence of Morocco had always been an unvarying point in the policy of England, but that I believed that Her Majesty’s Government desired that the maintenance of the *status quo* should be interpreted as genuinely and as loyally by other countries as by England.

I thanked Signor Brin for the counsels of moderation which he had given

to M. Rascon, and which I ventured to believe were entirely in accordance with your Lordship's wishes.

Document 84:⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ *If the question of territorial compensation is mooted, in the context of Melilla's crisis, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris M Develle will at once consult Her Majesty's Government.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that no allusion whatever was made by the Spanish Ambassador (in an interview he had just had with his Excellency) with regard to the questions of indemnity or of territorial compensation.

This latter question had not been broached to M. Roustan, the French Ambassador at Madrid, who obviously would refrain from embarking on it of his own accord.

M. Develle added that in the event of such a question being mooted, the French Government would at once consult Her Majesty's Government.

It appears, however, that the Spanish Ambassador had, some days ago, referred in vague terms to the cramped position of the forts at Melilla, and to the necessity of having to extend them.

No allusion was of course made by me to the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 13th instant.

Document 85:⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ *The French Government is strongly advocating the statu quo.*

At an interview which I had to-day with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Excellency told me that the French Government were now strongly advocating the *status quo*, having failed in their efforts to induce the Spanish Government to endanger it. They were alarmed at the possibility not only of an outbreak of religious fanaticism in Algeria, but even of a European conflagration, and had deferred the expedition to Tuat while endeavouring to calm the excitement on the Malaja.

The article in the "Times" of Monday has given much satisfaction to his Excellency.

(104) Confidential 6448, n° 240, Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Paris, November 15, 1893.

(105) Confidential 6448, n° 242, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret and Confidential), (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, November 15, 1893.

Document 86:⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ *Troops sent to the Riff under the Sultan's brother. Six tribes commanded to cease opposing construction of fort under pain of the Sultan's curse. The Spanish Government begged to delay the building fort till Sultan can intervene effectually.*

Cid Torres yesterday sent a note to the Spanish Minister, acquainting him that 400 horsemen have been dispatched to the Riff by the Sultan under his brother, Mulai Arafa, to gather men as they go, and arrive at Melilla shortly. Letters have been sent by the Sultan to six of the tribes, commanding them to cease opposition to the construction of the fort on pain of his curse falling on them.

The Sultan says that as soon as his affairs permit he will remove to a position nearer the Riff, but, in case the tribesmen should not obey his orders, he begs the Spanish Government to delay building the fort until he can intervene effectually.

The Spanish Minister thinks his Government may dislike this suggestion, but, otherwise the answer is regarded as very satisfactory by him.

Document 87:⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ *Comments by Ernest Satow related to the Sultan's substance note on Melilla's crisis after a meeting with his Spanish colleague in Tangier.*

The Spanish Minister showed me this afternoon a translation of the note which he received yesterday from the Sultan's Agent at Tangier in reply to his earliest presentations respecting the Melilla affair.

The note states that the Sultan has learnt with much annoyance of the hostilities commenced by the tribesmen with the object of preventing the construction of that which was being constructed, and that they will have to pay for their weak understanding which has caused them to suppose that His Shereefian Majesty would permit anything to be done which could injure the long-standing friendship between the two countries, That His Majesty is sending a detachment of horsemen to the spot for the purpose of restoring order in the meantime, and that he will proceed to act with such vigour that no trace shall remain of anything that might cool the existing friendship between the two Governments.

My colleague states that, in the judgment of those who know the country, this is fairly satisfactory answer, especially when it is remembered

(106) Confidential 6448, n° 247, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery,(Telegraphic) P, Tangier, November 16, 1893.

(107) Confidential 6448, n° 267, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, Tangier , November 9, 1893.

that at the date of the Sultan's letter His Majesty had no knowledge of the events at Melilla subsequent to 2nd October.

In addition, information has been furnished to him unofficially that the Sultan is paring to send a considerable force to the Riff, under the command of a Shereef of importance related to His Majesty, to support the commands which will be transmitted he tribesmen by the leader of the detachment above mentioned.

The messengers, who brought the Sultan's reply, left His Majesty near Tafilelt on 21st ultimo, having thus employed nineteen days on the journey. Travelling on horseback, as they have done, they naturally took a longer time than the runners, dispatched from Tangier on the 6th ultimo, with the letters containing the first news. It is evident that His Majesty was duly impressed by the gravity of the occasion, for he lost no time in making up his mind to the reply he had to give. The apparent vagueness of the Sultan's language, as compared with the terms of the Spanish Minister's demands, reported in my despatch n^o 147 of the 7th October, is not thought to indicate any desire to decline responsibility, but rather to be due to a characteristic Moorish habit of avoiding precise expressions.

Cid Mohammed Torres has stated to me that as far as he knows, the Sultan's intention, at the moment of dispatching his messengers, was to remain some time yet in the region of Tafilelt, The best information I have been able to obtain shows him to have then been still two days' march from the Sanctuary, to visit which formed the declared object of his expedition. But it is just possible that the advice given in the letters dispatched to the Court, after the engagement in which General Margallo was killed, by Cid Mohammed Torres, at the instance of the Spanish Minister, and by the majority of the foreign Representatives, may induce His Majesty to hasten his return to this side of the Atlas.

Document 88:⁽¹⁰⁸⁾*The Spanish Minister has drawn his attention to the article in "Diario de Tanger", an organ of the French Legation. Its change of tone makes him doubt whether the French are acting straight.*

The Spanish Minister has drawn my attention to an article in the "Diario de Tanger" of the 11th instant, of which I beg to inclose an extract, alleging that the Sultan, more farsighted than certain European Governments, on the 30th September last *officially requested the Spanish Government to suspend the construction of the Fort of Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach] until his return from Tafilelt, in order to avoid disturbances or conflicts with the Riffians.* (The

(108) Confidential 6448, n^o 268, Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret), Tangier, November 13, 1893.

italics are those of the journalist.) The reason being, it adds, that the Sultan saw what the unfortunate General Margallo could neither see nor foresee, because the Monarch was aware of the friction that had taken place between the Commandant of Melilla and the Chiefs of the Riff country. It goes on to say: “Illogical conclusion: the Sultan has had to endure the shameless smuggling openly carried on through Melilla, in spite of his efforts to prevent it; the Sultan tried to avoid sanguinary conflicts, and no notice was taken of his wise warnings; and now he will have to pay for it all.” The article winds up by saying that it will be the duty of the Spanish Government to place in the scales the shortcomings as well as the rights of both parties, when the accounts between them and the Sultan come to be made up.

The paper in question is believed to be the property of M. Kerdec, and is regarded here as an organ of the French Legation. It is this latter fact which gives the article importance in the eyes of my Spanish colleague, up till now the “*Diario de Tanger*” has warmly supported the Spanish cause, and this sudden change of tone has surprised others of my colleagues besides M. de Potestad,

Quite recently rumours have been circulated that the settlement of the Melilla affair would probably be submitted to arbitration, to the annoyance of M. de Potestad, who sees in this an indication that some of the Powers wish to intervene. The origin of the suggestion has been attributed to various Legations in turn, and this article of the “*Diario*” seems, in his opinion, to fix it on the French. He is not altogether convinced that the French Government are acting straightly, and fears that while ostensibly giving their support to Spain at both Paris and Tangier, they may be working in a contrary direction through Dr. Linares, who is with the Sultan.

M. de Potestad assures me that, as far as he knows, the assertion that the Sultan had warned the Spanish Government in the manner indicated is absolutely false.

Inclosure in document 88:⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ *Extract from the “Diario de Tanger” of November 11, 1893 as mentioned above.*

(Translation.)

The incident of Melilla has once more demonstrated that Mulai Hassan is gifted with more foresight than certain European Governments.

(109) Confidential 6448, n° 268, Inclosure in document 87, Extract from the “*Diario de Tanger*” of November 11, 1893.

Under date of the 30th September he officially requested the Spanish Government to suspend the construction of the Fort of Sidi Aguariach [Sidi Ouriach] until his return from Tafilelt in order to avoid disturbances and conflicts with the Riffians. This is because the Sultan saw what the unfortunate General Margallo was not able to see nor foresee, because the Moorish Sovereign knew the friction which had taken place between the Governor of Melilla and the Chiefs of the Riffian country.

Illogical conclusion: the Sultan has had to suffer the barefaced contraband which has been carried on openly through Melilla, in spite of his efforts to prevent it; the Sultan wanted to avoid bloody conflicts, and no account was taken of his wise warnings, and now *he will have to pay for the whole*.

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Now the Spanish Government is bound to act with a due regard to justice, throwing into the scales of the balance the faults as well as the rights of everyone when the accounts are settled between them and the Sultan, if they wish to maintain with the Moorish Government relations and a prestige more than diplomatic, that is to say, more than superficial.

We shall see.

Document 89:⁽¹¹⁰⁾ *The Arrival of the Sultan's brother at Melilla.*

With reference to my telegram N° 57, Mulal Arafa, the Sultan's brother, arrived at Melilla yesterday.

Document 90:⁽¹¹¹⁾ *Information from Baron Pasetti in Vienna about the French proposals to Spain regarding Tetuan.*

Morocco. Baron Pasetti informed me yesterday of the fact, should your Lordship not have heard of it already, that the French Ambassador at Madrid proposed to the Queen-Regent that Spain should make territorial acquisitions in the direction of Tetuan. He offered support of France for this purpose, but the Queen-Regent absolutely rejected the offer.

Document 91: ⁽¹¹²⁾ *Conversation with Señor del Mazo respecting Melilla's crisis. A sortie is contemplated to satisfy the public feeling, and the French proposal about Tetuan.*

(110) Confidential 6448, n° 269, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Tangier, November 21, 1893.

(111) Confidential 6448, n° 270, Sir E. Monson to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret), (Telegraphic.) P, Vienna, November 21, 1893.

(112) Confidential 6448, n° 275, The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff, (Confidential), Foreign Office, November 22, 1893.

I had a conversation of considerable interest to-day with the Spanish Ambassador respecting affairs in Morocco, which, his Excellency said, were proceeding not unfavourably. The Sultan's brother had arrived in the neighbourhood of Melilla to arrange matters, but, nevertheless, it was in contemplation to make a sortie in order to satisfy Spanish public sentiment, which was much excited. Replying to an observation of mine, expressing fear that a sortie might lead to a war, M. del Mazo stated that it was only intended to destroy a road and some earthworks constructed by the enemy, and that the Spanish Government reiterated in the strongest sense their determination of maintaining the *status quo*. "Not an inch of territory," he repeated, "as I have said before." He added that he should cease to hold his post were this policy departed from.

I then told M. del Mazo of the overtures made by the French Ambassador at Madrid to the Queen-Regent with reference to Tetuan, information respecting which had reached me from various quarters, but of which his Excellency had apparently not heard, and I also told him, in confidence, that M. Develle denied all cognizance of the matter.

Document 92: ⁽¹¹³⁾ *Señor Castelar's suggestions. The Substance of his letter to Señor Sagasta, taken from the newspaper.*

With reference to my despatch n° 304 of the 11th instant, and to your Lordship's telegram n° 30 of the 14th instant, on the subject of a suggestion emanating from Señor Castelar respecting certain action to be taken at Melilla, it appears that a letter has been addressed by that statesman to Señor Sagasta, in which he sets forth his views as to the course and possible results of events in Morocco.

The letter itself has not been published; but, according to the newspaper which professes to give the substance of its contents, Señor Castelar felt no alarm for Spain, or for the maintenance of her rights, so long as the conflict was confined to the aggression, on the part of certain rebel tribes, against a civilized country which had not only the right but also the power to punish such acts of hostility with energy and severity. But when recourse has been had to diplomatic action, and repeated promises have been obtained from the Sultan to reduce his rebel subjects to obedience, and to guarantee the rights of Spain by means of his troops, and when no result ensues, and the Riffs continue their hostilities regardless of the Sultan's mediation, the question assumes an international character; and becomes a war between Spain and Morocco.

(113) Confidential 6448, n° 286, Sir H. Drummond Wolf to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 20, 1893.

It is this state of affairs which causes Señor Castelar anxiety on account of the complications which a rupture of the *status quo* in Morocco would entail by gravely compromising the peace of Europe. In this connection he recalls the part which he himself played in similar circumstances, when, believing as he did that a rupture with the United States on the question of the “*Virginius*” would result in a general conflagration, and would imperil Spanish independence, he did not hesitate to sacrifice everything to the interests of his country.

The newspaper from which Señor Castelar’s views are taken does not profess to give the precise means which his Excellency advocates for terminating the war. It confines itself to stating that, in that statesman’s opinion, a termination should be placed to the existing state of affairs, which is mortifying to the national dignity and degrading to the spirit of the army, and which constitutes besides a serious menace for the future relations between Spain and Morocco, and for the peace of Europe.

Document 93:⁽¹¹⁴⁾ *Telegram from General Macias reporting the arrival of the Sultan’s brother and his wish for an interview.*

I have the honour to inclose a translation of a telegram from General Macias, announcing the arrival, near Melilla, of the brother of the Sultan, and his desire of an interview.

In one of the morning papers, it is asserted that a part of the telegram has been suppressed asking the Spaniards to postpone the construction of the objectionable fort.

Inclosure in document 93:⁽¹¹⁵⁾ *Extract from the “El Liberal” of November 21, 1893, Official Telegram from Melilla from General Macias.*

(Translation.)

The Minister of War received the following telegram yesterday:-

“Melilla, November 19, 1893, 10^h 40 P.M.

“The General Commandant to the Minister of War:-

“In the reconnaissance carried out to-day before the forts of Cabrerizas Altas y Rostro Gordo, by sections of “disciplinaires” (penados), and soldiers with Mauser rifles, with the object of protecting the works which the engineers were completing, one of the” *disciplinaire*” was killed.

(114) Confidential 6448, n° 287, Sir H. Drummond Wolf to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 20, 1893.

(115) Confidential 6448, Inclosure in n° 287, Extract from the “*El Liberal*” of November 21, 1893, Official Telegram from Melilla from General Macias.

“Very stormy weather continues to prevail, rendering the departure of ships impossible; those which have attempted to leave having been obliged to return. The discharging of steamers has consequently been suspended, and the engineers have been obliged to stop work. Neither the city nor the forts have opened fire to-day, no enemy having been seen. At three o’clock this afternoon there presented himself with a letter from the Pasha of the camp a Moor from Rey, informing me that a brother of the Sultan was in the neighbourhood of Guelaia [Qal’ia], and that he was coming to hold a personal interview with me, in order to bring about a termination of the troubles between Spain and the frontier tribes; to use his words.

“In addition, he informed me in his letter that he had sent me another messenger, but that he had been unable to reach me owing to the fire of the outposts and the forts.

“I replied that as the Sultan was a great friend of my King, I should feel highly honoured in receiving his brother; but the orders of my Government were so explicit, and the disloyalty of the Kabyles towards Spain so great, that I was unable to order the cessation of fire so long as a single Moorish soldier could be seen in the neighbourhood of our lines near or far; but that I should give orders that care should be taken not to fire when a white flag appeared, so that the Sultan’s brother might enter our lines without danger, requesting that this might take place soon, since I could not any longer restrain myself from chastising the rebels and commencing the construction of Fort Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach] and any other forts which the Government of my King Alfonso XIII (whom God preserve) should deem fit to command.”

Document 94:⁽¹¹⁶⁾ *The Spanish Ambassador in London. Denial of any authorization for proposal concerning Tetuan made by the French Ambassador at Madrid. Señor Moret asks by what statement on the part of Lord Dufferin this denial was elicited.*

The Spanish Ambassador in London has telegraphed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to say that M. Develle has denied that any authority has been given to the French Ambassador at Madrid to propose an acquisition of Moorish territory affecting the *status quo* to the Spanish Government.

Señor Moret would be glad to learn, at your Lordship’s earliest convenience, what was the statement made to M. Develle by Lord Dufferin by which this disavowal was elicited. Mention was made of Tetuan. His

(116) Confidential 6448, n° 288, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret and Confidential), (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, November 23, 1893.

Excellency fears that this communication may prevent further confidences on the part of France.

Document 95:⁽¹¹⁷⁾ *Conversation with the Spanish Ambassador concerning the alleged communications made by French Ambassador at Madrid about Tetuan to Queen Regent.*

The Spanish Ambassador called to-day and communicated the substance of a telegram from Señor Moret respecting the communication said to have been made by the French Ambassador at Madrid to the Queen-Regent on the subject of Tetuan. It represented the report as exaggerated, and as being inaccurate in one point.

Señor Moret expressed the hope that I should suspend my judgment of the incident until the receipt of a written communication which he is sending to the Spanish Embassy.

Señor del Mazo was informed, in reply, that the report had reached me from many quarters, and that, as I had already mentioned to him, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had denied that there was any foundation for it. His Excellency remarked that M. Roustan was very “remuant,” and an intriguer, and that it was possible that he had made the suggestion without authority.

Document 96:⁽¹¹⁸⁾

Moulay Arafá asked for a delay and the Spanish General refused his request.

I have the honour to report that no result has ensued from the meeting between General Macia and the Sultan’s brother.

The latter asked for delay until the Sultan could arrive at Fez, and promised that the Riffs would be punished, but the General replied that he could not accede to this delay.

The prince then asked that permission to trade with the fortress should be granted to the Riffs, but this was also refused, the General saying that he must continue operations.

The General accordingly continues his preparations, while the Sultan’s brother promises to do all in his power to give satisfaction, and to punish the Riffs.

There are rumours of a Ministerial crisis, and no decision seems to have been arrived at by the Government.

(117) Confidential 6448, n° 289, The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff, (Confidential), Foreign Office, November 24, 1893.

(118) Confidential 6448, n° 291, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, November 24, 1893.

Document 97:⁽¹¹⁹⁾ *Remarks made by Señor Sagasta, to a journalist, expressing his desire for a speedy peace.*

A great sensation has been caused by the publication of an interview of a journalist with Señor Sagasta, in which the latter states openly his desire for a speedy peace with Morocco. His Excellency dwells on the “uselessness of the war,” from which nothing could be gained, his conviction that a heavy punishment had already been inflicted on the Riffs, his apprehensions as to increasing expenditure, and the order given to the General to stop the advance against the tribes whenever he considers it convenient, subject to the exigencies of the struggle.

I have the honour to inclose a translation of the remarks of Señor Sagasta.

They have created a violent excitement in the press.

Inclosure in document 97:⁽¹²⁰⁾ *Extract from “La Epoca” of November 22, 1893 with details on the above subject.*

(Translation.)

Both opinions, carried to extremes, are exaggerated; but the most lamentable part of the question is the uselessness of the war.

What city, what territory is there that we can conquer at the end of our labours, and as the reward of our victory? None; for this territory of the Riff is of no use to us, and it will happen that when our troops go to Gurugu, and even encamp there, they will find no Moors with whom to fight; yet when they return the Moors will reappear, occupying the positions from which they had been dislodged.

I know very well that public opinion is very strong on the subject of “inflicting a severe chastisement on the Kabyles;” but if, in inflicting this chastisement, even though we killed 500 Moors, 20 Spaniards were to die, the chastisement would cost us very dear, since nothing could repay us for the lives of our soldiers uselessly sacrificed.

What has occurred is, that though no chastisement has been inflicted upon them in battle, in a potent and brilliant manner, they have nevertheless been severely chastised, since their casualties have amounted to more than 300 killed and 1,000 wounded, in addition to the serious destruction of their villages and dwellings.

(119) Confidential 6448, n° 296, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 23, 1893.

(120) Confidential 6448, Inclosure n° 296, Extract from “La Epoca” of November 22, 1893.

With regard to the slowness of the operations, it must be borne in mind that it was at first proposed to employ 8,000 men to bring them to their conclusion; then 12,000 to 15,000 were talked of, after which 20,000; and now an encampment is proposed large enough to hold 25,000 to 30,000 men.

All this requires time, and the Government cannot precipitate the action of the Commandant of the forces at Melilla. On one occasion it was pointed out to him that there was no apparent advantage in provisioning the forts for a few days at a time, as this merely occasioned a loss of time and lives, and that it would be better to provision them for two or three months. General Macias replied, however, that he was acting in this manner in order to gradually accustom his troops to active service, by employing different regiments and corps in turn on convoy duty.

As to the cost of all this, added Señor Sagasta, it is simply alarming. I believe it will amount to 60 millions of pesetas, since 30 are already spent, and I do not think that the contracts and requisitions already made will fall much below this figure; for since everything has to be bought in a hurry, and on disadvantageous terms, it results that we pay much more than we should have to in normal times.

Bearing in mind that there are 16,000 men over there, more than 2,000 of which are cavalry, that the remittance of ammunition is enormous, that a demand has just been made for 30,000 shells, and further, that the army cannot move one step without even transporting its drinking water, since the Moors have filled up the wells, and the ruinous cost of this war becomes apparent.

Document 98:⁽¹²¹⁾ *The Spanish note to the Sultan is refusing truce asked for by his brother while any Moroccans are with their territory, and calling upon him to carry out Treaty of Wad Ras.*

Morocco. A note has been addressed by the Spanish Government to the Sultan, stating that it is impossible to grant the truce asked for by Muley Araaf [Arafa] so long as there are any Moors within the Spanish territory. The Spaniards will themselves undertake to expel the Riffs, and they call upon the Sultan to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of Wad Ras.

This note will be communicated to the Representatives of European Powers at Tangier.

It is evident that the Sultan's brother has little or no influence with the Riff tribesmen.

(121) Confidential 6448, n° 298, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, November 27, 1893.

Document 99:⁽¹²²⁾ *The British Government have never doubted the good faith of the Spanish assurances. The object of Lord Dufferin, the British Ambassador in Paris, was to elicit the intentions of the French Government.*

In reply to your Excellency's despatch n° 321, I do not know that I can say more than that Her Majesty's Government have never for a moment doubted that the assurances of the Spanish Government were given in good faith.

The object of Lord Dufferin's communication to the French Government was merely to force their hand and elicit their intentions, by reminding them of M. Waddington's previous communication on the subject.

Document 100:⁽¹²³⁾ *Fears from the appointment of Marshal Campos to lead to anticipations of hostilities on a large scale.*

The appointment of Marshal Campos will, I fear, lead people to anticipate that hostilities on a great scale are contemplated.

Document 101:⁽¹²⁴⁾ *Reinforcements sent recently to Melilla.*

Since my last despatch n° 39 of the 15th instant, the troops that have been sent from here to Melilla have been the 1st Battalion of the Regiment of "Mallorca," 729 men; 1st Battalion of the Regiment of "Toledo," 760 men; and 120 sailors with General of Brigade Berry and his Staff.

Document 102:⁽¹²⁵⁾ *The French Ambassador has explained that his alleged offer was a misunderstanding. Proposes to let the matter drop.*

With reference to your Lordship's telegrams nos 37 and 38 of the 24th and 27th instant respectively, M. Roustan, the French Ambassador, has stated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that his alleged offer with regard to Tetuan was a misunderstanding.

I would therefore propose, with your Lordship's sanction, to let the matter drop, unless otherwise requested by the Minister.

Document 103:⁽¹²⁶⁾ *The appointment of Marshal Campos was meant to*

(122) Confidential 6448, n° 299, the Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff, (Telegraphic.) P, Foreign Office, November 27, 1893.

(123) Confidential 6448, n° 300, the Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff, (Telegraphic.) P, Foreign Office, November 27, 1893.

(124) Confidential 6448, n° 301, Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery, Malaga, November 23, 1893.

(125) Confidential 6448, n° 302, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, November 28, 1893.

(126) Confidential 6448, n° 303, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, November 28, 1893.

avoid a crisis and satisfy the public clamour. Prince Gorchakoff says Russia must be consulted on all the Mediterranean questions.

With reference to the appointment of Marshal Martinez Campos in Morocco, it was inevitable to avoid a Ministerial crisis and to satisfy public clamour.

As the cost now is at least 20,000*l.* a-day, I cannot think that the Spaniards want a great war; at the same time, an early ending seems to depend on the execution of the VIIth Article of the Treaty of Wad Ras by the Sultan after the first Spanish success.

Prince Gorchakoff, the Russian Minister, informed me last night that Russia would insist on being consulted in all questions affecting the Mediterranean.

Document 104:⁽¹²⁷⁾ *Offer regarding the city of Tetuan made by M. Roustan, disavowed by M Develle.*

Yesterday evening, on calling at the Ministry of State, Señor Moret asked me if I could explain the meaning of a telegram he had just received from Señor del Mazo. He showed me the document, which I had only time to read cursorily.

The Ambassador telegraphed to say that your Lordship had sent for him to tell him that M. Develle had repudiated the action of M. Roustan in offering to the Queen-Regent the support of France if Spain took possession of Tetuan; that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had declared that M. Roustan was not authorized in using such language, and that your Lordship asked whether Spain would tolerate an Ambassador who had taken such a course without instructions.

Señor Moret seemed much concerned by this telegram, as he feared that the incident reported would cut off, both from himself and also from Her Majesty's Government, a source of information as to the real attitude and intentions of France.

His Excellency therefore urged me to telegraph at once to request your Lordship to inform me, as a guide for his own language, the exact nature of the communication made by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to M. Develle, and which elicited from that Minister the disavowal of M. Roustan's language.

(127) Confidential 6448, n° 304, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret and Confidential), Madrid, November 24, 1893.

With regard to the subject treated in my telegram n° 93 I had but little conversation, as our time was occupied with the discussion of Senior Mazo's telegram. I told Senior Mazot that the communications made by Lord Dufferin to the French Government, which he had referred to on a former occasion, were merely a reproduction of the language employed by your Lordship to all friendly Powers on the occasion of Sir West Ridgeway's mission, namely, that Her Majesty's Government wished to maintain the *status quo*, a policy which could best be carried out by the friendly co-operation of all Governments.

I should say that the information respecting the Tetuan offer was supplied to me by a colleague, who had heard it from Señor Moret immediately after it had been made. In order not to commit my informant, I did not mention it until I had heard it from other sources, when I thought it best to let Señor Moret know indirectly that I was not ignorant of what had occurred, to which, in conversation with me, his Excellency had only alluded vaguely, and with a certain mystery. I imagine that Señor Leon y Castillo is very much under French influence, and gives a French colouring to any statements made to him at Paris in connection with Her Majesty's Government.

Probably, under this influence, Señor Moret has been more guarded than before in his communications with me, as, before dispatching my telegram n° 93, he was clearly annoyed at what he had heard from Paris.

Your Lordship will receive by post to-morrow a despatch in cypher (n° 321), sent off yesterday.

Document 105:⁽¹²⁸⁾ *Interview of General Macias with the Sultan's brother. Rejection of the proposals by the Council of Ministers. Extracts from newspapers.*

I last night had the honour to telegraph to your Lordship a summary of the Report by General Macias of his interview with Prince Muley Araaf [Moulay Arafa]

I have now the honour to transmit a translation in full, as well as a translation of the decision thereon taken by the Council of Ministers late yesterday evening, after a prolonged sitting.

The newspapers report dissensions in the Cabinet. Señor Moret, while agreeing with his colleagues in rejecting the truce requested, considered the request as logical, and pointed out the problems of international gravity which

(128) Confidential 6448, n° 305, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 25, 1893.

he considered would follow if this difficult question were not handled with extraordinary prudence.

General Lopez Dominguez, it is understood, persists in his determination to resign if not allowed to take the command of the expedition.

Señor Sagasta asked for a short delay to consider the importance of the Ministerial question, and a further Council will probably be held to-day.

Inclosure 1 in document 105:⁽¹²⁹⁾ *Extract from the "Imparcial" of November 25, 1893.*

(Translation.)

The following is the official note communicated to the press:-

The Council of Ministers, having carefully studied the telegram in which the General commanding the forces at Melilla gives an account of his interview with Prince Muley Araaf [Moulay Araf], are agreed to approve of the conduct held by General Macias, as being a faithful interpretation of the instructions received. They are also agreed that General Macias should inform the said Prince that the Government cannot grant his Petition of suspending, by any delay, the operations indispensable to the defence of their territory and to the respect due to their flag, and that it maintains the demand already communicated to the Sultan, exacting the complete and immediate fulfilment of Article VII of the Treaty of Wad Ras, throwing on the Empire all the responsibility that may result from its non-observance.

The Government, considering that the visit of Prince Araaf [Araf] to the camp has in no way altered the pending situation, has resolved to repeat the orders it had previously transmitted, and to further pursue and terminate the operations judged proper to conciliate the different elements and necessities of the situation.

Inclosure 2 in document 105:⁽¹³⁰⁾ *Extract from "El Pais" of November 25, 1893.*

(Translation.)

The General in Command to the Minister of War,

To-day at twelve o'clock, according to appointment, the interview with the brother of the Sultan took place in the Central Camp, known by the name of "Instruction."

(129) Confidential 6448, Inclosure 1 in n° 305, Extract from the "*Imparcial*" of November 25, 1893.

(130) Confidential 6448, Inclosure 2 in n° 305, Extract from "*El Pais*" of November 25, 1893, Melilla, November 23, 1893.

He presented himself, preceded by the Pasha, escorted by twenty infantry and thirty cavalry.

I went forward on horseback to greet him, and the regiment of Santiago in line saluted. The brigades held themselves in readiness to avoid any gathering of people. One of the tents used for a General-in-chief had been already pitched. After mutual salutes, he charged me to signify to the Government the loyal friendship the Sultan entertains for Spain, and that no efforts will be left untried to insure its continuance. That he acknowledges our perfect right to construct whatever we think fit on our territory, and that he proposes to severely punish the Kabyles, he petitioned a delay, so that the Sultan might come to Fez with the object of distancing the Kabyles, and taking them from the interior. He insisted again and again on this.

I answered in the name of Her Majesty, thanking him for his good intentions, promising to make them known to the Government, but that on no account could I grant him one moment of delay in the work and movement of the troops which may be necessary; that as a soldier, I could but obey the order of your Excellency. He begged me also, with the object of softening asperities on both sides, to allow the Riffs to trade with the Camp, to which I answered in the negative, and that this could not be done until my Government ordered it. After having first satisfied the national honour, and insisting much on one or two other petitions which I roundly refused, he left, renewing his phrases of friendship. In a word, what he offered is to do what he can to chastise the rebels and give satisfaction, while I shall continue the work with more activity in the measure of my powers.

On leaving he made me a present of an ancient arquebuse and a scimitar.

Document 106:⁽¹³¹⁾ *Views of Major von Funcke, the German Military Attaché, to which Drummond Wolf, the British Ambassador in Madrid, attaches great weight.*

Last night I had a long conversation with Major von Funcke, the German Military Attaché, as his opinions and views of the present state of things in Morocco are founded on military knowledge as well as personal acquaintance with the country. I beg to call to them the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government.

Major von Funcke considers that the whole crisis has been unnecessary. Spain ought never to have begun building the fort at Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach], although within the Spanish territory, and this for three reasons:-

(131) Confidential 6448, n° 306, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret), Madrid, November 25, 1893.

1. The site chosen was, from a military point of view, not a good one, as it is dominated by two other hills also within the Spanish radius.

2. The opposition of the Moors was quite justifiable, as the building was most offensive to their religious feeling.

3. When built, the distance from the town, about 3 kilom., and the scarcity, not to say absence, of water and supplies, would entail endless expense. Melilla itself is dependent for water, in a great measure, on Malaga and Nemours, from which places it is conveyed in barrels.

With respect to the existing position Major Funcke considers that, with the best intentions, the Sultan will be unable to give any material assistance in coercing the Riffs. It will be some time before the news can reach His Majesty of the breakdown of the negotiations, and the Spanish troops cannot remain idle during this period. Moreover, the Sultan, he thinks, will fear undertaking operations against the Riffs, his co-religionists, conscious as he is that he may perhaps before long require their assistance against foreign aggression or invasion. Spain therefore has no alternative but to proceed with her operations against the Riffs. A compromise is possible between her and her adversaries, but only at the cost of national pride. If Spain undertook not to proceed with the fort at Sidi Guariach, [Sidi Ouriach] but to content herself with fortifications on the two hills before mentioned, the Riffs would be perfectly satisfied, and strategical requirements would be fully carried out. This is, I believe, the course advocated by Señor Castelar, but in the present Chauvinistic wave rolling over the army and the press, it is impossible to foresee what might be the consequence of adopting it. It therefore seems inevitable that Spain should pursue her operations against the Riffs, and carry matters to their bitter end. But if she does so, the victory would appear to be worse than sterile. The ordinary garrison at Melilla has been hitherto from 1,500 to 1,700 strong. The present forces on the spot arc from 16,000 to 20,000, maintained at a large cost. No one can well foresee the expense of further operations, to say nothing of the risk of ulterior complications.

But supposing the Spanish army to triumph, the new fort or forts could not be held with a garrison of less than from 8,000 to 10,000 men, the cost of which, in comparison to the 1,700 till now maintained in Melilla, would be a heavy if not intolerable burden on Spanish resources.

This burden would be largely augmented if Spain, as she it is said wishes, were to take possession of the Hill of Gurugu, which would increase the Spanish territory from 3, as it now is, to 8 kilom.

This view may appear pessimistic, but Major von Funcke is remarkably calm and clear-headed, and I attach great weight to his opinion.

Document 107:⁽¹³²⁾ *Lord Rosebery suggested in his conversation to Señor del Mazo, the Spanish Ambassador in London, as the best solution that Spain should demand just as much territory as enough to make the fortress secure. An indemnity which would cover the Spanish expenditures is clearly out of the question.*

I had another conversation to-day with the Spanish Ambassador with regard to the difficulty at Melilla. He said that Señor Moret would not remain in office if there were any disturbance of the *status quo* in Morocco, because he had pledged himself so entirely in that direction to the Great Powers of Europe. He also told me that Marshal Martinez Campos had been appointed to command the troops, in order to satisfy the demands of public sentiment in Spain.

I remarked to his Excellency that what I had foreseen at the outset had already become evident, which was, that any claim for pecuniary satisfaction, which would reimburse the expenditure incurred by Spain, was out of the question. The Sultan could not possibly pay what had already been spent. M del Mazo admitted that this was so; but hinted at some security in the shape of a "Douane." Without entering into any discussion on this suggestion, I continued that, on the whole, the best solution of the question would, in my opinion, be that Spain should demand such small amount of territory (provided that it was small) as would make the fortress secure. I understood that the whole Peninsula of Melilla was insignificant in area, and, I was sure, if there were no territorial encroachments sufficient to cause a real disturbance of the *status quo*, or to encourage the pretensions of others, that this would be the least objectionable method of terminating the difficulty. His Excellency said that 2 kilom. at the most would be required, and I told him that if he would procure from his Government a map showing what was the line required to secure Melilla against attack, I would then be prepared to consider seriously the arrangement I had proposed. What was more, should the Government of Spain so desire, I would submit to the other Powers concerned this solution of the dispute. I would do this to show that Her Majesty's Government were disinterested in the matter, and out of my warm regard for Spain, though I should prefer not being put forward, and should only act if it was the real desire of the Spanish Government.

(132) Confidential 6448, n° 306, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret), Madrid, November 25, 1893.

His Excellency thanked me cordially, and promised to transmit my proposition to his Government.

Document 108:⁽¹³³⁾ *Memorandum from the official sources of the course of events since the 6th instant until the arrival of the Sultan's brother.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a Memorandum containing a short account by Sir George Bonham, taken from official sources, of the course of events at Melilla since the 6th instant until the arrival of Muley Araaf [Moulay Arafa], the Sultan of Morocco's brother.

Inclosure in document 108:⁽¹³⁴⁾ *Memorandum with details of the previous events concerning the affair of Melilla.*

With the exception of a few skirmishes and some artillery firing at long ranges the period which has elapsed since the 6th instant at Melilla has been singularly uneventful. The official telegrams from General Macias to the Minister of War and from the naval officer in command to the Minister of Marine report the arrival of fresh troops, and the departure of the ships in which they came for Algeciras or for Malaga. The works connected with the trenches and new fortifications have been delayed at one time by torrential rains, and latterly by severe tempests.

On the 7th, and again on the 9th, the forts of Rostrogordo and Cabrorizas Altas were provisioned without any difficulty, as the convoy was not attacked; the provisions are stated to have been sufficient to last for twenty days. On the 8th, General Macias reported that the Pasha of the district, the Pasha of Magazan [Mazagan?], and the officer in command of the troops, had asked for an interview, and had informed him that the Kabyles of the interior alone desired to carry on hostilities, exercising pressure on those living on the frontier, who are described as being desirous of peace, to carry on the war, and asking for a truce of eight days, within which time it was expected that the Sultan's force would arrive and inflict severe chastisement on the rebels. General Macias, answered that if at 3 P.M. on the following day a definite petition for peace with an admission of the right to construct a fort at Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach] had not been made, he would open fire along the whole line.

Accordingly, no answer having been received, the forts opened fire next day on the enemy who were seen in large force, but who did not return it. The Spaniards also commenced intrenchments at Horcas to protect the camp.

(133) Confidential 6448, n° 309, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 26, 1893.

(134) Confidential 6448, Inclosure in n° 309, *Memorandum*.

Subsequently, the Captain of the "Venadito" reported that the Moors appeared to be fighting among themselves. On the 12th the forts at Cabrerizas and Rostrogordo opened fire, compelling the enemy to retire from the positions taken up.

From the 12th to the 17th hostilities seem almost to have ceased; a considerable number of troops arrived, and so much progress was made with the intrenched camp, that it would be possible for an army of 30,000 men to encamp with security, and General Macias asked for two additional regiments.

On the 18th a reconnaissance was carried out between Cabrerizas Altas and Rostrogordo a heavy fire being kept up, which compelled the enemy to retire. Later they obtained possession of the heights, and opened a fire on the ridge of Santiago, but they were dislodged on this occasion, one of the convict force being killed.

On the 19th at 3 P.M. a messenger arrived at Melilla with a letter, stating that the Sultan's brother had arrived and wished to see General Macias, in order to put an end to the frontier difficulties. The General answered that he would be glad to receive the Sultan's brother, but that his orders were so strict, and the treachery of the Moors had been so great, that he could not order a cessation of firing so long as a Moor remained within sight, but that he would give orders that the white should not be fired on in order that the Sultan's brother might approach the fort. Late the same evening the Pasha came to salute the General, giving assurances that the Kabyles would be punished, and asking that the interview with the Sultan's brother might take place on the 22nd. General Macias answered that he would have the honour to receive him, but that he must realize the fact that hostilities would continue, and that if any Moors came within range of the forts or of the infantry practising they would be fired on. The General received assurances that the Riffs of the interior had retired, and that those on the frontier would not fire.

During these days the weather had been extremely bad. The Reina Mercedes, with the 10,000 Mauser rifles, had arrived, and after landing them, which was done with some difficulty, had left for Algeciras.

On the 21st General Macias telegraphed that, in obedience to instructions, the works were being proceeded with without interruption, that a convoy was about to start next day to Cabrerizas Altas and Rostrogordo, and that the Moorish intrenchments in the neighbourhood of Fort X would be destroyed. Three battalions had been armed with the Mauser rifle, and that a large number of men were employed in unloading the "Gerona" and other vessels laden with ammunition and provisions. The Sultan's brother had arrived, and

was encamped at a distance of 1 kilom. from the Mosque of Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach].

On the 22nd General Macias received a letter from the Sultan's brother, Muley Araaf [Moulay Arafa], to the effect that he was unable to go to see him that day as arranged, being tired after his long journey, and having many arrangements to make in his camp. It was noticeable that the Moors no longer came near the Spanish lines. The day was spent in taking provisions and water to Rostrogordo and Cabrerizas.

On the 23rd, at midday, the conference took place. Muley Araaf [Moulay Arafa], begged the General to assure the Spanish Government of the loyal friendship felt by the Sultan for Spain, that he would spare no means to preserve it, that he recognized the right of the Spaniards to build forts anywhere in their own territory, that he intended to chastise the Kabyles with great severity, and that he asked for a month's truce to give the Sultan time to go to Fez in order to dislodge the Kabyles of the interior.

General Macias answered that he would convey these proposals to his Government, but that he could not for a moment desist from the works which had been commenced or in the movement of troops. Muley Araaf [Moulay Arafa], then asked that, in order to soften the bitter feelings between the opposing parties, the Moors might be allowed to come and traffic at Melilla, but this was at once refused.

The Government entirely approved General Macias' language to Muley Araaf [Moulay Arafa], and instructed him to make known their determination not to grant a suspension of arms or of the works undertaken. They repeat their demand that Article VII of the Treaty of Wad Ras should be strictly carried out, making the Sultan's Government responsible for any results arising from its non-execution.

They further observe that, as the arrival of Prince Araaf [Arafa] has made no alteration in the state of affairs, General Macias is to continue the operations already commenced.

Document 109:⁽¹³⁵⁾*The marshal is advancing to the Spanish limits and commencing to build forts. If attacked, he will advance into the Moorish territory.*

Marshal Martinez Campos has received orders to advance to the limits of the Spanish territory, and to commence building the fort at Sidi Guariach

(135) Confidential 6448, n° 312, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, November 30, 1893.

[Sidi Ouriach]. If attacked during these operations by the Moors, he is to advance into their territory as far as circumstances call for.

Document 110:⁽¹³⁶⁾*The building commenced without molestation.*

I have on good though not official authority the following news from Melilla: At 3 o'clock the works of the fort of Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach] commenced, without any molestation from the Moors. The Spanish army had taken precautions. Marshal Martinez Campos conversed with the Pasha at the limits of the Spanish territory when the works began. It is believed that the Pasha answers for the preservation of tranquillity.

Document 111:⁽¹³⁷⁾*Conversation with the Spanish Ambassador relative to M. Roustan's communications regarding the city of Tetuan. Letter from Señor Moret and explanations given in reply.*

In continuation of our interview of yesterday, the Spanish Ambassador called again this afternoon for the purpose of reading to me a letter from Señor Moret relative to the communications respecting Tetuan made by the French Ambassador at Madrid.

Señor Moret explained that M. Roustan had spoken to him as he had spoken to his predecessor at the Ministry of State, and, as Señor Moret supposed, he had spoken to the Queen, respecting the satisfaction with which France would see Spain consolidating her position in Morocco; that during the conversations which had taken place, Señor Moret had alluded to the possibility of war in the event of the Sultan refusing to carry out the Treaty of Wad Ras, and, on that hypothesis, M. Roustan had stated that, if Spain found it necessary to declare war against Morocco, in his opinion, France, seeing her sympathy for Spain, would not be displeased by Tetuan being eventually occupied, as had happened in 1860; but M. Roustan did not offer French support, much less volunteer a guarantee by France that possession should be permanent.

Señor Moret added that, under the influence of the best possible understanding on the subject, M. Roustan, as well as your Excellency and nearly all the other Ambassadors, had merely told him that if Spain found it necessary to have some small increase of territory, for the sake of securing greater safety round Melilla or other fortified positions, no one would deprecate such action, or consider it a cause for displeasure among the European

(136) Confidential 6448, n° 313, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, November 30, 1893, 8 P.M.

(137) Confidential 6448, n° 314, the Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff, (Secret), Foreign Office, November 30, 1893.

Powers. It was notorious that France had always maintained friendly relations with the Spanish Government on the question of Morocco; such relations had been, and still were, entirely compatible with loyalty to the international relations maintained by Spain, and M. Roustan had also informed him of what had passed between M. Develle and Lord Dufferin respecting events at Melilla, and had done so with the very proper intention of clearing away any suspicion of the existence of an understanding between France and England, to the detriment of Spain.

Señor Moret concluded by expressing a wish that his letter should be read to me, and that I should be told that his object in writing it was to destroy any cause for distrust or suspicion, as he sincerely believed that what had occurred with regard to this matter had no real importance, and should not be regarded as more than an episode in the many conversations that had taken place with regard to Spain's relations with Morocco.

I requested Señor Mazo to explain to Señor Moret how Lord Dufferin had come to make the remark which was attributed to him. In August 1892, M. Waddington had come to announce the anxiety of the French Government for cordial co-operation with Great Britain in the affairs of Morocco, and since then I had always treated the French Government with the utmost frankness on the subject, for, indeed, I had nothing to conceal. But I had met with no reciprocity, and had received no communication of any kind from the French Government. The other day, therefore, I had thought it well to instruct Lord Dufferin to remind M. Develle of M. Waddington's communication, and of my readiness to act on that basis. M. Develle had expressed satisfaction at this communication, and shortly afterwards we had heard from every capital in Europe of the overtures made by M. Roustan.

Under these circumstances, I did not like to refuse Lord Dufferin permission to make an allusion to M. Roustan's proceedings, which were so incompatible with the French declarations. Moreover, I wished Señor Moret to understand that I had in no respect violated his confidence. What he had told me as a secret I had kept as a secret, but when I heard the news from every quarter of Europe, I felt that I was at liberty to sanction the allusion made to it by Lord Dufferin.

Document 112:⁽¹³⁸⁾ *Cabinet crisis averted by the appointment of Marshal Campos.*

(138) Confidential 6448, n° 316, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret and Confidential), Madrid, November 28, 1893.

With reference to my telegram of to-day n°.101, I am informed that the choice lay between a damaging change in the Cabinet and sending General Lopez Dominguez, the Minister of War, to Melilla, which, owing to his unpopularity, might have been the cause of a military revolt, already in preparation, among the officers, and that the Queen-Regent saved the situation by her firm attitude.

Her Majesty declined to accept the resignation of Señores Moret and Lopez Dominguez. Marshal Martinez Campos, already on his way to Madrid from Barcelona (with what object is uncertain), was then appointed to the command in Morocco, as being the only man possessed of sufficient prestige to make a policy of moderation acceptable to the country, and as a concession to the officers and warlike attitude of the press.

Document 113:⁽¹³⁹⁾ *The Marshal's instructions and intentions as mentioned in the "Imparcial".*

The "Imparcial," which is supposed to represent the section of the Cabinet influenced by Señor Gamazo, inserts to-day the following paragraph, headed, "How far will the troops advance?"

"The Council of Ministers was occupied last night in the new instructions of a political character which should be given to General Martinez Campos. The formula employed by the General when he passed through Madrid was sufficiently expressive. 'We shall go to where it may be necessary' ('preciso'). And, in fact, the Government considered yesterday that a General-in-chief should take with him to a campaign the most ample powers to proceed according to circumstances.

"But if Señor Martinez Campos desires to know the opinion of the Government, it decided last night that his mission is to secure respect for our interests in Melilla, and the construction of the fort of Sidi Guarriach [Sidi Ouriach].

"Furthermore, it appears that the Government maintains that the troops should advance within our territory ['campo' means land or a camp] to the limits of the same, and construct the necessary fortifications; and that in the case of the lives and labours of the Spaniards not being thus sufficiently secured from the hostility of the Moors, then to advance as far as may be required.

(139) Confidential 6448, n° 320, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid, November 30, 1893.

“This decision of the Government is in accordance with the idea maintained by the General-in-chief.”

The Marshal is reported to have held yesterday a conference with the Sultan’s brother, who asked for delay in the advance so as to give time to reduce to order the contumacious tribes. This request the Marshal is said to have refused in these words, “ I will wait, but proceed” (“ esperar, pero andando ”).

It is now said the expenses amount to about 1,000,000 pesetas a-day, and twenty six General officers have been appointed to the expeditionary force.

The newspapers also make allusion to the supplies furnished to the Riffs by the Kabyles of Muluya, adding that strict orders have been issued on this subject by the French Government to the Military Governor of Oran.

There is one point which seems to give confidence in Marshal Martinez Campos to competent judges, which is that on former occasions he has succeeded as much by negotiation as by fighting. Two officials from the Foreign Office well acquainted with the Treaties have been attached to his staff, from which the conclusion is drawn that attempts may be made for a pacific solution of the campaign.

Document 114:⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ *The Sultan’s action and intentions. Précis of note from Mohammed Torres, the Sultan’s Naïb, to the Spanish Minister in Tangier, and the translation of the Sultan’s letter to the Riff tribes.*

I have the honour to report that on the 14th instant letters arrived from the Sultan to his Minister Cid Mohammed Torres stating that on the 28th ultimo His Majesty had dispatched his brother, Mulai Arafa, from the camp at the head of 400 horsemen, and with instructions to collect soldiers from various tribes as he proceeded down the valley of the Muluya towards the Riff. The letter mentioned eleven days as the time to be occupied on the road, but as no information has yet been received of Mulai Arafa’s arrival in the vicinity of Melilla, it is probable that he has been delayed by difficulties connected with the levying of the required force. I learn, however, from Mr. Vice-Cousul Macleod that Mulai Arafa passed Ksabi-es-Shorfa, at the head of the Muluya valley, about the 8th instant.

The Sultan has sent letters direct to six of the Riff tribes concerned in the hostilities against Melilla commanding them to desist from their opposition

(140) Confidential 6448, n° 322, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, Tangier, November 18, 1893.

to the construction of the Spanish fort, and menacing them with his curse if they are disobedient,

His Majesty further instructed Cid Torres to say to the Spanish Minister that, as soon as the affairs upon which he is engaged permit of his leaving Tafilelt, he will remove to a spot nearer to the Riff. Further, that he is determined to castigate the tribesmen severely in case they should disobey his commands to abstain from opposing the building of the fort, and he expresses the hope that in such a contingency the Spanish Government will not proceed with its construction until he can make his authority effectively felt,

The business alluded to is doubtless the arrangement of a dispute about some lands belonging to the people of Tafilelt, of which they accuse the tribe of Ait Atta of having deprived them, and the consolidation of his influence in those parts. It will doubtless be of importance to His Majesty to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with his brother, Mulai-er-Reschid, before turning his face homewards. Every day's delay increases the probability of the passes of the Atlas becoming blocked with snow, and by some persons it is even thought possible that he may remain in the neighbourhood of Tafilelt till the spring.

As a précis of Cid Torres' note to the Marquis de Potestad, and a translation of the Sultan's letter to the tribes have been published here, I venture to inclose them. I have reason to feel certain that these documents are authentic.

Inclosure 1 in document 114:⁽¹⁴¹⁾ *Précis of Note of Mohammed Torres the Sultan's representative to the Spanish Minister in Tangier.*

(Translation.)

In the note dispatched yesterday to the Spanish Representative by Cid Mohammed Torres, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latter says, according to the information which has reached us, that his Sovereign (may God help him) orders him to acquaint the Spanish Representative, for the information of his Government, that, in consequence of the events at Melilla, he has sent his brother, Mulai Arafa, with a body of cavalry to the forces of the Riff, at a place called Bu Jenad, in order to warn and admonish the people that they will be chastised unless they abandon their hostile attitude towards Spain, and allow the garrison to construct the projected fort.

(141) Confidential 6448, Inclosure 1 in n° 322, Précis of Note of Cid Mohammed Torres to the Spanish Minister.

That he has dispatched the strictest orders to the Governors of the Riff to join the Prince with their people at the spot already mentioned.

That he has given instructions to his illustrious brother to keep in touch with Cid Torres in whatever relates to this matter until its satisfactory solution for the well-being of both Governments, and he hopes that no trace will remain of anything that might cool the friendly relations existing between them.

He then adds that he hopes the tribes of the Riff will implicitly submit themselves to the desires of the Sultan. In the contrary case, if they do not submit, the Sultan begs the Spanish Government, through the medium of Cid Torres, and as a sacrifice to the maintenance of the friendship between both nations, to defer the construction of the fort which has given rise to this conflict until His Shereefian Majesty arrives in his dominions of the Gharb to subdue the Riffians and inflict on them the condign punishment which they have deserved. The Government, recognizing the rights of Spain, asks its Government to have patience, understanding, as they will, that the Sultan greatly deplors this incident to such a degree that he announces that he will hasten his return to Morocco city with the object of settling the question in accordance with his desires.

Mula'i Arafa left the 28th October, and, as he was to occupy some twelve days in performing the journey, has very probably reached his destination.

The Imperial letter is dated Jumada, 1311 (October 1893).

Inclosure 2 in document 114:⁽¹⁴²⁾ *Extract from "El Eco Mauritano" of November 18, 1893.*

(Translation.)

We have received the letter reporting that the Governor of Melilla had made arrangements to construct a fort in the vicinity of Sidi Aguariach [Sidi Ouriach], and that the adjacent Moors had opposed this. At the same time we have received a complaint from the Spanish Government that the Riffians adjacent to Melilla hinder the authorities and troops of that fortress from constructing a fort within their limits, twice destroying the walls which they had begun to raise for the purpose. That the Spaniards had sent forces to protect the construction, and that the Riffians attacked them in large bodies, there being killed and wounded on both sides, and this ill spite of land being concerned bought from the Riffians and ceded to the Spaniards for them to do what they liked with it. What ground existed, therefore, for hindering the

(142) Confidential 6448, Inclosure 2 in n° 322, Extract from "*El Eco Mauritano*" of November 18, 1893.

said construction, which was within their limits, and without there being any Treaty between them in existence to justify this? All the blame for the misfortunes and blunder committed falls upon the Riffians themselves, since, even supposing that any Treaty existed, they ought to have appealed to the Sultan and waited until he answered, and not offer opposition without an order from the Government, They are responsible for the present trouble, which they have caused by their wrong behaviour, and for the loss they have brought upon themselves, their families, their brethren, and their own country.

As for thee, the duty was to have prevented thy countrymen from doing all this, to have counselled them and warned them of the consequences, and have contributed on thy side everything requisite to dissuade them.

For this reason, we send our brother with a body of cavalry, bringing orders not to oppose the construction, and, if they had any Treaty to prevent it, that they bring the same forward, and hold themselves submissive until the Sultan inquires into the matter.

We order thee, therefore, to aid our brother in his mission, and that thou cause them to obey his wishes, reminding the Riffians of their duties in order that they may fulfil them if they love their peace and prosperity. In the contrary case, they shall be cursed, and shall be visited with a chastisement the like of which they have never yet seen.

Document 116:⁽¹⁴³⁾ *Event at Melilla. Despatch from Señor Moret, with report from General Commanding, and an instruction to the Spanish Minister in Tangier.*

(Translation.)

I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency a copy of a despatch, with two inclosures, which I have received from the Secretary of State, on the subject of events at Melilla.

Inclosure 1 in document 116:⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Señor Moret to Señor del Mazo,

(Translation.)

The presence of Prince Muley Araaf [Moulay Arafaf], sent by his brother, the Sultan of Morocco, to put an end to the rebellion and excesses of the Kabyles of the Riff, has, unfortunately, not had the immediate result which His Majesty's Government were justified in expecting. You will see from the

(143) Confidential 6448, n° 324, Señor del Mazo to the Earl of Rosebery, Spanish Embassy, London, December 2, 1893.

(144) Confidential 6448, Inclosure 1 in n° 324, Extract from "*El Eco Mauritano*" of November 18, 1893.

declarations, made by the Prince to the General Commanding at Melilla, a copy of which I transmit herewith, that the Prince founds his request for a temporary cessation of the military operations which the Spanish army has undertaken in the neighbourhood of Melilla on the rebellious conduct of the tribes, which he has not been able to subdue or pacify, and, since he has come to the Riff unaccompanied by sufficient forces to accomplish the mission intrusted to him by his brother, the Spanish Government has not seen its way to agreeing to the truce, or to allowing the Riff Arabs to trade with the fortress of Melilla, a concession which, apart from its being incompatible with the state of war existing between Spain and the Kabyles, would inevitably have led to reprisals on the part of the Spanish soldiers, who see in the Kabyles the men who have mutilated the corpses of their comrades. If it had been a question of military operations, in the course of which the troops had left the confines of Melilla, and had occupied Moorish territory, the Government would have considered the propriety of acceding to the request of its ally the Sultan; but, seeing that the sole objects of the instructions given to the General Commanding, and of the operations which he has been directed to carry out, are to secure to us the possession of our own territory, to drive the Moors out of it, and to construct forts, all of which the Sultan admits we have a perfect right to do, the Government has decided that it would be derogatory to the national dignity and incompatible with our sovereignty to accede to this request. The Government is well aware that the scanty resources of the Emperor, and the distance which separates him from Melilla, make it difficult for him to enforce his commands; nevertheless, while fully recognizing the loyalty of his intentions, it trusts that all the Cabinets of Europe will understand that the Spanish nation cannot for one moment allow savage and undisciplined tribes to assassinate its soldiers, invade its territory, and make constant attacks on the small detached forts erected in the neighbourhood of Melilla for the protection of those engaged in agriculture. An end must be put to these proceedings at once, either by persuasion or by force; and if the Sultan is unable to enforce the provisions of the Treaty of Wad Ras, Spain will enforce them herself, reserving to herself to make the Sultan responsible later on for the non fulfilment of the terms of that Treaty.

In communicating the above to the British Foreign Office, you will take care to make it clear that Spain, without departing in the least from the attitude she has taken up in this matter, insists on the execution of the Treaty by the Sultan, and, meanwhile, intends to act energetically for the defence of her territory, and to avail herself of her perfect right to protect herself against aggression.

The Spanish Government is well aware of the difficulties which the non-execution to the Treaty of Wad Ras introduces into the relations between Spain and the Sultan; nevertheless, it trusts that the loyalty of His Shereefian Majesty on the one hand, and the judgment of the European Governments on the other, will make him understand the urgent necessity of taking steps without delay to put an end to this conflict, and of offering to Spain the reparation to which she is entitled, and the necessary guarantees that incidents like those which occurred in October last shall not be repeated.

The exceptional position occupied by Spain in Morocco, where no other European or Christian nation possesses territories surrounded by the Sultan's dominions, imposes on her exceptional duties, which no doubt are well understood by Her Majesty's Government, and, in defending which, Spain trusts that she has the sympathy of that Government, and of public opinion in England.

I inclose a copy of the Royal Order which I am to-day sending to the Spanish Minister at Tangier.

I am, &c.

The Under-Secretary of State,

(Signed) Joaquin Valera.

Inclosure 2 in document 116:⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ *The General Commanding at Melilla to the Minister for War.*

(Translation)

The meeting with the Sultan's brother took place by previous agreement at noon in the middle of the field known as the Field of Instruction. He came preceded by la of the camp, and escorted by twenty infantry and thirty cavalry-men. I advanced back to salute him, and the regiment of Santiago formed in line and saluted. The brigades were drawn up in camp to avoid a crowd, and one of the tents provided for the commanding Officer had been pitched beforehand. After the usual salutations, he requested me to inform the Government of the feelings of loyal friendship which the Sultan entertains towards Spain, and to state that he will spare no effort to avoid losing that friendship; that he admits that we have a perfect right to build anything we like in our territory, and that he proposes to punish the Kabyles severely. He asked for time, in order that the Sultan might come to Fez and pacify the Kabyles in the interior. He repeated this several times. I replied in the name

(145) Confidential 6448, Inclosure 2 in n° 324, the General Commanding at Melilla to the Minister for War, (Telegraphic), Melilla, November 23, 1893, 6'40 P.M.

of His Majesty's Government, thanking him for his kind words. I said that I would communicate them to the Government, but that I could not agree to delay for one moment any works or any movements of troops which I might consider advisable, and that, as a soldier, I could not do otherwise than obey blindly the orders given by your Excellency.

He also asked that, in order that hostile feelings might be allayed, the Riff Arabs might be allowed to come and trade in the town. I replied in the negative, and said that this could not be until my Government considered that the national honour had been satisfied and allowed it. He pressed both requests, but I refused point-blank. He took leave, with repeated expressions of friendship. He promised to do all he could to punish the rebels, and to give satisfaction.

I shall continue the works more actively, with all the means at my disposal.

On taking leave, he presented me with a gun and a sword.

Inclosure 3 in document 116:⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ *Señor Moret to the Spanish Minister at Tangier.*

(Translation.)

The Cabinet, after carefully considering the inclosed telegram from General Macias, account of his interview with Prince Muley Araaf [Moulay Araf], has resolved as follows: The result of its deliberations has been communicated by telegraph to the General Commanding at Melilla, in order that he may inform the Prince, as an act of courtesy, in reply to his friendly expressions. The Government wishes to show once more by this action its desire to please His Shereefian Majesty, and its friendship for him, Prince Muley Araaf having come to Spanish territory as the Representative of His Majesty.

The Government has not seen its way to complying with the request that the fortification works and military operations which our troops are carrying on in the neighbourhood of Melilla should be suspended. Even supposing that those operations were limited in the manner described in the note of the Moorish Foreign Office, dated the 15th November, to the Spanish Government, the latter considers that it would be incompatible with its dignity to abstain from taking such steps as it considers necessary for the security of its territory and the protection of the Spanish flag. If the Spanish Government

(146) Confidential 6448, Inclosure 3 in n° 324, Señor Moret to Spanish Minister at Tangier, Madrid, November 25, 1893.

had only to consider the ties of friendship which unite it to a Sovereign who shows his anxiety to fulfil his international obligations, and its wish to please His Shereefian Majesty, it might be inclined to accede to his request. But there are other considerations which can not be ignored. On the one hand, the uncertainty of the Sultan's position, the impossibility of communicating directly with him, and the consequent absence of guarantees respecting the proposals of His Shereefian Majesty, and the length of a time he would require to carry them out, would give to the suspension of operations a vague and indefinite character at variance with the exigencies of the situation.

Unfortunately, the state of things has become more serious every day since the attack of the 2nd October, and the events of the 27th and 28th have so aggravated the insult Spain by the Riff men, that public opinion here, as well as the fundamental principles of Government, which require above all that the sovereignty of the State be upheld, whatever may be the circumstances under which that sovereignty has been infringed, demand that the attacks which the Riff men continue to make upon our territory should be repelled with the greatest energy.

On the other hand, Muley Araaf's own words show that he cannot answer for the obedience of the rebel tribes, and that it will take some time to subdue those in the interior, which evidently have no intention of submitting. If his words had been accompanied by action, that is, if he had come with a body of troops sufficiently strong to give effect to his words, so that the Emperor's forces might have united with those of the King of Spain, the Spanish people would have considered the Sultan's intervention satisfactory, and likely to be productive of good results. In the absence of these conditions, however, the position of the Spanish army at Melilla, and the attitude of the Riff men, who are rebelling against the Sultan and carrying on war with Spain, force this country to take into its own hands the work of driving the invaders from Spanish territory, and protecting the lives of the Spanish soldiers without loss of time.

It is equally impossible to grant the request that the Riff men may be allowed to come to trade at Melilla. Such permission, which would be incompatible with the state of war existing with the tribes in question, would seriously endanger the lives of the Moors, in whom the Spanish soldiers see the assassins of their comrades. I must add, nevertheless, that the Spanish Government, adhering to its policy of peace and friendship, repeats what it has stated in its former notes, and urgently requests the Sultan to carry out the stipulations of Article VII of the Treaty of Wad Ras, and is still confident that he will be able to enforce its provisions.

You are authorized to communicate a copy of this despatch to Sidi Mohammed Torres, and to renew to him the assurance of the friendship of the Spanish Government for the Sultan of Morocco, and of their confidence in his loyalty and in his efforts to subdue his rebellious subjects, and to carry out to the letter the provisions of the Treaty of Wad Ras in the manner indicated in your former notes to the Moorish Foreign Office.

Document 117:⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ *Intelligence Division to Foreign Office. Statement of the Spanish forces believed to be at Melilla.*

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward herewith a statement of the Spanish forces believed to be actually present in Melilla under General Martinez Campos.

Inclosure in document 117:⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ *Statement of the Spanish forces believed to be at Melilla.*

“Ordre de Bataille” of Spanish Forces in Melilla,

Original Garrison.

Infantry Regiment of Africa	845
Discipline Battalion.....	445
Section of Cavalry.....	50
Fortress Artillery.....	90
Engineers	70
Total	1,500

Reinforcements.

Infantry of the Line.

2 nd Regiment	Reina.
5 th	Infante.
6 th	Saboya.
9 th	Soria.
10 th	Cordoba.
11 th	San Fernando.
13 th	Mallorca.
15 th	Estremadura.
17 th	Bourbon.
28 th	Luchana.

(147) Confidential 6448, n° 325, Intelligence Division to Foreign Office, 18, Queen Anne's Gate, London, December 4, 1893.

(148) Confidential 6448, n° 325, Intelligence Division to Foreign Office.

29 th Regiment	Constitucion.
34 th	Granada.
35 th	Toledo.
42 nd	Canarias.
47 th	San Quentin.
48 th	Pavia.
50 th	Wad-Ras.
53 rd	Guipuzcoa.
55 th	Asia.
56 th	Alava.

Total-20 infantry regiments, each of 2 battalions = 40 battalions.

Battalions of Cazadores (Rifles)

1 st Battalion.....	Cataluña.
3 rd	Barcelona.
5 th	Tarifa.
6 th	Figueras.
12 th Battalion.....	Segorbe.
17 th	Cuba.
19 th	Puerto Rico.
Total.....	7 battalions.

The strength of battalions, both for Infantry of the Line and Cazadores, is believed to be, on the average, about 350 men. The total infantry available is, therefore-

Original garrison.....	1,290
Reinforcements.....	16,450
Total	17,740

Cavalry.

Regiment of Dragoons (Santiago).....	300
Two squadrons of Lancers (Reina).....	150
Total	450
Original garrison.....	50
Total cavalry	500

Field Artillery.

Four field batteries.....	24 guns.
Four mountain batteries.....	24
Total.....	48

Fortress Artillery.	
Eight companies.....	720
Original garrison.....	90
Total	810
Engineer.	
Six companies.....	600
Original garrison.....	70
Total.....	670

Intelligence Division, War Office, December 4, 1893.

Document 118:⁽¹⁴⁹⁾*Discontent about the inaction at Melilla. The Sultan is expected at Marrakech.*

There is general dissatisfaction in the Madrid press with the present inactivity at Melilla.

The report is that General Martinez Campos, not satisfied with the strategical position of the fort at Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach], intends to erect an unimportant work, merely as an assertion of the right of Spain.

The "Liberal," which is Señor Moret's paper, states that the Minister is pressing for an answer to his demands for reparation, the performance of the Treaty of Wad Ras, the punishment of the ringleaders, and an indemnity, and that it will be considered as a *casus belli* if any of these conditions are not complied with.

The Sultan is expected to arrive at Morocco [Marrakech] on the 10th or 12th.

The Moors round Melilla have been quarrelling among themselves. The continued inaction is causing discontent among the Spanish troops.

Document 119:⁽¹⁵⁰⁾*The Sultan's absence complicates the negotiations. Conversation with Señor Moret.*

The Minister of Foreign Affairs called on me to-day, as I have been unwell, and confirmed generally the contents of my telegram n° 105. He is not expecting war, but begs me to apprise your Lordship that the fact of the Sultan's whereabouts being unknown complicates matters, and is a hindrance to the negotiations, since the instructions received by Muley Araaf [Moualy Arafa] are insufficient.

(149) Confidential 6448, n° 326, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, December 5, 1893.

(150) Confidential 6448, n° 327, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Secret and Confidential), (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, December 5, 1893.

His Excellency places entire confidence in Marshal Martinez Campos. He wishes to thank your Lordship for the language held to M. del Mazo.

Document 120:⁽¹⁵¹⁾ *Conversation with the Spanish Ambassador in London, removing any suspicion of a secret conspiracy between France and England against Spain.*

With reference to my despatch n° 169, Secret, of the 29th ultimo, the Spanish Ambassador read to me this afternoon the following telegram from Señor Moret in reply to my proposals respecting the acquisition by Spain of small amount of territory around Melilla such as would make the fortress there secure:-

“Your letter of the 29th received to-day. I am extremely obliged to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the friendly and confidential communication he has made to your Excellency. Please tell him that I am keeping it for when an opportunity occurs, which I hope will be soon.”

I told M. del Mazo that I wished to notice (“relever”) an observation in Señor Moret’s previous letter, recorded in my despatch to your Excellency n° 169 A. of the 30th ultimo, which seemed to point to a suspicion of an understanding between France and England as against Spain in Morocco. I desired once more to make it clear that what had passed was this: that in August 1892 M. Waddington had come to me to convey the wish of the French Government for a cordial understanding and intercommunication with respect to Morocco, and that I had expressed a perfect readiness to reciprocate this feeling, and had communicated all I had to say on the subject, notably in regard to Sir West Ridgeway’s mission. But in the sixteen months since M. Waddington had made his statement I had received no intimation whatever from the French Government as to what they were doing or contemplating in Morocco. It was consequently clear, even if it were not otherwise self-evident, that there was no understanding of the kind described. I was, however, ready to tell the French Government or anyone else my views to-morrow about Morocco, for we had no designs on that country, and no policy with regard to it which could not be openly declared.

I gathered from M. del Mazo’s manner that he had had some doubt as to whether there was not a secret understanding between ourselves and the French with regard to Moorish affairs, but that, at any rate, this strange suspicion was now removed.

(151) Confidential 6448, n° 329, The Earl of Rosebery to Sir H. Drummond Wolff, (Secret), Foreign Office, December 6, 1893.

Document 121:⁽¹⁵²⁾ *Further reinforcements in Melilla. The Spanish forces reached a total of 18,000 men and 24 generals.*

THERE left here last night for Melilla Generals Chinchilla and Primo de Rivera, with their respective Staffs, a personal escort for General Martinez Campos, composed of 150 Lancers and 50 mounted Civil Guards, and 124 men of the "Constitution" regiment.

According to the Spanish papers, the forces now at Melilla come to 18,000 men, with 24 Generals.

The hospital arrangements are said to be somewhat improved, though not up to the requirements of so many men, and the Engineers are unable to dig trenches for want of implements and tools for certain classes of work."

Document 122:⁽¹⁵³⁾ *Marshal Campos recommends sending forts to Ceuta. A Military Attaché would be a great convenience.*

Marshal Martinez Campos has, I understand, advised the Spanish Government to send a considerable force to Ceuta, by way of making a demonstration, and as the natural base of operations in case of hostilities against the Sultan, being on the high road to Tetuan. The Government are considering these proposals, but no decision has been arrived at.

Consul Finn's telegram referring to an understanding between France and Spain has just arrived.

I am now practically dependent for War Office information on the German Military Attaché; the assistance of an officer would be a great convenience.

Document 123:⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ *Resentment in army at some comments in English press on condition of Spanish force in Melilla.*

An article appears in the "Liberal" newspaper of to-day reporting the desire expressed by the Minister of War that some feat of arms should be performed by the Spanish force at Melilla, and that their advance should proceed as far as may be judged necessary by the Commander-in-chief, who will probably meet with opposition from the Riffs if he carries out his intention of at once marking out the proposed neutral zone.

(152) Confidential 6448, n° 332, Consul Finn to the Earl of Rosebery, Malaga, November 30, 1893.

(153) Confidential 6448, n° 334, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, December 6, 1893.

(154) Confidential 6448, n° 335, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential), (Telegraphic.) P, Madrid, December 7, 1893.

The paragraph proceeds to say that it is suspected by the Government that influence is being brought to bear on the Sultan from some extraneous source to hold back in the negotiations. No such intrusion will be tolerated, though the Government will act with all circumspection.

Resentment has, I understand, been aroused in the army by some comments in English newspapers on the constitution of the expeditionary force, the number of Generals, and other details. Might not something be done to modify this?

I shall see the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, and may accordingly have to telegraph later.

Document 124:⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ *The Spanish government programme. A neutral zone to be occupied by Spain, and hostages to be given by people from the Rif. After construction of fort, the Marshal returns to Spain and negotiations to follow ordinary channels.*

The Government programme in Morocco is as follows:-

A temporary arrangement between Muley Araaf [Moulay Arafat] and the Marshal, a neutral zone to be occupied by the Spanish troops, and hostages to be given by the Moors.

When the fort is constructed, which cannot now be long, the Marshal is to return to Spain, and definitive negotiations through the ordinary diplomatic channels will be entered into with the Sultan.

Document 125:⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ *About the request of H. D. Wolff, the British Ambassador, for a Military Attaché. Is it considered advisable or not?*

I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to state, for the information of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for War, that Her Majesty's Ambassador reports, by telegraph, that he has reason to believe that Marshal Campos has suggested to his Government that a large force should be transferred, by way of demonstration, to Ceuta, which is on the road to Tetuan, and which would be the base of any future operations.

The proposal is still under the consideration of the Spanish Government, as there are difficulties in the way of accommodating troops at Ceuta.

In connection with this question, Sir H. D. Wolff calls attention to the fact that he is solely dependent on the German Military Attaché at Madrid for

(155) Confidential 6448, n° 337, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, December 7, 1893.

(156) Confidential 6448, n° 339, Foreign Office to War Office, (Very Confidential), Foreign Office, December 8, 1893.

intelligence as to matters of military interest, and urges that the present crisis makes it a matter of much importance that he should be provided with the assistance of a British military officer in the capacity of Attaché, in order to facilitate communication with the Spanish War Office, and to enable him to report all military details for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I am to inquire whether the Secretary of State for War would consider it advisable to act upon Sir R. D. Wolff's suggestion.

I am to add that, so far as the Foreign Office is concerned, the interest taken in the Spanish campaign is political, not military.

Document 126:⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ *The meeting with the Sultan's brother is postponed, and Marshal Campos may provoke hostilities to gratify the public feeling. His return to Spain may create difficulties.*

A conference which should have taken place yesterday between the Sultan's brother and Marshal Martinez Campos has been postponed.

In deference to the impatience general among civilians and soldiers, it is possible that the Marshal may endeavour to provoke hostilities and so gratify the national pride. There is a report that he has demanded the surrender of all the arms in the possession of the Riffs, in addition to the conditions laid down by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but the Government is so reticent, and the correspondents on the spot are under such severe restrictions, that nothing definite is known.

Difficulties may arise if the Marshal returns at once, whether dissatisfied or in triumph. These will be complicated by the formidable agitation at present going on against the Commercial Treaties, which the actual Minister of Finance is said to have joined with the Conservatives in organizing.

Document 127:⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ *Fruitless negotiations between the Spanish and the Sultan's brother. The proposal to defer construction of fort is unaccepted by Spain. No answers from the Sultan except to first representations.*

The Spanish Minister, in accordance with instructions received from his Government, has shown to his colleagues a despatch from Señor Moret, announcing that the Spanish Government are unable to accept the proposal of Mulai Arafa, that the construction of the fort of Sidi Guariach [Sidi Ouriach] should be deferred until the Sultan can reach Fez. He is instructed to make a communication in this sense to Cid Mohammed Torres, and to insist upon the

(157) Confidential 6448, n° 340, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential), (Telegraphic) P, Madrid, December 9, 1893.

(158) Confidential 6448, n° 341, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, Tangier, November 29, 1893.

strict observance by the Sultan of Article VII of the Treaty of Wad Ras, by which His Shereefian Majesty is pledged to cause his subjects to respect the territory ceded to Spain by that instrument.

At the same time the despatch reiterates the intention of the Spanish Government to limit their military operations to such as are necessary for asserting the rights of Spain, and not to depart in any degree from their already announced policy of maintaining the *status quo*.

As the resumption by the Spanish forces of the works of construction, and the expulsion of the tribesmen from the inside of the Spanish limits will be at once proceeded with, it is possible that Mulai Arafa may find himself in a dangerous position, and he has therefore been offered a refuge within the walls of Melilla in case of necessity. Should he take advantage of this proposal, added the Spanish Minister, it will be patent to everyone that Spain is acting in accord with the Sultan.

The escort of 400 horsemen, which Mulai Arafa was stated to have had with him on starting from the Sultan's camp, to which others were to have been added on the road, finally turned out to number only sixty when he arrived at Melilla, a force obviously insufficient to secure even his mere personal safety, in case the tribesmen should prove hostile to the Sultan's Envoy. It can only be conjectured that the Sultan conceived the events of the 2nd October to be of no greater significance than those of 1890, when a small detachment of Spanish cavalry engaged in exercises was fired on by tribesmen, and some horses were killed, and the matter was settled by the payment of an indemnity of [? 0,000] dollars, and a salute to the Spanish flag.

Otherwise the proposal to defer any further operations until the Sultan can arrive at Fez, an event to which no date has ever been even proximately assigned, could hardly be regarded as serious.

Up to the present at least no letters have reached Tangier in answer to any but the first representations made by the Spanish Legation, and we have yet to learn whether the more urgent notes dispatched to the Court after the death of General Margallo have aroused in the mind of His Shereefian Majesty any conception of the magnitude of the affair which he has on his hands at Melilla. It is extremely unfortunate that the Sultan should be still so far away that it takes at least twelve days for a courier from Tangier to reach him, and that nothing certain is known of his movements. Over and over again his speedy arrival at Morocco city has been announced as positive, yet he has not yet crossed the Atlas, as far as it is known. Other reports were that he was making his way along the further side of the Atlas back to his

southern capital, and the last rumour that has reached me locates him at a point between Tafilelt and Ain Shair. Under these circumstances I venture to think that the Spanish Government could hardly have been expected to wait for an indefinitely long period before proceeding to take active measures for the expulsion of the Riffians from the territory which they have violated.

Document 128:⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ *Newspaper article reporting the French proposal that Spain should join Russo-French Alliance and share Morocco with France. Proposal rejected.*

I have the honour to transmit, under separate cover, a copy of the “*Correo Español*,” the Carlist organ, containing an article, evidently inspired from French sources, stating that “We have heard on very good authority that :M. Roustan, the French Ambassador in Madrid, presented himself to the Regent and proposed to her, in the name of President Carnot, that Spain should join the Russo-French Alliance, and partition Morocco with France, but that ‘ Doña Cristina’ rejected the proposal.”

Further particulars are promised.

Document 129:⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ *the strength of Spanish forces at Melilla. Article in “Imparcial”.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an article in Wednesday’s “*Imparcial*,” giving the strength of the forces of the army of operation at present in Melilla.

I have forwarded a copy of the article in question to Major-General Chapman, Superintendent of the Intelligence Department, War Office.

Inclosure in document 129:⁽¹⁶¹⁾ *Extract about the subject above from “El Imparcial” of the 6th December, 1893.*

The Army of Operations,

(Translation.)

The forces now believed to be at Melilla according to their organization and the probable strength of the corps are as follows:-

(159) Confidential 6448, n°. 343, Sir H. Drummond Wolf to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential) P, Madrid, December 8, 1893.

(160) Confidential 6448, n°. 344, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, Madrid. December 8, 1893.

(161) Confidential 6448, Inclosure in n°. 344, Extract from “*El Imparcial*” of the 6th December, 1893.

Forces at Head-quarters.	Men
The Regiment of Africa.....	800
Disciplinaires.....	550
Engineers.....	500
Fortress Artillery.....	650
Four Field Batteries.....	500
Santiago Dragoons.....	320
Escort.....	200
Total.....	3,520
Forces of the 1 st Army Corps.	
1 st Division.....	Men.
1 st Brigade.....	1,400
2 nd	1,400
3 rd	1,400
Total.....	4,200
2 nd Division	
1 st Brigade.....	1,400
2 nd	1,120
3 rd	1,400
Total.....	3,920
Two Mountain Batteries.....	240
Total of the 1 st Army Corps.....	8,360
Forces of the 2 nd army Corps.	
1st Division-.....	Men
1 st Brigade.....	1,400
2 nd	1,400
3 rd	1,300
Total.....	4,100
2 nd Division	
1 st Brigade.....	1,400
2 nd	2,420
3 rd	1,400
Total.....	5,200
Two Mountain Batteries.....	240
Total of the 2 nd Army Corps.....	9,540

Aggregate	Men
Forces at Head-quarters	3,520
.....of 1 st Army Corps.....	8,360
.....of 2 nd	9,540
Auxiliaries, Medical, Administration, Police, Company of Marines....	350
Total.....	21,770

The forces in the field amount, therefore, to 21,770 men, 500 horses, and 48 guns. The Generals, according to the established organization, should number twenty-six who, as there are two army corps, four divisions, twelve brigades, may be classified as follows:-

Commander-in-chief.....	1
Chief of the Staff.....	1
Commanders of Special Corps.....	2
Commanders of Army Corps	2
Chiefs of the Staffs of the above menti.....	4
Generals commanding Divisions.....	4
Generals commanding Brigades.....	12
Total.....	26

Besides these, a Sub-Sanitary Inspector and a Paymaster, and Auditor-General are attached to the above.

Document 130:⁽¹⁶²⁾ *Appeal to inhabitants of Porto Rico to assist Spain in Melilla's crisis contains insulting language to Great Britain. Representation made to Governor-General, and his reply is promising satisfaction.*

By reason of the recent events in Melilla, Africa, which have obliged the Spanish Government to send troops to that place in order to exact of the Moors a reparation for the insult offered to her flag, there have been published in this island various appeals to the inhabitants to aid the mother country in her enterprise; among others, the one addressed to the people of Inyaguez, which I have the honour to inclose, accompanied by a translation.

As your Lordship will perceive, it contains an attack on Great Britain, and as the first signature at its foot, Miguel Pons, is that of the Mayor of Mayaüez, I have deemed it my duty to bring it to the notice of his Excellency the Governor-General of this island, protesting against the publication. A copy of my communication to his Excellency is herewith inclosed.

(162) Confidential 6448, n°. 346, Acting Consul Latimer to the Earl of Rosebery, Porto Rico, November 16, 1893.

On the 12th his Excellency replied by sending to this Consulate his Excellency the General 2^o Cabo to express his regrets at the publication, stating that, had the signers all been unofficial persons, it would not have been in his power to give any satisfaction, as the liberty of the press is such that he could not have prevented it, but that as the Mayor was one of the subscribers, he would call him to account. His Excellency further inquired whether I desired to have the Governor-General's reply in writing, which he promised should be done on my answering in the affirmative, and have received it to-day, I have the honour to inclose herewith copy with translation.

Telegrams received on the 13th instant by steamer from Cuba state that it has been necessary to guard Her Majesty's Embassy at Madrid, and that your Lordship has given the Spanish Government assurances of England's neutrality in the settlement of the affairs of Morocco.

Trusting that my action may meet with your Lordship's approval, I have, &c.

Inclosure in document 130: ⁽¹⁶³⁾ *Printed Sheet with details concerning the above appeal.*

(Translation.)

To the Inhabitants of Mayagliez.

The fiercest Kabyles of Moordom, the fanatic Riffs, have bespattered the face of our country with the glorious blood of the brave Spanish Chief, the unconquered General Margallo.

By the side of the hero, and under the weight of the sharp Morocco cutlasses, have also fallen a great many other worthy compatriots.

Great is the calamity and great the sorrow, but it matters not.

The sons of the illustrious and brave nation which in all ages of history have known how to shed their blood in defence of their honour have not degenerated, no, by God, even in this century of miserable positivism and general corruption. Peacefully may our generous forefathers rest in their venerated tombs, in the security that their posterity will neither dishonour them with a cowardice which they have never known, nor with mercenary avarice, for which there is no place in patriotic breasts.

A nation as hypocritical as she is wily, and more false than brave, which, though she helped us one day to combat the Colossus of the Seine, has for two centuries kept our faces purple with shame by a foreign Gibraltar, no doubt

(163) Confidential 6448, Inclosure 1 in n^o. 346, Printed Sheet without date.

encourages the deeds of those African hordes, more fierce each day in their hatred to the Spaniard.

most powerful are the enemies which we have before us, and if to the savage rage of the audacious votary of Mahommed is added the gold and cunning of the cold and calculating son of the misty Albion, severe shall be the struggle, obstinate the strife.

That so great an enterprise will not terrify us it is needless to declare. Spain never counted her enemies nor reckoned dangers. It is necessary to conquer ... and we shall conquer.

Spanish Americans! Our country is in the throes of affliction, and prepares in a body to chastise those who have provoked her with blood. Let not one of us be wanting at his post of honour, to aid in proportion to his strength. Since the distance prevents us running to the help of our brothers, and shedding gloriously our blood, and, if need be, dying with them around our country's standard, let us at least contribute with the most fervent enthusiasm from our stores. Let us endeavour that the great essential in modern warfare shall not be wanting-gold

[Here follow the resolutions adopted for raising funds, with signatures at foot]

Document 131:⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ *Reported proposal by Marshal Campos could probably not be accepted without reference to the Sultan.*

With reference to your Lordship's telegram n° 41, it appears unlikely, from what Cid Mohammed Torres says, that the Sultan's brother, Mulai Arafa, has any power beyond arranging for the construction of the fort and the pacification of the tribes. The proposals which are reported as having been made by Marshal Martinez Campos, namely, the occupation of neutral ground, the giving of hostages, the evacuation of the ringleaders or surrender of rifles, could probably not be accepted until the Sultan, who has not yet arrived at Morocco city, has been referred to.

Document 132:⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ *Activity of the Duke of Tetuan. Demands of Spain are such that their executions are difficult. The history of the fort Sidi Ouriach.*

Some days before the departure from Barcelona of Marshal Martinez Campos, the Duke of Tetuan had gone to visit that city. He is a great personal

(164) Confidential 6448, n° 347, Mr. Satow to the Earl of Rosebery, (Telegraphic) P, Tangier, December 12, 1893.

(165) Confidential 6448, 348, Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Earl of Rosebery, (Confidential), Madrid, December 10, 1893.

friend and an old comrade of the Marshal, It was said that the object of his journey was twofold:-

1. To organize an agitation in Catalonia against the Commercial Treaties.

2. To profit by the unpopularity of the proceedings at Melilla to persuade the Marshal to head a demonstration, and to induce, or it may almost be said to coerce, the Queen-Regent to dismiss the present Government, and to confide to the Marshal the formation of a “Ministère d’Affaires.”

The state of the country would not have admitted of a Conservative Administration without an election, which was impossible.

It was thought, however, that a Cabinet formed by Martinez Campos would be strongly impregnated with an opposition element, and that the Duke of Tetuan might have been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. In short, it was known that the Marshal intended to come to Madrid, partly to take part in the discussion of the operations in Morocco, with which he was not satisfied; partly on account of the nervousness of his wife and daughter since the dynamite explosions, which were followed at constant intervals by letters threatening a repetition of the outrage,

Señor Sagasta, as I have already informed your Lordship, dexterously turned these circumstances to the advantage of the Government, and Marshal Martinez Campos, on his arrival at the capital, found himself already named Generalissimo in Morocco.

According to public rumour, the activity of the Duke of Tetuan has not yet given way. He and his friends are carrying on very serious agitation against the Commercial Treaties, and pressures is said to have been brought to bear on the Marshal so to complicate his demands on Muley Arraf [Moulay Arafa] as to render unlikely a peaceful conclusion, even of the preliminary local agreement.

If such be the case, and I cannot give any authority for It but the inferences of the press and of others who are more or less behind the scenes of Spanish politics, matters may become dangerously complicated.

In the unconfirmed reports from Melilla, it is stated that the Marshal has inserted an additional condition in his demands for the preliminary Agreement, that of the surrender of the arms in the hands of the Riffs. If this be true, no doubt resistance will be strengthened.

But the demands of the Government as they stand are of considerable stringency. The Spanish Government exact that not only shall the neutral zone

be evacuated by the Moors, but that it shall be occupied by Spanish troops. This is plausible, if practical, as it merely asks for the fulfilment of Article V of the Treaty of Tetuan (the 26th May, 1860, see State Papers, vol. LI, p. 930). But the execution of such a requirement is not easy.

Ever since the Treaty was signed, the Moors have been allowed, not only to encamp, but to build on the neutral zone.

Even a mosque has been erected, and all this has been done with the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities at Melilla.

The immediate occupation of the neutral zone may therefore mean the destruction of the homes of the Moors, and this at a time of year when the cold, as represented by certain Spanish correspondents, is merciless.

The whole history of the fort at Sidi Gurriax [Sidi Ouriach], as it gradually oozes out, is curious. At the signature of the Treaty in 1860, a plan was made of the projected fort, and an annual vote has since been taken for its construction.

This money was either not drawn, or was applied to other purposes. In the recent reorganization of the military commands, Melilla was taken away from the Captaincy General of Andalusia, and constituted apart. The papers were then transferred from the office at Granada, and sent to General Margallo. That officer, on seeing the bundle, telegraphed to ask General Lopez Dominguez whether or not he should begin the works. The intermediate history was thus ignored, and a commencement was made of the work, which was both aggressive and useless.

The present sufferer from political agitation is Señor Moret, who, as Minister of State, is credited with an overstrained desire for peace, and with a want of patriotism in his advocacy of the Commercial Treaties, the latter charge being aggravated by his occupation of the post of Minister of Fomento, which includes the Commercial Administration.

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ملخص: وثائق بريطانية في موضوع الحرب المغربية الإسبانية بمليلية (1893-1894)، القسم الأول.

يتكون هذا القسم الأول من الملف الوثائقي الذي استقيناه محتوياته من الأرشيف البريطاني المحفوظ بالأرشيف الوطني في لندن، من 132 وثيقة تاريخية تجمع بين المراسلات والتقارير الدبلوماسية، والبرقيات، إلى جانب بعض الملحقات أو المقتطفات الصحافية، وغيرها من التقارير العسكرية، التي تتناول جميعها موضوع المواجهة العسكرية التي جرت أطوارها عند مشارف مليلية الواقعة في قبضة الاحتلال الإسباني، بين الجيش الإسباني ومجموعات من قبائل الريف المجاورة. وتسلط هذه الوثائق الضوء على الظروف الإقليمية والدولية التي جرت فيها هذه المواجهة، كما تعطينا فكرة عن الطريقة التي تعامل بها المخزن بوسائله البسيطة مع هذا الحدث الشائك في آخر سنوات حكم المولى الحسن.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الدبلوماسية؛ الريف، القبيلة؛ السلطان؛ مليلية؛ سيدي

ورياش.

Résumé: Documents britanniques sur la guerre hispano-marocaine à Melilla, (1892-1894), 1^{ère} partie.

Il s'agit de la première partie d'une série de documents britanniques relatifs au conflit militaire qui a opposé en 1893 les militaires espagnols à quelques membres des tribus riffaines aux environs de Melilla, sous occupation espagnole, sans l'assentiment du gouvernement central marocain. Ce corpus de 132 documents publiés dans leurs langues originales font partie de la série de documents intitulée Confidential Prints, qui ont été imprimés pour les usages exclusifs du personnel du Foreign Office, et sont toujours conservés aux Archives Nationales à Londres (Kew). Ils se constituent de correspondances diplomatiques variées, de rapports militaires et d'autres types de documents et coupures de presse de l'époque portant sur cette confrontation militaire. Ces échantillons de documents permettent de faire la lumière sur les circonstances régionales et internationales dans lesquelles cette confrontation a eu lieu, et nous donnent une idée des méthodes adoptées par le Makhzen et son appareil administratif modeste, pendant les dernières années du règne du Sultan Mawlay al-Hassan, pour faire face à un évènement si crucial et d'une telle ampleur.

Mots-clés: diplomatie; Rif; tribu; Sultan; Melilla; Sidi Ouriach.

Abstract: British Documents on the Spanish Moroccan War in Melilla, (1892-1894), Part I.

This is the first part of samples of British documents relating to the military conflict which took place at Melilla in 1893 between Spanish militaries and some Moroccan tribesmen from the Rif region in the north of Morocco without the consent of the central government. These 132 documents are part of the Confidential Prints series preserved at the National Archives in London (Kew), and they consists of diplomatic correspondences, military reports and other types of documents dealing with this military confrontation. These documents shed light on the regional and international circumstances in which this military confrontation took place, and give us an idea of the ways the Makhzen faced, by using his traditional and modest administratif means, this crucial and very sensitif event in the last years of Sultan Mawla al-Hassan's reign.

Keywords: diplomacy; Rif; tribe; Sultan; Melilla; Sidi Ouriach.

Resumen: Documentos británicos sobre la guerra hispano-marroquí en Melilla, (1892-1894). Primera parte.

Se trata de la primera parte de una serie de documentos relacionados con el conflicto militar que opuso, en 1893, a los militares españoles con algunos miembros de las tribus rifeñas asentadas en torno a Melilla, bajo ocupación española, y sin el consentimiento del gobierno central marroquí. Estos 132 documentos, publicados en su idioma de origen, forman parte de una serie de documentos titulados Confidential Prints, que fueron imprimidos para el uso exclusivo del Foreign Office, y se conservan en los Archivos Nacionales en Londres (Kew). Están compuestos de varias correspondencias diplomáticas, de informes militares y de otros tipos de documentos y recortes de prensa de la época, dedicados esencialmente a esta confrontación militar. La muestra en cuestión arroja luz sobre las circunstancias regionales e internacionales en los que este enfrentamiento se llevó a cabo, y nos da una idea de los métodos adoptados por el Majzen marroquí y su modesto aparato administrativo durante los últimos años del reinado del sultán Mawlay al-Hassan, para hacer frente a un evento tan importante y de tanta magnitud.

Palabras clave: diplomacy; Rif; tribe; Sultan; Melilla, Sidi Ouriach.